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Abstract 
Standard economic models explain decision making under risk as a utility maximization 
process. Developments in cognitive psychology and neuroeconomics showed the volatility of such 
conceptualization highlighting human bounded rationality and discussing the role of decision 
maker’s affective state (basic reactions to any emotionally charged event) in cognitive evaluation of 
risk (risk as feeling). In particular, an affective-based evaluation of choice options may determine 
whether decision maker’s behavior will be risk averse or risk seeking. Evidence indicates that 
affective reactions carry over significant information about the goodness of certain choice options 
directly influencing risk taking behavior. Affective influences on decisions may be directly 
associated with the evaluation of the choice options and the anticipation of future outcomes  
(integral affect) or may be associated with stimuli or event unrelated to the decision at hand, for 
example contextual factors or environmental cues (incidental affect). A classic advertisement 
strategy, such as a smiling face presented in association with a good, is an example of contextual 
affective manipulation. Research shows that experiencing a positive affective state may lead to risk 
aversion behavior while negative affect may lead to risk seeking. However, previous studies mostly 
adopted a valence-based approach to the study of affect ignoring its multidimensional nature. In 
particular, the role of arousal has been largely neglected. Recent studies showed that emotional 
states with the same valence may have opposite consequences on risk taking. Therefore, the main 
purpose of the series of studies described in this dissertation was to investigate the effect of 
inducing incidental affective states at high and low levels of negative arousal or positive arousal on 
preferences for monetary options varying in risk. Research shows that elevated arousal is associated 
with cognitive depletion, increased sensitivity to rewards, immediate gratification, less resistance to 
temptation. Therefore, we hypothesized that affective states characterized by high levels of arousal 
might increase preferences for the riskier option. We further predicted that including arousing 
stimuli as contextual factor of a decision scenario would capture individual attention interfering 
with information processing of risk. In order to achieve this goal, in a first series of experiments we 
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asked participants to make choices between couples of two-outcomes lotteries with the same 
expected value but different risk. Arousal was manipulated by presenting participants with visual 
stimuli (IAPS pictures) varying in the level of arousal (high or low) keeping the valence unvaried 
(negative or positive). By adopting the technique of contextual priming, participants were 
simultaneously exposed to stimuli (the lotteries) and the contextual factor (the arousing/unarousing 
image). An effect of arousal on predicting risky choice was found. Probability of selecting the 
riskier lottery was higher when an arousing stimuli (unpleasant or pleasant) was included as part of 
the decision context. In some cases, positive arousal was found to interact with gender: risk taking 
was higher in males than females when a pleasant arousing cue was presented. In a second series of 
studies, participants performed the same task and, by using an eye tracker, eye fixations and looking 
times were recorded. The predicted effect of arousal on attention was found. Participants spent more 
time looking at the arousing image (unpleasant or pleasant). This result is in line with arousal 
theories which correlate the level of arousal to attention allocated to the arousing stimuli. 
Furthermore, participants seemed to process less risky information (as indicated by decreased 
looking times toward the riskier option) when the arousing stimuli was contextually presented, as 
opposed to when the unarousing stimuli was presented.    
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When someone makes a decision, 
 he is really diving into a strong current  
that will carry him to places he had never dreamed of  
when he first made the decision. 
Paul Coelho  
15 
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CHAPTER 1 
Affect and Decision Making 
1.1 Definition of emotions and affective state 
Before discussing the influences of emotional states on decision making process we need to 
consider an important and controversial issue concerning how to define emotions and affective 
reactions. Despite the fact that the scientific interest in the study of emotions has a long tradition in 
psychology (Zajonc, 1988), there is very little consensus among scientists on how to define emotion 
and what the structure of emotion should be. The reason of such turmoil is the concept of emotion 
itself. ‘Emotion’ is mostly a convenient label used to describe certain aspects of the brain and mind 
(LeDoux, 1996).  The term is used to include a variety of situations such as the euphoria of passing 
an exam, a brief startle at an unexpected scary scene while watching a movie, feeling down in the 
dumps for no known reason, coping with a loss for a long period, lifelong love with one’s 
significant other, an interest in a news and so on and so forth. It is evident that there is a wild range 
of different situations where one can experience an ‘emotion’. In the early 1884, William James 
published a work titled What is an Emotion? where he argued that the exposure to a stimulus 
(mental or real) is always accompanied to physical reactions (e.g. changing in the cardiovascular 
activity) and that the feeling of such physical changes is emotion. According to James’ theory, 
people experience various emotions because they experience various physical reactions. 
Conversely, others believed that physical reactions are the same regardless the experienced 
emotional state (Cannon, 1929) and that what we call emotion is the result of a cognitive evaluation 
of the current situation (Arnold,1960; Schachter & Singer, 1962). The proliferation of  numerous 
theories of emotions makes it difficult to establish what is an emotion and what is not and  the 
experts are still far from achieving an agreement on this topic. As noted by the examples listed 
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above, emotion includes a too broad class of events to be attributed to a single specific category or 
definition. However a clarification is necessary, at least at a theoretical and empirical level.  
Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999) made a clear distinction between prototypical emotional 
episodes and core affects. Prototypical emotional episodes are often thought as discrete emotional 
categories (e.g. happiness, love, fear, anger, etc.) which stem from the common vision  of emotion 
that most people has and that is also reflected in the use of verbal self-report scales by the 
researchers. The peculiarity of a prototypical emotional episode is that it is typically about 
something: i.e. a person, a condition, a thing (real or imagined) at which a mental state is directed. 
Following the definition provided by Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999) a prototypical emotional 
episode is a set of interrelated subevents concerned with a specific object (p. 806). One is in love 
with, is afraid of, is angry with, so that the emotion is always directed toward an object. Prototypical 
emotional episodes involve high-level processing and cognitive appraisal (Roseman et al., 1990); a 
specific facial expression (Ekman, 1984); a pattern of physiological reactions due to the autonomic 
nervous system activity (Ekman et al., 1983);  behavioral response or action tendency (Frijda, 
1986); neural responses that underlie the emotional episode (Panksepp, 1982). Therefore, as pointed 
out by Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987), an emotion elicited by the presence of an object (real or 
imagined) should be considered as a complex event. Instead, there are other simpler emotional 
processes which could be free of objects and of that high-level processing characterizing the 
prototypical emotional episodes. Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999) used the term core affect to 
describe the most elementary consciously accessible affective feelings (and their neurophysiological 
counterparts) that need not to be directed at anything (p. 806). A core affect is the most basic 
reaction to any emotionally charged event. It is caused and affected by many internal and external 
forces like specific events, environmental cues (e.g. odors, noise, contextual cues), the weather or 
diurnal cycles, and so on. It represents the most primitive part of what characterize an emotion (the 
raw feeling). Examples of core affect, or simply affect (Watson & Tellegen, 1985), are sense of 
pleasure or displeasure, tension or relax, depression or elation (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999). A 
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person always has a core affect: at any point in time one can infer and provide information about 
his/her current affective state. For example, feeling cheerful or tense for no evident reason, feeling 
joy or sadness from listening to music, feeling good from playing a sport, feeling mournful on a 
rainy day, feeling relaxed while having drinks with friends after an hardworking day, and so forth. 
As proposed by Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999), affect has a dimensional structure since it can 
be described as variations along two independent dimensions: i.e. degree of pleasantness (valence) 
and degree of activation (arousal). As it will be explained in more detail later, all possible 
combination of different levels of those two dimensions can occur so as to make distinct states that 
are not emotion per se, but can provide a descriptive information about core affect at any point in 
time (i.e. the affective state) (see section 1.5 of this dissertation). Even though affect is an object-
free feeling, it could be directed toward a salient stimulus, as it becomes part of a prototypical 
emotional episode. For this reason, affect can also be seen as the elemental feeling included within 
the prototypical emotional episode (e.g. the activated pleasure within an episode of full joy). Affect 
and prototypical emotional episodes are related, partially overlapping, but far from identical. Affect 
is at the heart of an emotional episode and any prototypical emotional episode actually starts with a 
change in individual affective state in response to stimuli/events, but then it develops into a more 
complex process once high-level processing and cognitive structures are involved (Russell & 
Feldman Barrett 1999). 
Summing up, at the heart of emotional episodes and any emotionally charged event there are 
affective states experienced as variation of pleasantness and activation. These states, called core 
affect (from now on affect), influence cognition and behavior and are influenced by many internal 
or external forces. Affect can be experienced as an object-free feeling or it can be related to a 
specific cause beginning a prototypical emotional episode which involves more complex high-level 
cognitive processing. 
 After clarifying similarities and differences between affect and prototypical emotional 
episode as they have been theorized by Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999), I will focus on the 
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influences of affect on decision making. In the following section I will explain how the 
investigation on affect and emotion became salient in the study of the decisional processes (section 
1.2) and what kind of affective reactions are involved when one is faced with a decision to be made 
(section 1.3). I will present evidence about the role of affect, especially positive and negative affect, 
on risk-taking behavior (section 1.4). Then, I will continue presenting the dimensional approach to 
affect as it has been proposed by Russell (1980) and Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999) (section 
1.5). 
1.2 Influences of affect on decision making process 
Until recently researchers neglected the role of affect and emotions on decisions. For centuries 
the dominant economic model used for explaining decision making was the Expected Utility theory 
(EU) developed by Daniel Bernoulli (1738), a measure of satisfaction associated with the goodness 
of certain choice options. According to EU theory, decision making is an essentially consequential 
cognitive activity and the decision maker is assumed to be a fully rational individual able to select, 
dispassionately and by following a small set of axioms, the option which maximizes his/her 
expected utility. An important determinant of the overall utility of a given choice option is the 
probability that the option has to occur. For example, consider a decision maker faced with a choice 
between two alternatives with equivalent expected value
1: e.g. a sure payoff of €10 versus a gamble 
which offers a 10% probability to win €10, otherwise €0. In such a situation, the decision maker 
should prefer the sure option in order to maximize the expected utility. In mathematical terms, 
considering a gamble which offers pi probability of receiving the outcome xi, the expected utility of 
the gamble will result in the following expression: 
∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑢(𝑥𝑖)
𝑖
 
where u(xi) is the utility of receiving the outcome xi. 
                                                          
1
 The expected value E(x) of a random variable x (or a course of action) is given by the sum of all possible xi values 
weighted for the pi probability of each value to occur. In mathematical terms: 𝐸(𝑥) =  ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑖  
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 A new reexamination of EU theory was provided by Savage (1954) with the Subjective 
Expected Utility (SEU) theory. In this account, the decision maker will select the option which 
maximizes the expected utility, as predicted by the classical EU model, but instead of considering 
the objective probability of each choice option, he/she will consider his/her belief about its 
occurrence. Beliefs are differentiated from objective probabilities since they reflect the subjective 
degree of confidence that a specific outcome will be obtained and they are governed by Bayesian 
principles. Therefore, SEU theory (Savage, 1954) is the first normative model which explains 
choices (and risk taking) as guided by a purely subjective component and still remains, among 
economists, one of the widely-accepted normative approaches to optimal choice. Nevertheless, it 
follows the same conjectures of the EU theory assuming that the decision maker acts consistently 
with the normative rule of maximizing utility.   
 Empirical research showed some inconsistencies with the normative economic models in 
predicting choice behavior and many of these anomalies could be attributed to the unrealistic 
assumption that decision makers are coherent and stable while making decisions (Rick & 
Lowenstein, 2008). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) discussed one of the most relevant anomalies in 
risky choice called prospect theory. The authors showed how actual choices are often inconsistent 
with EU theory. When faced with a choice between a sure payoff of €3000 and an 80% chance to 
win €4000, people often prefer the sure win, but when faced with a choice between a sure loss of 
€3000 and an 80% chance to lose €4000, people often prefer the gamble over the sure loss. This is 
called the reflection effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and indicates that people are more risk 
seeking in the loss domain while they are more risk averse in the gain domain. Such evidence is 
definitely inconsistent with the normative theory of choice. 
 Considering that people do not have a preconceived system of preferences, and that these 
may change depending on the individual or the context in which the decision takes place, Simon 
(1987) proposed to replace the classical notion of economic rationality with the concept of bounded 
rationality. Many economists and psychologists agree with this claim which assumes that mental 
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representation of a choice prospect are not void of bias due to the effect heuristics which can 
influence the more rational part of the decision making process (Langer, 1975; Johnson & Tversky, 
1983; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). More important, many of these biases can be explained taking 
into account affective reactions that occur while making a decision. 
Decision affect theory and subjective expected pleasure  
Mellers et al. (1997) developed an emotion-based theory of choice by examining how 
people feel about monetary outcomes of gambles. Participants were presented with some gambles 
one at a time and they were informed about how much they won or lost. They were also asked to 
report their feelings about the obtained outcome. It was found that pleasure increased with the 
amount of the win, and displeasure increased with the amount of the loss. In addition, pleasure 
increased when the unobtained outcome was worse than the obtained one. Both wins and losses 
were more enjoyable of a large loss was avoided. Unexpected wins were more pleasurable than 
expected wins and losses were more painful than expected losses. Mellers et al. (1997) formalized 
the decision affect theory. To illustrate the theory, consider a gamble with the outcomes A and B. 
Imagine that the gamble is played and outcome A occurs. Decision affect theory predicts the 
affective response to the outcome A (RA) as follows: 
𝑅𝐴 = 𝐽𝑅[𝑢𝐴 + 𝑑(𝑢𝐴 − 𝑢𝐵)(1 − 𝑠𝐴)], (1) 
where JR is a linear response function; uA and uB are the utilities of the outcome A and B 
respectively; d is the so called disappointment function (Loomes & Sugden, 1986) based on the 
difference between the utilities of the two outcomes A and B; and sA is the subjective probability 
(belief) of outcome A to occur. Mellers et al. (1997) extended the decision affect theory to the case 
in which an individual is faced with a choice between two gambles and a complete feedback is 
provided. To illustrate the case consider a choice between gamble 1, with the outcomes A and B, 
and gamble 2 with the outcomes C and D. Imagine that gamble 1 is chosen and outcome A occurs 
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and that gamble 2’s outcome is C. The affective response to outcome A, when gamble 2’s outcome 
is C (RA(C)), is 
𝑅𝐴(𝐶) = 𝐽𝑅[𝑢𝐴 + 𝑑(𝑢𝐴 − 𝑢𝐵)(1 − 𝑠𝐴) + 𝑟(𝑢𝐴 − 𝑢𝐶)(1 − 𝑠𝐴𝑠𝐶)]. (2) 
Equation 2 is similar to Equation 1, but it also includes r, that represents a regret function (Loomes 
& Sudgen, 1982). The regret function is based on the difference between uA and uC, while sAsC is the 
subjective probability of the joint outcomes A and C to occur. Therefore, the impact of regret 
depends on the occurrence of both outcome A and outcome C.  
 As a further development of the decision affect theory, Mellers and colleagues (1997) also 
formalized an emotional theory of risky choice called Subjective Expected Pleasure (SEP) theory, 
according to which preferences for risky options are related to the anticipated pleasure of the 
consequences that will occur right after the decision is made, so that the decision maker will choose 
the option that maximizes the expected pleasure. For example, consider a decision maker who is 
choosing between two gambles with the possible outcomes A and B (gamble 1) or the outcomes C 
and D (gamble 2). According to SEP theory, the decision maker first assesses the overall anticipated 
pleasure for gamble 1as follows: 
𝑠𝐴𝑅𝐴 + 𝑠𝐵𝑅𝐵 (3) 
where sA and sB are subjective probabilities of outcomes A and B, and RA and RB correspond to the 
anticipated pleasure related to the outcomes A and B respectively. The same predictions are also 
made for the outcomes C and D for gamble 2, so that the subjective expected pleasure associated 
with gamble 2 is 
𝑠𝐶𝑅𝐶 + 𝑠𝐷𝑅𝐷. (4) 
Whether the value resulting from Equation 3 is greater than those resulting from Equation 4, gamble 
1 is chosen over gamble 2. In this way, risky choices are contemplated after evaluating the 
anticipated affect that would occur  if a specific outcome will be obtained. In particular, individuals 
who anticipate greater pleasure with good outcomes or less pain with bad outcomes are expected to 
exhibit greater risky preferences. Conversely, those individuals who anticipate greater pain with bad 
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outcomes or less pleasure with good outcomes are expected to be more risk averse (see also 
Mellers, 2000).  
Theorizations made by Mellers and colleagues (see Mellers, 2000; Mellers et al., 1997; 
Mellers et al., 1999) take into account only one category of affective reactions that has impact on 
the decisional process, that is anticipated emotions: i.e. affective reactions arising from thinking 
about the future consequences of a decision. Later in this paragraph I will present all affective 
influences involved in shaping decisions, especially focusing on those unrelated to the decision to 
be made (the so called incidental affect, object of the current thesis project). However, such 
theorization represents one of the first tentative of incorporating affect in models of decision 
making. 
Affective decisions 
Contemporary decision research is now characterized by an increased interest in the role of 
affect and emotions on decision making. Slovic et al. (2007) used the expression affect heuristic to 
specify that individuals rely on their feelings while making decisions. As proposed by Zajonc 
(1980) and LeDoux (1996), affective reactions are the very first impressions which occur 
automatically to guide the following information processing and elaboration of stimuli and that 
subsequently will orient action planning and decision making. This statement is consistent with the 
definition of affect provided by Russell & Feldman Barrett (1999). As explained in the previous 
section of this dissertation, most of the time affective reactions (also those related to a choice option 
or a risky stimulus) are not mediated by any cognitive evaluation, which will occur later at a 
subsequent stage of the decision making process. LeDoux (1996) provided interesting neurological 
foundations for such effects. At a subcortical level there are direct connections from the sensory 
thalamus, which processes stimuli only for their elementary physical features, to the amygdala, a 
limbic region which plays a critical role in the processing of affective information related to stimuli. 
This neural pathway overrides the cerebral cortex, so that the information processing is not 
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mediated by a deeper cognitive elaboration. This would result in an affective reaction elicited by a 
raw, quick and automatic representation of the stimuli (e.g. the choice options) that do not involve 
the upper processing systems of the brain that are implicated in thinking and analytical reasoning.  
Soon, many decisional researchers started to hypothesize that both cognitive and affective 
components may influence decision making process as well as risk perception and risk taking 
behavior (e.g. Damasio, 1994; Lowenstein, 2000; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Nevertheless, the affect 
heuristic is not able to depict the kind of interrelations that actually occur among the two 
dimensions (cognitive and affective). Loewenstein and colleagues (2001) provided a thorough 
explanation for this blank developing the risk as feeling hypothesis.  In this view, affective states 
(not cortically mediated) exert a reciprocal influence on cognitive evaluation of risk (based on 
subjective probability estimation and desirability of consequences). In addition, affective reactions 
are elicited by a variety of factors, such as anticipated feelings about the occurrence of an outcome, 
but also decision maker’s current mood that is not part of the cognitive evaluation and which 
respond to probabilities and choice options (e.g. monetary values) differently from the way in which 
the same elements are evaluated by the cognitive system. Therefore, the behavioral response (the 
decision) to a risky situation is determined by an interplay of both cognitive and affective responses 
but the evaluation of the same risk (or decisional prospect) may diverge among the two systems. 
Lo and Repin (2002), in a behavioral finance study, measured real-time affective responses 
of professional financial securities traders in a naturalistic setting. Psychophysiological reactions 
(i.e. skin conductance, blood volume pulse, heart rate and other autonomic parameters) were 
recorded during live treading sessions while simultaneously capturing changes in market stocks. 
Findings from this study suggest that affective response is a determinant factor in processing real-
time financial risk. In particular, Lo and Repin (2002) found statistically significant differences in 
mean electrodermal activity and in cardiovascular variables during periods of heightened market 
events volatility compared with no-event control baselines. Authors explain these results suggesting 
that a cognitive-emotional interaction is involved in the genesis of intuitive judgments characterized 
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by low cognitive control, low consciousness awareness and rapid processing of information guided 
by emotional mechanisms, as suggested by both risk as feeling hypothesis (Loewenstein et al.,  
2001) and affect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2007). 
In summary, evidence show strong influences of affective state on decision making process 
which may guide also individual risk preferences. In particular, when considering a decisional 
scenario, preferences for choice options are thought to be driven by two kinds of information: a 
cognitive-type information linked to the value of the outcomes and beliefs about their occurrence, 
and several affective-type information linked to the anticipation of the outcomes, to the act of 
making a decision itself and to other internal or external elements, such as feelings or contextual 
cues, which may trigger further affective reactions (e.g. Kahneman, 2011; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; 
Mellers et al., 1999). The combination of such influences will determine how the decision maker 
places the utility of a specific choice option, as well as his/her risk perception, so that affect results 
to be a powerful mediator between cognitive evaluation of risk and decision maker’s behavioral 
response. 
Neuroeconomics evidence  
The influence of affective states on decision making and risk taking behavior is also 
informed by neuroeconomics studies (e.g. Schonberg et al., 2011). Many researchers agree with the 
assumption that two important brain systems account for motivations which underlie diverse 
affective states: the reward approach (or appetitive) system and the loss avoidance (or defensive) 
system (e.g. Lang et al., 1990). These neural systems are evolutionary old and have evolved to 
mediate behaviors that protects and sustain life and even risk preferences are thought to be related 
to their activity. Specifically, risk taking behavior could be linked to the activation of the reward 
approach system whereas risk avoidance would be ascribable to the activation of the loss avoidance 
system (e.g. Peterson, 2007). Both systems are implemented by neural circuits in the brain which 
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have projections to the centers for autonomic regulation and systems which control attention and 
motor planning (e.g. Davis, 2000; Davis & Lang, 2003). 
The reward system is active when a potential reward or a stimulus present in the 
environment is evaluated as potentially appetitive or pleasing, so that it motivates the tendency to 
approach towards it. The neurotransmitter that regulates the activity of the brain areas of the reward 
system is dopamine which is associated to reward evaluation and well-being. Indeed, this neural 
network lies along the dopamine mesolimbic pathways which involves the ventral tegmental area 
(Vta), nucleus accumbens (Nacc) and ends at cortical level in the medial prefrontal cortex (Mpfc) 
(Bozarth, 1994; Knutson et al., 2001a). Knutson et al. (2005) found that Nacc activation is 
proportional to the anticipated gain magnitude while Mpfc responds better to anticipated gain 
probability, so that mesolimbic pathway is organized as to provide an accurate evaluation of 
expected value which includes also the affective components computes. Additionally, the activity of 
the reward system has been found to correlate with participants’ self-reported levels of positive 
affect (Knutson et al., 2001b). 
On the other hand, the loss avoidance system is mostly related to the subjective experience 
of anxiety and the neurotransmitter which modulates its activity is serotonin. It involves mostly 
regions of the limbic system including the amygdala and anterior insula. Paulus and colleagues 
(2003), in an fMRI study, hypothesized that the degree of risk taking correlates with the degree of 
activation in the insular region founding that right insula was significantly more activated when a 
risky option was selected and that the degree of insula activation was related to the probability of 
selecting a safe option after a negative outcome was obtained.  In addition, insula activation was 
related to the participants’ degree of harm avoidance and neuroticism as measured through 
personality questionnaires.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that both the reward system and the loss avoidance 
system are remarkably implicated in the genesis of the emotional response which guides risk taking 
27 
 
and risk aversive behavior respectively. In particular, among the reward approach system, Nacc 
seems to precede a risk response (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005). 
After briefly presented evidence from neuroscience studies, in the following section I will 
describe different kinds of affective reactions that are commonly thought to influence decision 
making process as well as risk taking behavior. 
1.3 Affective influences on decision making process 
So far, I presented studies showing that affective state is an important variable that should be 
taken into account while making predictions about one’s choice behavior, especially under 
conditions of risk or uncertainty. When considering a typical decision making scenario we can 
recognize different kinds of affective reactions and each of them could have specific influences on 
choice. 
The first distinction is kind of temporal: we distinguish between pre-decisional affect and post-
decisional affect (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Pre-decisional affect includes affective reactions that 
influence the decision before it is actually made. Anticipatory influences, anticipated influences and 
current mood (or background mood) are part of this group. Post-decisional affect, on the other hand, 
includes experienced affect: i.e. affective states experienced when the outcome of the decision is 
finally known. A second major distinction is the one between integral affect and incidental affect  
(Loewenstein et al., 2001; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Integral affect consists of affective 
influences that are strictly related to the decision at hand. They are elicited by the act itself of 
making a choice (e.g. imagining future consequences about a choice; thinking about future feelings 
that might be triggered out when the choice outcome will be known, and so forth). Anticipatory, 
anticipated and experienced influences are typical examples of integral affective states. Conversely, 
incidental affect concerns affective responses totally unrelated to the decision to be made. Incidental 
affect is an affective reaction elicited due to a specific cause or stimulus which could be, or not be, 
part of the decisional context (e.g. feeling teased if the decision takes place in a noisy environment, 
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or feeling calm and serene because it is a sunny day). Therefore, incidental affect determines 
decision maker’s affective state at the moment of choice (his/her background mood). Here, after 
briefly presenting some evidence relative to the interplay between integral affect and decision 
making process, I will focus, in more detail, on evidence about the role of incidental affect on risk 
perception and risk taking behavior (main theme of this dissertation). 
1.3.1 Integral affect 
Integral affective states encompasses influences normatively relevant to the decision at hand 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2000). They are elicited by the act itself of making a decision and they are 
strictly related to choice options as well as their probability of occurrence (Västfjäll & Slovic, 
2013). As an example, consider an investor who is evaluating the chance of buying an high risk 
stock. While the investor is making the decision, he/she may experience feelings of fear or anxiety 
because he/she could anticipate the regret that would be experienced if the investment would fail. In 
such a case, fear or anxiety presently experienced by the investor is the anticipatory emotion. The 
main antecedent of the anticipatory fear or anxiety is the concern for the likely feeling of regret that 
could be experienced  if the outcome would be negative (i.e. the anticipated affect). Whether the 
bought stock will increase in its price, it will be more likely that the investor’s final experienced 
emotion and affect will be negative (e.g. regret or disappointment); whereas whether it will increase 
in its price the investor’s final experienced emotion and affect will be positive (e.g. joy or elation). 
Therefore, anticipated influences are pre-decisional cognitive expectations about future 
consequences. They are not experienced at the moment of choice, but they are relevant as they 
prepare the decision maker for the feelings he/she might experience in the next future after the 
decision has been made (Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Mellers, 2000; Mellers et al., 1999). 
On the other hand, anticipatory influences are pre-decisional affective reactions triggered 
out by anticipating future consequences of a decision. Contrary to anticipated affect, which has 
influence only at a cognitive level, anticipatory affect is an immediate feeling experienced in the 
present. As noted by Damasio (1994), the association between the presentation  of an affective 
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eliciting stimulus (e.g. a risky option) with bodily sensations (somatic markers), allows the 
development of an internal representation of the possible future consequences related to that 
stimulus. Somatic markers are visceral reactions (e.g. changes in heartbeat, skin conductance, or 
other homeostatic reactions) produced by secondary feelings (e.g. the anticipated affect) which may 
favor the approach toward an appetitive stimulus or the avoidance of a dangerous one and guiding 
the decision (Bechara et al., 2000; Damasio, 1994). The association affective eliciting stimulus – 
affective reactions is the result of the activity of a neural network involving limbic areas, 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Vmpfc), somatosensory cortex (Smc), insula and basal ganglia 
(Damasio, 1998). This network has direct projections to the brain stem (in particular to the 
hypothalamus) that produce the physiological changes that underlie the anticipatory affective 
reaction (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Bechara et al. (1997) argued that Vmpfc plays a critical role in 
the translation of cognitive inputs from external environment into affective reactions. A damage to 
Vmpfc leads individuals to ignore signals from the body and to make more disadvantageous 
choices. 
Finally, experienced affect refers to post-decisional affective states elicited once the 
outcome of the decision is known (e.g. elation or happiness if the outcome is positive, regret or 
disappointment if the outcome is negative). 
Interesting evidence about the role of integral affect on decision making under risk comes 
from a study of Johnson et al. (1993) on consumer willingness to pay for flight insurance. Authors 
asked participants how much they would willing to pay for a flight insurance that covered against 
death due to “any act of terrorism” or another that covered against “any reason”. Johnson et al. 
(1993) found that participants were willing to pay more for insurance protecting against terrorism 
although an insurance covering all types of crashes would be more convenient. Authors explain 
these findings suggesting that events related to terrorism may be imagined more vividly so that 
consumers consider more important to insure against them. 
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1.3.2 Incidental affect 
Incidental influences are short-lived affective states with clear triggers or causes of which 
individuals may be aware or unware. They could represent a specific individual disposition to react 
to a given event in a particular affective way, otherwise they can be affective states elicited by 
situational factors (e.g. stressor events), or by particular contextual cues or environmental 
conditions (e.g. images, music, odors). Affective reactions produced by such external events/stimuli 
are normatively irrelevant to the decision task, nevertheless they have been found to influence 
judgment and decision making (e.g. Bagneux et al., 2013; Lerner et al., 2004), risk perception 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2001) and risk taking  behavior (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2003).  Influences of 
incidental affect can be experimentally investigated through the direct manipulation of participant’s 
affective state before or while making a decision. It is known that the effect of incidental affect can 
be strong enough to direct cognition not only to affective eliciting stimuli per se but also to other 
unrelated events, including judgments and decision making (the so called incidental carryover 
effect) (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992; Lazarus, 1991). For example, Schwarz and Clore (1983) 
asked participants to make judgments of happiness and satisfaction with one’s life after 
experimentally induced positive or negative moods. Moods were manipulated by requiring 
participants to describe recent happy or sad events or they were naturally induced by interviewing 
participants on sunny or rainy days. In both cases, participants reported more happiness and 
satisfaction with their lives when in a good mood than when in a bad mood. Authors concluded that 
affective states provide relevant information (affect as information) about the current situation and 
people tend to rely on these feelings while making judgments (or choices). 
Hirsch (1995) investigated the role of incidental odors on gambling behavior. The study was 
conducted in a Las Vegas casino where one area was odorized with a pleasant odor, while another 
one was unodorized. The author measured and compared the amount of money gambled in each 
area before, during and after the incidental odor manipulation. Data suggested that the amount of 
money gambled in the slot machines located in the odorized area was significantly greater than the 
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amount of money gambled in the same area before and after the experimental manipulation. Hence, 
the study by Hirsch (1995) suggests that a pleasant odor may elicit incidental affective states able to 
influence consumer’s gambling behavior. 
Further evidence from the consumer behavior field have shown that incidental affective 
states influence the way people price different products (Lerner et al., 2004), eating behavior 
(Grunberg & Straub, 1992), preferences for the status quo option (Yen & Chuang, 2008). Moreover, 
Andrade and Ariely (2009) demonstrated that incidental affective states can influence economic 
decisions not only in the short term, but that they can also live longer than the emotional experience 
itself. It should be also noted that even minimal sensorial stimulation can establish an affective state 
able to influence decision making process (Lowenstein & Lerner, 2002).  
Taken together, this evidence show that affective reactions unrelated to the decision may 
influence preference for different choice options. In the following section I will focus attention on 
the effect of different kind of incidental affective state on risk taking behavior. 
1.4 Incidental affect and risk taking 
The influence of incidental affect on risk perception and risk taking behavior is one of the most 
studied interplays between affect and cognition in the field of decision making. It is widely 
documented that different affective states carries over different information about the goodness of 
certain risky options (e.g. Lerner & Keltner, 2001). In particular it has been found that affective 
states have different impact on risk taking according to the degree of pleasantness: i.e. the 
dimension of valence (Russell & Feldman Barrett 1999).  
1.4.1 Mood maintenance and mood repair 
Many decisional researchers showed that positive (pleasant) affect leads to risk aversion 
whereas negative affect leads to risk seeking behavior (Isen & Patrick, 1983; Morris & Reilly, 
1987). In particular, it was found that people in whom a positive affect is induced make more 
optimistic assessments than people in negative mood and controls (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; 
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Williams et al., 2003). However, as noted by Isen and colleagues, they are characterized by a 
cautious optimism since they report high probability estimates of obtaining gains (which is an index 
of optimistic behavior) but they are more risk averse than controls when they are offered the chance 
to bet on an high risk gamble (Isen, 2000; Isen & Patrick, 1983; Isen et al., 1988).  As an 
explanation for these findings, authors proposed the mood maintenance hypothesis which suggests 
that people in positive affect have tendency to be protective of their positive feelings. When in a 
positive state, individual maybe reluctant to take more risks because of the repulsion from the 
chance of getting the negative outcome which might reduce their global well-being. Therefore, it 
seems that participants in a positive affective state increase the value associated with a potential 
gain. At the same time, they could consider a potential loss as more unpleasant than participants in a 
neutral or negative affective state, so that the risky option is evaluated with greater disutility (Isen, 
2000).  
Conversely, negative (unpleasant) affective states are associated with increased perceived 
uncertainty and lower probability estimates of obtaining gains (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). 
Furthermore, participants in a negative mood may be more prone to take risk than participants in 
positive or neutral mood (e.g. Desteno et al., 2000; Hockey et al., 2000; Mano, 1992; Raghunathan 
& Pham, 1999). It has been argued that, when in a negative emotional state, people are motivated 
by the desire of changing their current uncomfortable mood, so that the risky option is evaluated as 
more pleasant since the potential gain is conceived as a chance of turning the negative state into a 
positive one (Larsen, 2000; Morris & Reilly, 1987). This is called mood repair hypothesis. 
Taken together, these evidence suggest that decision makers’ incidental affective state influence 
the way choice options are evaluated in a valence-dependent manner. In particular, the valence 
dimension (pleasant – unpleasant) of current mood seems to provide strong information about 
current well-being, so that it may influence information processing, priming mood-congruent 
anticipated and anticipatory emotions and determining the psychological burden attributed to the 
risky option. 
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1.4.2 Same valence, different affect 
According to explanations provided from both mood maintenance and mood repair 
hypothesis, affective states which share the same valence should have equivalent influences on 
decision making and risk taking behavior. A serious limitation of these theorization is that affective 
state is conceived as a one-dimensional and bipolar construct (positive – negative or pleasant – 
unpleasant).  
Recently, researchers have begun exploring differences in the influence of different affective 
states with the same degree of pleasantness (e.g. DeSteno et al., 2000; Han et al., 2007; Lerner et 
al., 2004; Raghunathan & Corfman, 2004; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). For example, Raghunathan 
and Pham (1999) hypothesized that sadness and anxiety, two distinct negative emotions, may have 
different influences on risky behavior. Emotions were manipulated by presenting participants with 
three scenarios, each thought to induce a distinct emotion (i.e. anxiety, sadness, neutral). 
Participants were asked to experience the event described in the scenario as vividly as possible and 
imagine what they would feel in that specific situation. Later, participants were asked to assess the 
attraction of two gambles: a low risk – low reward gamble and a high risk – high reward one. 
Results from the study suggest that preference for the risky option was higher in the sadness 
condition than in the anxiety condition, with the neutral condition in between. Authors concluded 
that two emotions with same valence (negative) can have distinct influences on decision making 
under risk. Specifically, anxiety is associated with a low-risk preference, whereas sadness is 
associated with a high-risk preference. In a subsequent study, Raghunathan and Corfman (2004) 
proposed the Different Affect – Different Effect (DADE) model, according to which different 
negative affective states, such as sadness and anxiety, may target different motivational goals so 
that they could have opposite influences on behavior. Built on cognitive theories and psycho 
evolutionary perspectives of affect, DADE model proposes that sadness motivates individual to 
seek more pleasant stimuli in order to eliminate or mitigate it, as predicted by the mood repair 
hypothesis (Larsen, 2000; Morris & Reilly, 1987). Conversely, anxiety leads to more attentiveness, 
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since being attentive promotes the best deal in order to reduce uncertainty, typical of states of 
anxiety (Raghunathan & Corfman, 2004). This point of view is also supported by Han, et al. (2007) 
which provided the theoretical basis for the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (ATF) suggesting that 
specific emotions carry over specific cognitive and motivational processes able to account for the 
differences found for diverse influences of emotions and affective states of the same valence on 
decision making and assessment of risk.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that theorizations provided by mood maintenance and 
mood repair hypothesis (e.g. Isen et al., 1988; Morris & Reilly, 1987) does not account for the 
influences of incidental affective states on individual preferences for risk. As mentioned in section 
1.1, Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999) adopted a bi-dimensional model of affective state which 
explain affect as differences in the degree of valence and arousal. As I will suggest and argue in the 
following section, reducing affective states at a one-dimensional type conception (i.e. the reliance 
on affective valence) could represent a serious limitation, while the study of incidental affect in 
terms of valence (pleasant or unpleasant) and arousal (high or low) would result in a suitable 
understanding of the influences of affect on risk taking behavior.  
1.5 Dimensionality of affect 
As noted earlier, a valence-based approach to the investigation of influences of incidental 
affect on decision making and risk taking often fails in the tentative of identifying the variance 
which characterizes different affective states (e.g. Raghunathan & Corfman, 2004). Affect should 
be considered as a far more complex construct which is multidimensional in its nature. 
Factor analyses of self-reported affective states, scaling of words for emotion, vocal and 
facial expression for emotion has led most psychologists to describe affect as variation along two 
main dimensions interpretable as pleasure (valence) and activation (arousal) (e.g. Russell, 1980). 
Therefore, in addition to affective valence, there is one more dimension that should be taken into 
account when the influences of affective states on cognition are discussed: i.e. the dimension of 
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affective arousal. Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999) suggest that at any point in time, affect is a 
the result of the combination of different levels of valence and arousal pleasure. The two 
components  combine in an integral fashion, so that, subjectively, a person has one feeling rather 
than, for example, unpleasant and separately, deactivated (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999, pp. 
809). 
1.5.1  The circumplex model of affect  
A widely-accepted two-dimensional model is the circumplex model of affect proposed by 
Russell (1980) and it is still one of the most important reference models in describing affective 
states (e.g. Lang et al., 1993; Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999; Russell, 2003). In this model 
affective dimensions (valence and arousal) are depicted as two orthogonal axis whose intersection 
defines four quadrants which include affective states that result from all possible combinations of 
different levels of valence and arousal. Therefore, at any given moment, affect is a single integral 
blend of the two dimensions. In this model all affective states lie neatly around the two main 
dimensions forming a circumplex (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. The affective circumplex. The inner circle shows a map of core affect. The outer circle shows where several prototypical 
emotional episodes typically fall. Edited from Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999. 
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Valence dimensions ranges from unpleasant to pleasant, while arousal dimension ranges from 
activation to deactivation so that, for instance, boredom results from the combination of low level of 
valence (unpleasant) and low level of arousal (deactivation), whereas excitement is a combination 
of high level of valence (pleasant) and high level of arousal (activation). Likewise, relaxation is the 
product of high level of valence (pleasant) and low level of arousal (deactivation), while tension has 
low valence (unpleasant) and high arousal (activation). By rotating the two main axis of 45°, two 
intermediate dimensions will be obtained (see figure 2): pleasant activation – unpleasant 
deactivation including affective states characterized by positive valence and high arousal or 
negative valence and low arousal; unpleasant activation – pleasant deactivation including affect 
characterized by negative valence and high arousal or positive valence and low arousal.  
 
 Figure 2. Intermediate dimensions in the circumplex of affect.  
Russell and Mehrabian (1977, 1978) formalized the Pleasure – Arousal Hypothesis which explains 
individual’s preference for current mood according to both dimensions of valence and arousal. In 
particular, preference is linearly related to valence dimension while arousal assumes the form of an 
inverted U-shaped function (see figure 3) (regarding the effects of arousal on preference and 
cognition see sections 2.3 and 2.4 of this dissertation; see also Hebb, 1955; Yerkes & Dodson, 
1908).   
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Figure 3. Predictions form the Pleasure – Arousal hypothesis (Russell & Mehrabian, 1978). 
A statement of the Pleasure – Arousal Hypothesis is represented by the following regression 
equation: 
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ =  𝑏1𝑃 − 𝑏2𝐴
2 + 𝑏3𝑃𝐴, (5) 
where b1, b2 and b3 are positive constants expressing the weights of the terms, P is pleasantness 
(valence) and A is arousal. In Equation 5, approach is expressed as the result of the sum of the 
independent variables of valence and arousal: b1P represents the positive linear relationship 
between pleasantness (valence) and approach; b2A
2
 expresses the inverted-U relationship between 
arousal and preference for current mood and b3PA expresses the hypothesis of an interaction of 
valence with arousal, such that approach increases with arousal as valence increases (pleasant), but 
decreases with arousal as valence decreases (unpleasant) (Russell & Mehrabian, 1978). 
 Some authors  proposed that affect could be better explained considering more than two 
dimensions. Indeed, some additional features can be recognized including potency (Osgood, 1969), 
dominance (Russell & Mehrabian, 1977), aggressiveness (Bush, 1973), locus of causation (Russell, 
1978). Actually, each of these elements may characterize emotions but, as argued by Russell and 
Feldman Barrett (1999) they should be interpreted in relation to the event that elicits the emotional 
reaction and therefore they could not be considered as elementary elements that constitute affective 
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states. Rather, such features are better justified if considered as part of prototypical emotional 
episodes, but should not be attributed to affect per se, since by definition, affect doesn’t need to 
related to a specific object (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999; see also section 1.1 of this 
dissertation). Hence, more dimensions can be relegated as main aspects of the emotional experience 
but beyond the domain of core affect. Affective states remains a simpler two-dimensional 
conceptualization defined as variations in degree of valence and arousal. 
Valence  
 Valence dimension, at the level of the subjective experience, refers to the individual well-
being, so it describes the dimension of feeling happy, pleased, contented at one extreme or feeling 
unhappy, annoyed, unsatisfied at the other extreme. At any point in time, valence dimension should 
be considered as varying along a continuum, so that one could infer his/her personal state of 
pleasure – displeasure. Valence dimension has been also named differently: e.g. hedonic tone, 
good-bad mood, approach-avoidance, positive-negative, appetitive-aversive, but all of them refer to 
the same concept of pleasure – displeasure, therefore the similarity is clear. 
Arousal  
 Arousal dimension, at the level of the subjective and physiological experience, refers to 
sense of energy, tension, alertness of stress. It is related to the intensity by which a state of 
pleasantness or unpleasantness is actually experienced, so it describes the dimension of feeling 
hyperactive, alerted, wide-awake at one extreme, or feeling relaxed, sluggish, sleepy at the other 
extreme. At any point in time, arousal dimension should be as considered as varying along a 
continuum, so that one could infer his/her personal state of activation – deactivation. Arousal 
dimension has been also named differently: e.g. energy, tension, activity, but all of them refer to the 
same concept of activation – deactivation, therefore, again, the similarity is clear. 
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 In the present research the role of arousal on risk taking behavior is examined. In a series of 
experiments I induce incidental positive or negative arousal and individual’s preferences for risky 
monetary options are detected. In the following chapter I will provide a clearer description of 
arousal and its psychological and physiological features, then I will present evidence about the 
influences of  high/low arousal on cognition as well as on decision making and risk taking behavior 
and I will present the experimental research questions that I will try to address in a series studies 
presented throughout the rest of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Arousal and Decision Making 
 
2.1 Definition of Arousal 
In chapter 1 of this dissertation, I introduced the concept of arousal as it has been proposed 
by Russell & Feldman Barrett (1999). Differently from valence, which informs about how well one 
is doing, arousal refers to the experience of energy, mobilization, activity, alertness, tension, and so 
forth. Arousal is ranged from a state of full activation (e.g. feeling excited) to a state of complete 
inactivity (e.g. deep sleep). Arousal is also associated to a body experience since it is characterized 
by changes in many physiological parameters, through the activity of the autonomic nervous system 
(e.g. Hagemann et al., 2003). In the following section I will illustrate characteristics of arousal from 
a psychological and physiological perspective. Then, I will explain the impact that arousal has on 
cognitive system and, in more detail, on decision making.  
2.2 Psychological and physiological correlates of arousal  
At a psychological and subjective level, arousal is related to the intensity with which 
pleasure or displeasure is experienced (Russell, 2003).  Therefore, people may experience a positive 
form arousal or, conversely, a negative form of arousal. Positive arousal covers the first and the 
second quadrant of the circumplex of affect (see figure 2 in chapter 1). Affective states with high 
positive arousal (pleasant activation) include feelings of happiness, joy, or elation. These affective 
states are characterized by very intense positive mood: i.e. sensations of pleasantness combined 
with an high level of activation. At the maximum level of positive arousal there are feelings of 
excitement such as being in a very pleasant adrenaline situation (e.g. playing extreme sports); or 
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experiencing a very intense joy (e.g. getting married or graduating); or being attracted by someone 
else (i.e. being sexually aroused). Affective states with low positive arousal (pleasant deactivation) 
include feelings of calmness, relaxation, or peacefulness. These affective states are still 
characterized by sensations of pleasantness but they are associated with very low levels of 
activation. People may experience low positive arousal during leisure situations (e.g. spending a 
lazy summer day at the shore); or in the absence of a task to perform (e.g. being on vacation in a 
relaxing spa); or during a period of rest (going to sleep after an intense workday).  Conversely, 
negative arousal ranks in the third and fourth quadrant of the circumplex. Affective states with high 
negative arousal (unpleasant activation) include feelings of tension, distress, or fear. These are 
affective states marked by sensations of unpleasantness and elevated levels of activation. At the 
maximum level of negative arousal there are feelings of elevated tension such as being scared of 
something (e.g. be on the verge of an accident); or feeling anxious due to an imminent event (e.g. 
before presenting a public speech); or feeling upset (e.g. be angry with someone). Among affective 
states with low negative arousal (unpleasant activation) we found negative feelings associated with 
low energy or activity. For instance, being sick at home, or feeling very sad or depressed are typical 
situations in which people may experience such feelings.  
Even tough positive arousal and negative arousal are qualitatively distinct, they are similar 
in several aspects. First of all, they are physiologically overlapping.  It has been found that 
presenting participants with pleasant and unpleasant stimuli equated for the level of arousal elicits 
the same physiological reactions (Bradley et al., 2001; Codispoti et al., 2008). Negative arousal is 
typically characterized by changes in skin conductance and heart rate deceleration. This is the case 
also for positive arousal (see Codispoti et al., 2008). Skin conductance is expected to increase as an 
automatic reaction to any increase in emotional arousal. Conversely, cardiac deceleration has been 
interpreted as reflecting orienting and attention (Bradley et al., 2001; Lang et al., 1993). Second, 
several brain areas involved in the processing of unpleasant arousing stimuli are similarly activated 
when people are presented with pleasant arousing stimuli (Stark et al., 2005). Third, when presented 
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with affective-eliciting pictures combined with increased arousal the differentiation between self-
reported levels of positive affect and negative affect is highly reduced (Reich & Zautra, 2002). 
Therefore, to the extent to which physiological reactions, neural activations and self-report indices 
are the same for both positive and negative arousal, it is reasonable to believe that arousal may have 
a unique and specific influence on decision making and cognition, regardless of valence. As I will 
explain in more detail in section 2.3 and 2.4, it seems that the specific role of arousal is to provide 
information about urgency and importance (Storbeck & Clore, 2008). 
As mentioned above, psychological states of arousal are always associated to a 
physiological changes, elicited through the activity of the autonomic nervous system (e.g. 
Hangemann et al., 2003). Physiological correlates of arousal are primarily related to electrodermal 
response (skin conductance) (Lang et al., 1993). However, the relation between the subjective 
experience of arousal and its physiological counterpart is still poorly understood (on this topic see 
Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999). Moreover, arousal is a key component of the stress response and 
in many cases the two words are used interchangeably. Neural components that modulate arousal 
play also an important role in modulating the response to stress (see Winsky-Sommerer et al., 
2005). An interesting distinction has been provided by Selye (1978) who differentiated between a 
negative form of stress (distress) and a positive form of stress (eustress). According to Selye’s 
definition, stress is the nonspecific response of the body to any demand. Such demand may be 
positive or negative so that it could produce pleasure or pain. Distress (negative arousal) arises 
when something is perceived or evaluated as a threat to one’s well-being (e.g. the loss of a job). 
Eustress (positive arousal) arises when something is perceived or evaluated as appetitive and 
motivating (e.g. a job promotion). Selye (1978) argues that both eustress and distress elicit a similar 
physiological response (i.e. the arousal reaction). Whether this response is perceived as a form of 
eustress or distress depends primarily on how the stressful situation is perceived and interpreted by 
the individual (appraisal).  
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In summary, at a psychological level we can distinguish between a pleasant form of arousal 
(stress) and a negative form of activation. At any point in time, people can experience high/low 
positive arousal or high/low negative arousal. Both kind of activation elicit a similar physiological 
reaction due to the activity of the autonomic nervous system. Such evidence permits to postulate 
that both forms of arousal may have similar consequences on the functioning of the cognitive 
system.  
2.3 Effects of arousal on cognition 
In this section, I will present some evidence about influences of arousal on cognitive 
processes (i.e. perception, attention, memory). Then, I will continue introducing the Yerkes-Dodson 
law, that is the most common pattern of description about the influence of arousal on cognitive 
performance. 
Perception 
For centuries, researchers of visual perception retained that the perception of physical basic 
stimuli was not influenced by emotional factors. It was assumed that affective response occurred 
only after object perception and only as a reaction to it (e.g. Arnold, 1960). This means that we first 
see a red, round, hard object perceived as an apple and right after recognizing the object we can add 
other affective features like its sweetness or remembering of enjoying very good apples in a specific 
time and place and so forth. Nevertheless, this standard view has been revised and redefined by 
studies finding that affective response to objects may occur at an early-stage of the perception 
process (e.g. Barrett & Bar, 2009). There is accumulating evidence that, during object perception, 
the brain quickly responds to a first rough vision of the scene (e.g. Bar et al., 2001; 2006). In 
generating such initial prediction of the scene, the brain integrates information from the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), a region highly involved in producing affective response to stimuli. This 
supports the idea that affect is an essential part in constructing object perception.  
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Evidence show that also arousal plays a role in perception. For example, Proffitt et al. 
(2006) found that when individuals are physically exhausted (e.g. while wearing an heavy 
backpack) they perceive hills as steeper as well as when their resources are limited (e.g. when 
people are elderly in declining health condition). Furthermore, when people are asked to assess 
perceptions of distance from a balcony to the ground below, distance estimation is increased by 
mild fear (Stefanucci & Proffitt, 2008). In order to test the influence of arousal in this process, 
Stefanucci and Storbeck (2009) asked participants to view either arousing or unarousing pictures 
before estimating the height of the balcony and the size of a target on the ground below the balcony. 
Judgments of height were higher for people who viewed arousing pictures compared to those who 
viewed unarousing pictures. In another experiment of the same study, both valence and arousal 
were manipulated and it was found that arousal moderated height perception, while valence did not. 
Furthermore, when viewing the arousing pictures, some individuals were asked to try to up-regulate 
or down-regulate their affective reaction in order to make it more or less arousing. A control group 
simply viewed the arousing pictures. It was found that the up-regulation group provided 
significantly higher estimates of the balcony height than down-regulation group and controls. 
Authors concluded that the experimental manipulation of arousal influenced height perception, and 
that this influence may be moderated by emotion regulation strategies.  
Arousal has been found to influence also time perception. In one experiment, participants 
were presented with pictures varying along valence and arousal dimension and they were asked to 
estimate for how long the pictures were shown. Results show a significantly valence by arousal 
interaction in time estimation. Among low arousal stimuli, negative pictures were judged to be 
presented relatively shorter than positive pictures. among high arousal stimuli, negative pictures 
were judged to be presented relatively longer than positive pictures. Authors explain results through 
a model of action tendency, where arousal controls two different motivational mechanisms, one 
emotional and the other attentional.  
Attention 
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In addition to influence perception, arousal modulates attention allocation. It is well-known 
that high arousal narrows attentional focus. A typical example is the ‘weapon effect’, a phenomenon 
in which witnesses of an homicide failed to remember the serial killer, but did remember the gun 
(e.g. Loftus, 1979). This effect occurs because the most arousing cue in a specific scenario is also 
capable to capture attention since it is evaluated as the most important object in the scene while few 
attentional resources remain available for other peripheral information (Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). 
 Some theories of arousal correlate directly arousal with attention. For example, Anderson 
(2005) reports that increased arousal is also associated with decreased attentional resources, 
enabling emotional significance to shape perceptual experience. This assumption has been 
empirically investigated showing that arousal produces an interference effect which has 
consequences on attention allocation and cognitive performance (Fernandes, et al., 2011; Gronau et 
al., 2003; Lang et al., 1993; Schimmack, 2005).  In particular, it has been shown that it is arousal 
that influences the amount of attention that is voluntarily or involuntarily directed to those stimuli. 
Lang et al. (1993) demonstrated that participants look at arousing stimuli for longer than unarousing 
stimuli, regardless of valence. It was also found that skin conductance, which is a direct feature of 
arousal, is correlated with the interference effect on emotional Stroop task (Gronau et al., 2003). 
The same interference effect emerged when people were asked to ignore emotional stimuli 
(pictures) while performing a cognitive task (solving math problems) and an attentional task 
(detecting the location of a line) (Schimmack, 2005). On both tasks, the arousal level of stimuli 
predicted the interference effect with the most arousing stimuli (both positive and negative) 
producing the strongest interference effect.  
 Taken together, this evidence suggests that arousing stimuli are capable to capture attention, 
since they are perceived as the most important and relevant stimuli present in a given scenario, 
leaving few attentional resources available. This can also cause an interference effect which may 
have consequences when an additional cognitive task is performed.  
Memory 
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As a consequence of the effects of arousal on attention allocation, it is reasonable to believe 
that arousal may also influence information consolidation, thus signaling which information is 
important for memory. As illustrated by Storbeck and Clore (2008), arousal signals importance of a 
stimuli in a duplex way: implicitly, through the release of adrenergic hormones, and explicitly, 
through subjective experience. The release of adrenergic hormones represent a typical response to 
stressing (arousing) situations. This process also results in enhanced long term memory for specific 
events. For example, most people can easily remember where they were and what they were doing 
on September 11, 2001. The most important hormone involved in this process of long memory 
consolidation is epinephrine released into the peripheral nervous system by the adrenal gland 
(Packard et al., 1995). Epinephrine has effects on amygdala and this would be a critical process for 
the consolidation of information in the long-term memory storage. Therefore, the effect of arousal 
on memory is not due to the heightened attention allocation during stimuli presentation but rather to 
hormonal phenomena that take place afterward (Storbeck & Clore, 2008). 
Summing up, a state of elevated arousal has multiple consequences on cognitive functions. 
In particular, it influences visual perception as well as attention allocation and selects relevant 
stimuli that will be retrieved in the long-term memory. More important, it seems that emotional 
arousal may interfere with cognitive performance when the arousing reaction takes place in close 
concomitance with the execution of a cognitive task. In the next section I will illustrate this effect 
describing the Yerkes-Dodson law and the cognitive depletion hypothesis.  
2.3.1 Arousal and cognitive performance 
So far, I underlined the importance of differentiating affect and emotion in terms of arousal, 
in addition to valence, when affect is used as explanatory variable of  a behavioral response. As 
explained earlier, arousal does have impact on cognition since it signals importance and urgency, 
therefore it constitutes a central part of the psychological process of motivation which guides 
human behavior toward a particular goal.  
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What kind of relationship exists between arousal and cognitive performance? The current 
view is that optimal human performance requires an intermediate level of affective arousal 
(emotional intensity), while too little or too much arousal results in an impaired performance. 
Intermediate levels of arousal are necessary for executive functions since, as explained above, 
arousal is capable of orienting attention toward important or relevant environmental stimuli. As a 
consequence, when an individual experiences very low level of activation cognitive system is not 
able to perform complex tasks. For instance, an individual in condition of sleep deprivation or 
illness, which represents typical situations of low arousal, would not be able to have a satisfying 
performance on a cognitive task. Similarly, too much emotional activation lead the person to be so 
aroused that reasoning and self-control become disorganized (e.g. Yates, 1990) creating an instance 
of cognitive depletion (e.g. Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010). Such relationship is well described by the 
Yerkes-Dodson law. According to this law, cognitive performance is related to arousal through an 
inverted U-shaped function.  
 
Figure 4. The relationship between cognitive performance and arousal in the Yerkes-Dodson law (Kaufman, 1999). 
In figure 4 the vertical axis represents any kind of mental or physical task where P1 represents a 
very low performance, P2 an intermediate performance and PMAX is the best performance, while the 
horizontal axis is referred to arousal (both mental and physiological) or the intensity of a specific 
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emotion (e.g. fear or anxiety). On the horizontal axis, A1 is low arousal, A2 is intermediate arousal 
and A3 is high arousal. Therefore, the curve well represents the statement according to which the 
best performance (PMAX) is reached at the intermediate level of arousal (A2), while at low arousal 
(A1) and high arousal (A3), performance is below the minimum level P1. Empirical studies 
investigated the effect of emotional intensity on examination performance (test scores) by 
manipulating participants’ level of arousal before the examination (Field et al., 1985; Ashcraft & 
Faust, 1994). Consistently with Yerkes-Dodson law it has been shown that with low level of arousal 
(e.g. boredom) test scores were relatively low. As level of arousal increased, participants’ test 
scores increased as well until an optimum point. However, with additional arousal increase (e.g. 
under anxiety conditions) participants’ performance decreased again. 
Yerkes-Dodson law (1908) and the cognitive depletion hypothesis (e.g. Fedorikhin & 
Patrick, 2010) is also valid in the domain of decision making. Kaufman (1999) suggests that 
affective arousal can become a source of bounded rationality, since conditions of elevated arousal 
(negative and positive) may have detrimental effects on cognitive system, including decision 
making. According to Kaufman’s theory, bounded rationality can be decomposed in two parts: one 
is related to the cognitive limitations, typical of human mind (cognitive BR), while the second form 
of bounded rationality is related to extremes in emotional arousal (emotional BR). In figure 4 the 
horizontal line at PMAX represents the decision making outcome if the human agent possesses ‘full’ 
rationality. At A2 emotional BR is zero by definition, therefore the gap between the horizontal line 
at PMAX and P2 measures the inefficiency in decision making related to cognitive BR only. For any 
given individual, the gap PMAX – P2 is larger the more restricted is the agent’s cognitive capacity or 
the more complex the decision making problem. The amount of emotional BR is then the distance 
between the horizontal line at P2 and the U-shaped curve at any given level of arousal. At arousal 
level A1, for example, emotional BR is P2 – P1 amount. People who are better able to exercise self-
control over their emotions will have a curve which lies closer to the P2 line and will thus suffer less 
impairment to their decision making at low or high emotional arousal (Kaufman, 1999 pp. 139). 
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Why too little or too much arousal should impair decision making? Under low arousal 
conditions little energy is devoted to information processing and problem solving, attention is not 
focused on the main task and often memory is blocked by ruminant thoughts (e.g. in states of 
depression) and physiological activity is at very low levels (see Baker & Channon, 1995). An 
increase in emotional activation creates good conditions for optimal decision making, at least up to 
a point. An excessive activation (high levels of arousal) lead the individual to make extra effort in 
information processing and problem solving (Kahneman, 1973). The autonomic activity is very 
high and this creates the conditions for cognitive depletion  so that decision making quality 
becomes very poor, losing much of its logical component so that behavior is guided by impulse, 
obsessions, and instinct (Kaufman, 1999). Such detrimental effects on cognition caused by elevated 
arousal (cognitive depletion) have been experimentally documented in several areas of decision 
making including consumer choice (Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010); decision making under 
uncertainty (Laier et al., 2013); decision making under risk (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006). In the 
following section I will present and discuss the effect of arousal on judgment, decision making and 
risk taking behavior. 
2.4 Influences of arousal on decision making  
 In chapter 1 I illustrated how the role of emotions and affective states have been largely 
ignored by decisional researchers. Even less attention has been payed to the impact of affective 
arousal on decisional process. Schwarz and Clore (1988) explained that often people rely on their 
feeling while making judgments and decisions. In this way, affective reactions provide useful 
information which will be used as a basis for guiding decisions. This is well-known as affect-as-
information approach. In particular, when faced with a decision, people would first assess the 
goodness of a choice option by asking themselves ‘How do I feel about it?’ (Schwarz & Clore, 
1988). Authors report that, generally, people in positive affect express more positive judgments 
while a negative affective state seems to be associated with more negative judgments. Affect-as-
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information approach is still considered one of the most important descriptions for the influences of 
affect on judgments and decisions. However, it is mainly conceived as a valence-based approach 
since it accounts for differences between positive and negative affect, but it ignores the role of 
arousal. More recently, Storbeck and Clore (2008) extended the affect-as-information approach to 
arousal dimension. In particular, when faced with judgments and decisions people would also ask 
themselves ‘How strongly do I feel about it?’. Therefore, authors argue that whether valence 
provide a basic information about the pleasantness (or unpleasantness) of a thing, arousal should 
further intensify that information. Thus, arousal may make an object seem more important or may 
intensify its apparent affective value so that positive objects seem more positive and negative 
objects more negative (Storbeck & Clore, 2008, pp. 1827). Zillman (1971) showed that arousing 
cues can be easily (incidentally) misattributed or transferred to other unrelated objects or events 
(e.g. choice options) when arousing and target stimuli occur in close temporal proximity. Moreover, 
Schwarz & Clore (1983) posit that affect may influence decision making, but only when the source 
of affect is attributed to the object of the decision at hand and is experienced as a reaction to that. In 
a classical study conducted by Dutton and Aron (1974), male participants were asked to cross an 
high suspended bridge over a deep ravine, a situation capable of inducing an high level of arousal. 
On the other side of the bridge an attractive female experimenter debriefed them about the 
experiment and this included also giving them her telephone number. It was found that few days 
later, aroused males were more likely to telephone her compared to the control group who crossed a 
low unarousing bridge. Authors explained this result as a tendency to misattribute the arousing 
feelings arising from crossing the high suspended bridge to the presence of the attractive woman, 
thus amplifying feelings of attraction to her. Such misattribution effect of arousal on decision 
making has been often exploited by marketing companies in order to make products more desirable 
at consumers’ eyes. Indeed, in advertisements it is common to see products associated to arousing 
contexts: for example, spots of car often include attractive women or high speed driving scenarios. 
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The idea is that a consumer should experience the arousing stimulation as a reaction to the product 
itself. 
Evidence from neuroimaging studies showed that when participants are asked to evaluate 
emotionally arousing words an increased brain activation is registered, especially in the amygdala 
(55). Moreover, amygdala activation is associated with processing the importance of specific 
stimuli (Cunningham et al., 2008). Therefore, it has been suggested that arousal may signal 
relevance and importance of stimuli (Storbeck & Clore, 2008).  Studies on the effect of arousal on 
judgment found that high arousal negative emotions, such as anxiety and anger, increase 
stereotypical judgments toward out-group members, compared to judgments made in a low arousal 
state (e.g. Bodenhausen, 1993). Further studies investigating the effects of arousal on decision 
making found that it has impact on advertisements evaluation (Gorn et al., 2001); consumer 
preferences (Di Muro & Murray, 2012); ultimatum game (Van den Bergh & Dewitte, 2006); 
intertemporal choice (Van den Bergh et al., 2008); moral judgment (Carmona-Perera et al., 2014). 
Some researchers also started to investigate the role of affective states on decision making under 
risk focusing on the influences that the decision maker’s current state of arousal may have on the 
evaluation of the choice scenario and preferences for risky options and most of evidence converge 
on the fact that experiencing high levels of arousal increases risk taking (e.g. Ariely & Loewenstein, 
2006; Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010; Knutson, Wimmer, Kuhnen, & Winkielman, 2008; Mano, 1992; 
Porcelli & Delgado, 2009; Starcke et al., 2008). In part II of this dissertation I will review the more 
relevant studies from this field of research before presenting empirical evidence for this research. 
In the next section I will present the most used methods researchers use to manipulate 
individual’s level of arousal in experimental setting. Then. I will focus especially on a wide used 
system of affective eliciting pictures, which have been used in all empirical studies presented in part 
II of this dissertation. 
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2.5 Methods for arousal manipulation 
Manipulation of emotion in an experimental setting has always represented a big challenge 
for psychological research. Emotion manipulation is indeed a controversial topic which involve 
ethical, methodological and practical problems. Several methods have been suggested for the 
experimental manipulation of specific emotions, such as joy, fear, happiness, sadness and so forth 
(for a review on this topic, see Gerrards-Hesse et al., 1994).  
Whether inducing an emotion or a positive/negative affect may be an hard achievement, the 
experimental manipulation of arousal dimension might represent an even harder accomplishment, 
since the goal is to induce a positive/negative affective state at high/low level of intensity. One of 
the most common methods to induce negative arousal in studies that have tested influences of 
arousal on risk, is the public speech (Lejuez et al., 2002; Mano, 1992; Pabst, et al., 2013; Starcke et 
al., 2008). The technique requires that participants are asked to prepare a public talk or presentation 
prior to perform a risk taking task. Giving a public speech is considered a typical situation in which 
people experience high distress, this make it a good and ecological method for inducing negative 
arousal (Levenson, 1988). Another wide-used method for inducing distress is the cold press task 
(Ferracuti et al., 1994), where participants are asked to immerse a hand into an ice water container 
for at least one minute. This is experienced as a very stressful situation capable to enhance the level 
of negative arousal. The cold press task has been used in studies on decision making under risk as 
well (e.g. Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). Other methods are thought to induce a physical stress: e.g. 
requiring participants to spend some time in an oxygen depleted environment (Pighin et al., 2012), 
or doing physical exercise (Schmidt et al., 2013). Conversely, few studies have examined the role of 
positive arousal or eustress, therefore there are few methods documented in literature able to induce 
positive affective state with high intensity. Sexual arousal, a specific form of positive arousal, has 
been examined more often and it has been manipulated mainly by presenting participants with 
erotic stimuli (e.g. erotic pictures) while or before performing a decision making task (e.g. Knutson 
et al., 2008; Laier et al., 2013; Van den Bergh & Dewitte, 2006). Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) 
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manipulated participants’ level of sexual arousal through self-stimulation (masturbation). Generic 
positive arousal has been also experimentally manipulated through exposition to highly pleasant 
incidental odors (Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010). 
A wide-adopted method for affective manipulation is presenting participants with affective 
eliciting pictures: i.e. images with emotional content able to induce changes in individual’s affective 
state while viewing them. Most of the studies interested in examining the effect of both dimensions 
of valence and arousal dimensions at the same time use the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang et al., 2005), a wide collection of affective pictures rated along dimensions of valence 
and arousal. In all studies presented in this dissertation IAPS pictures have been selected as method 
for manipulating participants’ affective state. Therefore, here I will briefly introduce and describe 
such methodology. 
2.5.1 The International Affective Picture System (IAPS) 
 In this section I will discuss on the use of the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; 
Lang et al., 2005). IAPS are currently used in several studies interested in the investigation of 
emotion and attention since they are able to induce transitory short-lived affective states; they 
guarantee good experimental control and facilitate replication as well as comparison with other 
studies. IAPS pictures contain a large set of color photographs that include ratings along dimensions 
of valence and arousal provided by men and women
2
. A large amount of studies across psychology 
and neuroscience have explored the subjective, physiological, neurophysiological and behavioral 
reactions of individuals while viewing IAPS stimuli (Cuthbert et al., 2000; Lang et al., 1993; 
Libkuman et al., 2007).  
 IAPS pictures include about 1000 images depicting mostly scenes from human experience: 
joyful pictures, sad pictures, terrifying pictures, attractive pictures, erotic pictures, and so forth; but 
                                                          
2
 In addition to valence and arousal, IAPS pictures are rated also along a third dimension, called dominance. 
Dominance dimension refers to the sense of potency – impotency that a person live while experiencing an affective 
state. However, the investigation of dominance dimension has been widely neglected by previous studies and it is also 
beyond the goal of this research.   
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also pictures depicting animals, objects, landscapes, geometric shapes, cemeteries, pollution, sport 
events, etc. To each picture is assigned a four-digit number that permits to recognize it. Presenting 
participants with IAPS pictures is useful for studies which aim to induce affective states following 
the circumplex model of affect (Russell, 1980) since the experimenter, following the affective 
norms, is able to select the best pictures in order to induce a specific affective state or, as the case of 
this research, affective states lying in a specific quadrant of the circumplex of affect (see figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Samples of IAPS pictures. 
In particular, pictures with negative valence and high arousal include scenes of mutilation, death, 
surgery operations. Such images are judged as terrifying and elicit emotions such as fear, disgust, 
emotional tension. Pictures with negative valence and low arousal include pictures eliciting mostly 
a sense of sadness, boredom or depression: e.g. children or adults crying, scenes of poverty, 
environmental pollution, photographs of cemeteries, and so forth. Pictures eliciting affective states 
characterized by positive valence and high arousal include two main categories of stimuli: erotic 
stimuli, depicting opposite-sex couples intercourses, and pictures depicting people playing extreme 
sports or having fun. An additional category of stimuli is for neutral stimuli: i.e. pictures expected 
to not provide a substantial change in participants’ affective state. In this category we found pictures 
depicting objects as well as geometric shapes.  
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Figure 6. IAPS stimuli in the affective space. 
In figure 6 is provided a graphical representation of  different types of IAPS stimuli in the affective 
space determined by the two dimensions of valence and arousal. A large amount of 
psychophysiological and neuroimaging studies provide evidence that IAPS pictures are actually 
able to induce affective states, by recording of different physiological parameters (i.e. skin 
conductance; heart rate variability; startle reflex; EEG; EMG; and so on) (e.g. Anders et al., 2004; 
Bradley et al., 2001; Codispoti et al., 2001; Nielen et al., 2009). 
Rating system: the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM)  
 As explained earlier, IAPS is built on the normative ratings provided by men and women for 
each picture that characterize the whole collection. Normative ratings have been gathered by using 
the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) and it is frequently adopted in studies that use IAPS pictures 
(Bradley & Lang, 1994). As depicted in figure 7, SAM includes two 9-pointed scales depicting a 
manikin. One is a valence scale, the scale depicted above in figure 7, the other one is the arousal 
scale, the scale below in figure 7. Valence scale ranges from a smiling manikin to a thrown 
manikin. At one extreme of the scale, individual felt happy, pleased, satisfied, contented, hopeful.  
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Figure 7. Valence scale and Arousal scale from the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM). 
At the other hand of the scale, individual felt completely unhappy, annoyed, unsatisfied, 
melancholic, despaired, bored. The scale also allow to describe intermediate feelings of pleasure – 
displeasure by selecting any of the other manikins. If one felt completely neutral, neither happy or 
unhappy, should select the figure in the middle, while if the feeling of pleasure – displeasure falls 
between two of the pictures, one should select the space between the two figures. This permits 
people to provide a more-fine grain rating of their personal reaction while viewing pictures. Arousal 
scale ranges from an excited manikin to a sleepy manikin. At one extreme of the scale, individual 
felt stimulated, excited, frenzied, jittery, wide-awake, aroused. At other hand of the scale, individual 
felt completely relaxed, calm, sluggish, dull, sleepy, unaroused. The scale also allow to describe 
intermediate feelings of activation – deactivation by selecting any of the other manikins. If one feel 
not at all excited or not at all calm, should select the figure in the middle of the raw, while in order 
to make a more accurate rating could select the space between two manikins. Participants are 
instructed to select on each scale and for each picture, the manikin that better correspond to their 
actual experience of valence and arousal while viewing the picture.   
 In sum, IAPS pictures are visual stimuli thought to induce specific affective states varying in 
the level of valence and arousal dimension. Such experimental tool has been created in order to 
reach such aim in a safe and noninvasive way, in a controlled experimental setting. IAPS pictures 
vary in the intensity of their emotional provocation. However, such provocation never exceed those 
that may be generated by other pictures available in the most common media, such as TV, cinema, 
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newspapers, the net. They have been found to be very efficient for those studies that currently seek 
to understand the role of emotions, affect and attention on several cognitive functions. For this 
reason, IAPS stimuli have been selected as the most efficient experimental method for this research, 
in order to manipulate participants’ affective state along valence and arousal dimension. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Aim of the Thesis 
 
As aforementioned, there is accumulating evidence showing that emotions and affective 
states have an influence on a wide range of cognitive functions (Barrett & Bar, 2009). Most 
important, they play a prominent role in shaping judgments and decisions. As reviewed in the 
previous chapters of this dissertation, affective reactions are able to provide information about the 
goodness of certain choice options, thus influencing risk perception and risk taking behavior 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  
However, previous studies on this topic mostly adopted a valence-based approach. That is, 
they have considered affective states as a unidimensional bipolar construct (negative or positive), 
ignoring its multidimensional nature (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999). In particular, the role of 
arousal (i.e. the intensity by which pleasure or displeasure is actually experienced) has been largely 
undervalued from prior studies. It has been shown that emotional states with the same valence (e.g. 
sadness and anxiety) may have different consequences on risk taking (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). 
Therefore, it is crucial to examine the influence of affect taking into account differences along the 
arousal dimension since focusing on valence dimension only fails in capturing all the variability 
among different affective sates. Few research investigated the effects of affective states on risk 
preference at different levels of arousal (e.g. Mano, 1992). In particular, the way in which arousal 
(negative and positive) impact risk taking and the processing of risky information remains still 
unclear.    
Hence, the fundamental aim of this thesis was to explore whether inducing negative or 
positive affective states at high or low levels of arousal  differently influences individual’s 
preference for monetary options varying in risk. 
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To address this question I first tested whether a high arousal state, either negative or 
positive, increases individual tendency to take risks. In particular,  I sought to understand whether 
including an unpleasant (pleasant) arousing cue as part of the decision scenario (contextual priming; 
Yi, 1990) influence the probability of selecting a risky option, as compared to a control condition in 
which an unpleasant (pleasant) unarousing cue is presented (chapters 4 and 5). Secondly, I inquired 
into possible explanations for this effect. In two eye-tracking studies I tested an hypothesis of 
cognitive depletion according to which an affective state characterized by elevated arousal would be 
associated to decreased attentional resources to be allocated to the processing of risky information 
(chapters 6 and 7). 
3.1 Summary of empirical studies 
The aforementioned aims will be analyzed throughout the second part of this dissertation in 
four different papers, summarized as follows. 
Paper 1 – Galentino, A., Bonini, N., Savadori, L. (in preparation). Incidental arousal elicited 
through contextual factors influences individual’s preference for risk. (Chapter 4) 
In this study, the effect of inducing incidental negative and positive arousal on preferences 
for risky monetary options has been investigated. Starting from evidence showing that inducing 
high levels of distress (negative arousal) increases risk taking behavior (e.g. Mano, 1992), I 
replicate and extend the effect of experimentally inducing incidental arousal (negative and positive) 
on incentivized risky choice. In two experiments, participants’ affective state has been 
experimentally manipulated in order to induce high or low levels of negative arousal (experiment 1) 
and positive arousal (experiment 2). Affect was manipulated by presenting participants with 
affective eliciting pictures (IAPS pictures), selected for each experimental condition with refer to 
the affective norms. In experiment 1 the effect of negative arousal has been examined. Therefore, in 
order to induce incidental affective states, unpleasant pictures with high or low level of arousal have 
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been selected and inserted as contextual factor of the decision scenario. Preferences for monetary 
lotteries with same expected value, constant probability but different risk were recorded.  
 Seventy-two participants took part in the study for monetary remuneration. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: Unpleasant Activation (UA, high arousal 
group; n = 31; 19 females); Unpleasant Deactivation (UD, low arousal group; n = 41; 17 females). 
Participants played a computerized risk taking task where in each trial they had to choose one 
among a pair of two-outcome lotteries. Each pair of lotteries was equal in expected value and 
probability of occurrence (50%). Riskiness was determined by manipulating the variance between 
the two monetary payoffs: The higher the variance, the higher the risk. IAPS pictures were 
presented in combination with each pair of lotteries. Therefore, on a single trial participants were 
presented with a pair of lotteries and a picture (high or low in negative arousal) displayed on the 
background of the screen. No feedback was provided. Once completed the risk taking task 
participants performed an affective experienced task where they were presented with all the 
previously seen pictures and they were asked to report the current level of valence and arousal 
experienced while viewing the pictures, using the two SAM scales. At the end of the experiment 
one trial was randomly extracted and the lottery chosen for that trial was played for participants’ 
remuneration. As expected, participants in the UA group (high arousal) reported higher levels of 
arousal than participants in UD group (low arousal). More important, it was found that the 
probability of selecting the risky lottery was higher for participants assigned to the UA group (high 
arousal) compared to those assigned to the UD group (low arousal). The result however, was one-
tailed significant. No gender effect emerged. 
 In experiment 2, the effect of positive arousal has been examined. Sixty-eight participants 
took part in the study for monetary remuneration. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
two experimental conditions: Pleasant Activation (PA, high arousal group; n = 30; 15 females); 
Pleasant Deactivation (PD, low arousal group; n = 38; 15 females). Procedure was identical to that 
adopted for experiment 1, except that pictures were selected among those with high level of valence 
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(pleasant stimuli) and high or low levels of arousal (according to the experimental condition). 
Participants assigned to the PA group (high arousal) reported higher levels of arousal than 
participants in the PD group (low arousal). Contrary to experiment 1, no main effect of arousal on 
risky choice was found. However, a gender effect and an interaction effect arousal by gender 
emerged: Probability of selecting a risky option was higher for males than females and this 
difference was increased by the arousal manipulation. More specifically, high positive arousal 
increased risk taking in males, but decreased risk taking in females. 
 Taken together, findings from this study suggest that arousal does impact risky choice. In 
particular, an unpleasant arousing contextual cue enhances probability of making a risky choice. 
Moreover, positive arousal also influences risk taking but a gender-dependent effect has been 
found. It may increase risk taking in males and decreasing it in females. Since there are few 
evidence in the literature documenting the effect of positive arousal (eustress) on risk-taking 
behavior, I conducted an additional study focusing on the role of positive arousal only, in order to 
deeply understand its impact on individuals’ preferences for risk. 
Paper 2 – Galentino, A., Bonini, N., & Savadori, L. (Submitted). Positive arousal increases 
individual’s preference for risk. (Chapter 5) 
 In this study I investigated whether preferences for monetary options varying in risk are 
influenced by inducing incidental affective states with high or low level of positive arousal. 
Research on arousal and risk suggests that negative arousal (i.e. distress) leads to increased risk 
taking (Porcelli & Delgado, 2009; Starcke et al., 2008) while very little is known about the role of 
positive arousal. Recent research suggests that positive arousal is accompanied to cognitive 
depletion, heuristic processing, less resistance to temptation and more willingness to engage in risky 
activities (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010). This is generally accounted in 
terms of increased sensitivity to rewards and immediate gratification. Therefore, I predicted that 
also positive arousal would influence preferences for risky monetary choices. Specifically, I expect 
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that a pleasant arousing contextual cue would increase probability of making a risky choice.
 One-hundred twenty-five participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions (High arousal, n = 65; 32 females, Low arousal, n = 60; 31 females). Risk taking was 
assessed by asking participants to choose between couple of lotteries with same EV but differed in 
terms of risk. Arousal was manipulated by presenting participants with visual stimuli (IAPS 
pictures) varying in the level of arousal keeping the valence constant (positive). Contrary to studies 
presented in paper 1, new lotteries have been included and also neutral images were presented.  By 
adopting the technique of contextual priming each subject was simultaneously exposed to the 
stimuli (the gambles) and the contextual factor (the arousing/unarousing image). Time spent for 
making each decision was also recorded.  
 A main effect of arousal on predicting risky choice was found: Participants in the high 
arousal condition selected the risky option more often than participants in the low arousal condition. 
Furthermore, participants in the high arousal condition took on average more time than participants 
in low arousal condition for making each choice. This result is in line with arousal theories which 
correlate the level of arousal of a stimuli to attention showing that high arousal is associated with 
decreased attentional resources (Anderson, 2005). Additional studies including some process 
tracing measures (e.g. eye tracking) are described in the rest of the thesis that may help to 
disentangle the cognitive mechanisms that determine the impact of arousal on choice. 
 Contrary to experiment 2, no effect of gender was found in this study. This is puzzling, 
however it is not the first time in the literature that the effect of gender shows to be inconsistent (in 
some studies it is elicited and in other studies it is not). The boundaries of this effect have not been 
further explored because they are out of the main aim of the present dissertation.  
 In summary, with this study I provide evidence that incidental affective states characterized 
by high levels of positive arousal increase preferences for risky monetary options. Since, both 
positive and negative arousal are characterized by changes in physiological activity, it may be 
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reasonable to posit that the same effects of negative arousal on cognition may occur even when the 
antecedent of the arousing  reaction is a pleasant event or stimuli.  
 Despite, at present, it has not been provided any exhaustive description for why arousal 
should increase risk taking, some psychological explanation suggests that an optimal cognitive 
performance requires a low/moderate level of arousal, while too little or too much arousal may have 
detrimental effects on cognition, including decision making (Kaufman, 1999; Yerkes & Dodson, 
1908). 
Paper 3 – Galentino, A., Bonini, N., Savadori, L., Venkatraman, V., & Vo, K.(In preparation). 
Incidental negative arousal and individual’s preferences for risky lotteries: an eye tracking study. 
(Chapter 6) 
 In this study I seek to understand the mechanism underlying the influence of negative 
arousal on preferences for monetary offers varying in risk. Research show that subjects 
experiencing high levels of distress (e.g. a public speech) were more risk taking in playing 
hypothetical gambles (e.g. Mano, 1992). In the present work I replicate and extend the effect of 
experimentally inducing incidental negative arousal on risky choice. I further tested the influence of 
arousal on visual attention. Evidence shows that high arousal narrows attentional focus (e.g. Loftus, 
1979). Therefore, I predicted that introducing an unpleasant arousing cue as part of the decisional 
scenario would have influence on participants’ attention allocation  
 Twenty-two participants (10 females) were asked to choose between couples of two-
outcomes lotteries with same expected value but different risk (variance between payoffs). Arousal 
was manipulated within subjects by presenting participants with IAPS pictures varying in the level 
of negative arousal (i.e. unpleasant stimuli with high or low levels of arousal). By adopting the 
technique of contextual priming (Yi, 1990), participants were simultaneously exposed to stimuli 
(lotteries) and a contextual factor (the arousing/unarousing image). In addition, eye fixations were 
recorded. 
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 An effect of arousal on predicting risky choice was found. Probability of selecting a risky 
lottery was higher when an arousing contextual cue was presented, as found in experiment 1 (paper 
1). Moreover, the predicted effect of arousal on attention allocation was found. Participants spent 
more time looking at the arousing image, compared to trials when an unarousing image was 
included. This result is in line with arousal theories which correlate the arousal level of a stimuli to 
attention (e.g. Fernandes et al., 2011). 
 In summary, with this study I provided evidence that incidental affective states characterized 
by high levels of negative arousal increases individuals’ preferences for risky monetary options 
compared to safe monetary options and influence attention allocation. The robustness of this result 
is also given due to the within subjects manipulation of arousal adopted for this experiment. 
Consistently with previous research, it was found that arousing stimuli are capable of capturing 
attention. A growing literature on the effect of arousal on cognition shows that elevated arousal is 
often accompanied with cognitive depletion and decreased attentional resources (Anderson, 2005; 
Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). This experiment shows that less attentional resources may be devoted to 
the processing of information, and this might be an explanation for the increase in risk-taking (or 
better, decrease in risk aversion) tendency of individuals under high arousal states. However, the 
link between less information processing and risk taking is still ambiguous, and further exploration 
of this topic is needed. 
Paper 5 – Galentino, A., Bonini, N., Savadori, L., Venkatraman, V., & Vo, K.(In preparation). 
Incidental positive arousal and individual’s preference for risky lotteries: an eye tracking study. 
(Chapter 7) 
  In this study I seek to understand how incidental affective states with high or low levels of 
positive arousal differently influences preferences for monetary offers varying in risk. Previous 
studies show that subjects positively aroused through exposure to IAPS pictures were more risk 
seeking while playing real gambles (Knutson et al., 2008; Galentino et al., submitted). However, the 
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instances for this effect are scant and, more importantly, the mechanisms underlying the effect of 
arousal on risk preferences are not clear. In a within-subjects eye-tracking experiment I 
experimentally induced positive arousal (high and low) and recorded individuals’ preferences for 
monetary lotteries varying in risk. I further predicted that arousing stimuli would capture visual 
attention and, as a consequence, would induce an high level of interference with the processing of 
risk information (measured as time spent looking at the riskier option).  
 24 participants (11 females) were asked to choose between couples of two-outcomes 
lotteries with same expected value but different risk (variance between payoffs). Arousal was 
manipulated within subjects by presenting participants with IAPS pictures varying in the level of 
positive arousal (i.e. pleasant stimuli with high or low levels of arousal). By adopting the technique 
of contextual priming (Yi, 1990), participants were simultaneously exposed to stimuli (lotteries) and 
contextual factor (the arousing/unarousing image). In addition, eye fixations were recorded. 
No behavioral effect of arousal on risky choice was found for this experiment. Nevertheless, 
eye-tracking data showed that participants spent more time fixating the arousing image, compared 
to trials when a pleasant unarousing image was included. Furthermore, participants seemed to 
process risky information longer when the pleasant unarousing cue was presented, as opposed to 
when a pleasant arousing cue was presented: fixation times towards the risky monetary offer was 
longer when the pleasant unarousing stimuli was contextually present, compared to when the 
pleasant arousing stimuli was present. 
In conclusion, this study provides evidence of the effect of arousal on attention allocation 
and information processing of risk. It was found that when a pleasant stimuli with low levels of 
arousal is included as part of the decisional context, participants process risky information for 
longer than when a pleasant arousing cue is presented. Even though no behavioral effect was found 
for this experiment, results may explain evidence from previous studies which found that presenting 
pleasant arousing stimuli included as part of the decision context makes participants less risk 
averse.  
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This result is in line with arousal theories which correlate the arousal level of a stimuli to 
attention (e.g. Fernandes et al., 2011) and with studies showing that elevated state of arousal are 
often associated to cognitive depletion (Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010).  
In summary, based on the evidence of this experimental work, it is possible to say that 
incidental affective states characterized by high levels of arousal may increase risk-taking behavior. 
This effect is consistently found for negative arousal (paper 1 and paper 3). It is partially found for 
positive arousal (paper 1, paper 2 and paper 4). Such effect may be due to an instance of cognitive 
depletion that characterizes elevated states of arousal. In such condition, arousal may influence 
attention allocation, leaving few cognitive resources available for a deeply information processing 
of risk. This may reduce people’s risk aversion normally observed in studies involving choices 
between gambles with same expected value. As suggested by Kaufman (1999), arousal may 
represent an additional source of bounded rationality, so that when people experience affective 
states (pleasant or unpleasant) characterized by high levels of arousal, choices may be guided by 
more impulsive mechanisms. This might lead people to make more hazardous choices. 
In the second part of this dissertation, there will be presented the four papers summarized in 
this chapter. 
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Everything in your life is a reflection of a choice you have made.  
If you want a different result make a different choice. 
Unknown  
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CHAPTER 4 
Paper I – Incidental Arousal and Individual’s 
Preference for Risky Lotteries 
 
4.1 Abstract 
 Incidental affect arise independent of a decision (e.g. due to contextual factors). Research 
show that negative affect may lead to risk propensity while positive affect may lead to risk 
avoidance, but very little is known on the effect of arousal on risk taking. Research shows that 
elevated arousal is associated to less resistance to temptations and increased willingness to engage 
in risky activities. In this study we investigated whether preferences for monetary offers varying in 
risk are influenced by inducing incidental affective states at high or low levels of arousal. Arousal 
was induced by presenting pictures varying in the level of negative (experiment 1; n = 72) or 
positive arousal (experiment 2; n = 68). Participants were randomly assigned to a low-arousal or 
high-arousal condition and asked to choose between pairs of two-outcome lotteries with same 
expected value, same probability, but different risk. Negative high-arousal increased preference for 
risk, while positive high-arousal influenced risk taking in a gender-dependent manner, increasing it 
in males and decreasing it in females. Implications for future research are discussed.   
4.2 Introduction 
Standard economic models explain decision making under risk as a methodical utility 
maximization process (e.g. Von Neumman & Morgestern, 1947). Developments in cognitive 
psychology and neuroeconomics show the volatility of such conceptualizations highlighting human 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1987) and discussing the role of decision maker’s affective state in 
cognitive evaluation of choice options, especially under risky conditions (Loewenstein, Weber, 
Hsee, & Welch, 2001). In particular, an affective-based cognitive evaluation of choice options may 
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determine whether the decision maker’s response will be more or less risk averse.(Isen, 2000; Isen 
& Patrick, 1983; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Affective state is distinguished from the wide-ranging of 
emotions for two reasons. First, they are steadily experienced as feeling states (in the presence or in 
the absence of awareness) (Russell, 2003). Most of the time, affective reactions remain at a 
subcortical level so that people are not always aware of them. Nonetheless, they always exert 
influences on several cognitive functions (e.g. memory, attention, judgment; for a review see 
Pessoa, 2008) and modify the way information is processed (e.g. Le Doux, 1996; Zajonc, 1980). 
Second, they can be explained according to some features including variations along valence and 
arousal dimensions (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999). For this reason, affective state is an 
overarching construct which incorporates not only emotions per se, but also feeling states that could 
have or could not have a clear triggering source, such as environmental cues and bodily reactions 
(e.g. Russell & Carroll, 1999; Schwarz, 2000). 
When considering affective influences on decision making process, two kinds of affective 
reactions are usually considered: integral affect and incidental affect (Loewenstein, Rick, & Cohen, 
2008). Integral affect consists of affective influences that are elicited by the decision process itself 
(i.e. by the act itself of making a decision), for instance by anticipating future consequences linked 
to the decision; thinking about future emotions that could be triggered out by knowing the decision 
outcome and so forth. In this study we focus on incidental affect which are, conversely, affective 
reactions unrelated to the decision to be made. Incidental affect are short-lived affective state with a 
clear trigger or cause. Specifically, they are elicited by situational factors (e.g. stressor events), or 
due to contextual cues and environmental conditions (e.g. images, music, odors). Affective 
reactions produced by such external events have been shown to influence judgment and decision 
making (incidental carryover effect; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992). For example, in a famous 
study, Hirsch (1995) investigated the role of incidental odors on gambling behavior. The study was 
conducted in a Las Vegas casino and one area was odorized with a pleasant odor, while another one 
was unodorized. The amount of money gambled in each area was measured and compared before, 
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during and after the experimental manipulation. It was found that money gambled in the slot 
machines located in the odorized area was significantly higher than the amount of money gambled 
in the same area before and after the experimental manipulation. Conversely, the amount of money 
gambled in the unodorized area did not change significantly. Hence, Hirsch (1995) suggests that a 
pleasant odor may elicit incidental affective states able to influence consumer’s gambling behavior.  
Many decisional researchers investigating the role of incidental affect on risk propensity 
show that positive affect may lead to risk aversion while negative affect may lead to risk seeking 
behavior (Isen & Patrick, 1983; Morris & Reilly, 1987). In particular, it has been shown that people 
in whom a positive affective state is induced report higher probability estimates of obtaining gains 
(i.e. an index of optimistic behavior) but, compared to controls, they are more risk averse when they 
are offered the chance to bet on an high risk gamble (Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988; Isen & Patrick, 
1983). As an explanation for this findings, the authors suggest that when in positive affect people 
may have the tendency to be protective of their feelings so that they would be reluctant to take more 
risk because of the repulsion from the negative outcome which might reduce their global well-being 
(mood maintenance). Conversely, when in negative affect, people would tend to take more risk 
since they find in the positive outcome the chance to enhance their low mood (mood repair, Morris 
& Reilly, 1987).  
A serious limitation of these theorizations is that affective state is conceived as a 
unidimensional bipolar construct (positive or negative) assuming that affective state with same 
valence have equivalent influences on decision making and risk behavior. Recently, researchers 
started to explore differences among diverse affective states which share the same level of valence 
(DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Raghunathan & Pham, 
1999) pointing out that adopting a valence-based approach may represent a big weakness since it 
fails in capturing all the variance which characterizes affective states. Rather, affect should be 
considered as a far more complex construct that is multidimensional in its nature (Russell, 2003). In 
addition to valence, at least one more dimension should be taken into account when influences of 
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affective states on cognitive processes are discussed: i.e. the arousal dimension (Russell & Feldman 
Barrett, 1999). While valence dimension refers to the experience of affective well-being and the 
hedonic tone of an affective state, arousal dimension refers to the subjective experience of energy or 
mobilization, alertness or tension. Affective arousal provides information about bodily experience 
since it is characterized by specific physiological reactions, elicited through the activity of the 
autonomic nervous system (e.g. Hagemann, Waldstein, & Thayer, 2003).  
In this study we focus on the role of incidental affective arousal on decision making under 
risk. By adopting the affect circumplex model, a widely-accepted bi-dimensional model of affect 
proposed by Russell (1980), we test the effect of inducing high or low levels of incidental negative 
arousal (experiment 1) and incidental positive arousal (experiment 2) on individuals’ preferences 
for risky monetary options.  
Evidence on influences of arousal on risk taking seem to converge on the idea that 
experiencing high levels of arousal increases risk taking behavior. It has been observed that people 
experiencing negative arousal (e.g. due to a pending presentation) were more risk seeking in playing 
hypothetical gambles (e.g. Mano, 1992). By using the same stressor, Starcke et al. (2008), required 
participants to play the Game of Dice Task (GDT, Brand et al., 2005), a computerized game where 
the goal is to maximize a capital of fictitious money by choosing between alternatives that consist 
of different combinations of dice. Compared to controls, stressed participants selected the risky 
combination more often and had a worse performance. In another study using the cold press task, a 
wide-used methodology for induce distress where participants have to immerse a hand into a 
container filled up with ice water (Ferracuti, Seri, Mattia, & Cruccu, 1994), a stronger reflection 
effect (Kahneman & Frederick, 2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) was observed: i.e. stressed 
participants showed an increased risk taking behavior in the loss frame (i.e. a gamble was preferred 
over a sure loss of equal expected value) and decreased risk taking in the gain frame (Porcelli & 
Delgado, 2009). In other studies, negative arousal (distress) has been found to interact with gender. 
For example, male participants exposed to the cold press task pumped more times on the BART 
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(demonstrating greater risk taking) than non-stressed male participants; while female stressed 
participants were less risk taking than female non-stressed participants on the BART (Lighthall, 
Mather, & Gorlick, 2009).  
Positive arousal has been examined less often than negative arousal. However, evidence 
shows that in some circumstances experiencing high-intensity positive affect increases risk taking 
behavior as well. For example, excitement, a pleasant emotion characterized by high levels of 
arousal has been found to be related to impulsive buying (Rook & Gardner, 1993). Similarly, 
Macht, Roth, and Ellgring (2002) found that joy, which is often accompanied by arousing reactions, 
increases chocolate consumption. Fedorikhin & Patrick (2010) studied the role of positive arousal 
on consumer choice finding that it is associated with cognitive depletion and results in decreased 
resistance to temptations. Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) studied the role of sexual arousal (i.e. a 
specific form of positive arousal) on sexual decision making. After inducing sexual arousal (through 
self-stimulation), authors required participants to make judgments and hypothetical decisions on the 
attractiveness of different sexual stimuli and activities; on the willingness to take various morally 
dubious measure to procure sex; and on the willingness to engage in risky sexual activities. Authors 
reported that, compared to the condition in which the same participants answered the questions in a 
neutral unaroused state, sexual arousal acted as a strong amplifier of sorts. More relevant to our 
study, it was found that the exposure to incidental pleasant stimuli (erotic pictures) increased 
financial risk-taking by altering anticipatory affect (Knutson, Wimmer, Kuhnen, & Winkielman, 
2008).  
The fact that negative arousal and positive arousal have a similar influence on risk taking 
behavior is not surprising. Although qualitatively different, negative and positive arousal are similar 
in several aspects. First, they elicit the same physiological reactions. It has been proved that 
pleasant and unpleasant stimuli equated for the level of arousal produce a similar physiological 
response (Bradley, Codispoti, Sabatinelli, & Lang, 2001). For instance, negative arousal is typically 
characterized by changes in skin conductance and heart rate deceleration. This is the case also for 
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positive arousal (Codispoti, Surcinelli, & Baldaro, 2008). Skin conductance is expected to increase 
as automatic reaction to any increase in affective arousal. Conversely, cardiac deceleration has been 
interpreted as reflecting orienting and sustained attention (Bradley et al., 2001; Lang, Greenwald, 
Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). Second, the processing of unpleasant arousing stimuli and pleasant 
arousing stimuli activates similar areas in the brain (Stark et al., 2005). Third, when presented with 
affective-eliciting pictures high in level of arousal, the differentiation between self-reported levels 
of positive affect and negative affect is highly reduced (Reich & Zautra, 2002).  
The way in which arousal impacts risk taking, instead, is still unclear. According to a 
dominant view, the increase in arousal is accompanied by a decrease in mental resources (Kaufman, 
1999). How, then, a decrease in mental resources translates in more risk taking is another 
problematic aspect of this explanation. According to several evidences, limited cognitive resources 
impacts human sensitivity to rewards, making them more desirable than what they are (Fedorikhin 
& Patrick, 2010). Following this view, increasing physiological arousal would increase human 
sensitivity to rewards and hence, make individuals more prone to accept risky options, which, by 
definition offer higher rewards, disregarding the fact that they also offer higher losses or, anyway, a 
less convenient outcome. 
Therefore, we predicted that introducing an arousing contextual cue as part of the decision 
scenario, would increase the probability of making a risky choice. 
Our study tries to encompass several limitations of previous studies. For example, the 
evidence suggesting that high levels of incidental arousal are associated to increased risk taking  is 
fragmented as regards of the type of arousal manipulation, the extent to which valence was kept 
constant and differed in the type of task used to measure risk taking. In our study we kept all these 
constant. Furthermore, most studies on positive arousal and risk referred only to male population 
(e.g. Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006), leaving the field of positive arousal unexplored for what 
concerns women subjects. In our study we used both male and female participants. We induced 
high or low levels of arousal keeping the valence controlled (negative and positive) and used the 
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same risk taking task across conditions, thus we were able to measure separately the influence of 
both incidental negative arousal (experiment 1) and incidental positive arousal (experiment 2) on 
risky choice. Furthermore, our arousal manipulation was minimally contaminated by uncontrolled 
emotions, such as fear, joy, or anger, that could have polluted previous studies. For example, 
requiring participants to give a public speech has been used as a manipulation of (negative) stress 
(e.g. Mano, 1992). However, one could complain that giving a public speech produces a cohort of 
emotions ranging from fear to excitement, which are both positive and negative in valence 
dimension. In this study we manipulated arousal and valence by using IAPS pictures (Lang et al., 
2005). This allowed us to control for the level of arousal as well as the level of valence induced by 
each stimuli in two ways. First, by using records collected in previous studies with a similar 
population. Second, by asking our participants to report perceived arousal and perceived valence for 
each stimuli at the end of the experiment. 
In experiment 1, participants were induced into a high-negative (Unpleasant Activation) or a 
low-negative (Unpleasant Deactivation) arousal condition and then their preferences for choices 
between couples of safer and a riskier two-outcomes lotteries, equal in expected value and 
probability but different risk (as determined by the variance between payoffs) were recorded. In 
experiment 2, participants were induced into an high-positive (Pleasant Activation) or a low-
positive (Pleasant Deactivation) arousal condition. We used the same risk taking task to measure 
individuals’ risk preference. Given that physiological reactions, neural activations and self-report 
indices are the same for both negative and positive arousal (Codispoti et al., 2008; Reich & Zautra, 
2002; Stark et al., 2005), we expect to observe the same pattern of results for both incidental 
negative arousal and incidental positive arousal. We also expect that a high arousal state will reduce 
risk aversion, as documented by previous literature on the effects of arousal on decision making 
under risk (e.g. Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Mano, 1992; Starcke et al., 2008). 
As mentioned above, in the current research incidental affect was manipulated by presenting 
participants with  affective-eliciting images (IAPS pictures) varying in the level of negative or 
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positive arousal. Adopting the technique of contextual priming (Yi, 1990), participants were 
simultaneously exposed to stimuli (i.e. the lotteries) and a contextual factor (i.e. the affective 
picture). In contextual priming, the simultaneous presentation of a stimulus and a contextual cue is 
able to create an association which can prime specific attributes of the stimulus influencing decision 
making. This is a very efficient way in order to specifically test the effect of contextual (incidental) 
affect on risky choice (distinguishing it from the effect of integral affect; see Mandel & Johnson, 
2002). 
4.3 Experiment 1 
In experiment 1 we tested the influence of incidental high-negative vs. incidental low-
negative arousal on preference for monetary lotteries varying in risk. 
4.3.1 Method 
Participants 
Seventy-two undergraduate students participated in the study  (Mage = 21.97 years; 36 
females). Students were recruited by a campus email announcement promising monetary reward for 
participation in a decision-making task. Eligibility criteria were defined as follows: (i) being in 
good health; (ii) having excellent knowledge of Italian language; (iii) not having actual or previous 
episodes of psychopathology and not being under psychopharmacological treatment. Before 
confirming their participation in the study all participants were asked to carefully read an 
information sheet containing few information about the aim of the study, eligibility criteria, 
experimental procedure, and remuneration procedure.  
Ethicality  
Approval for this study was obtained by the University Ethics Committee for 
Experimentation on the Human Being. This experiment was conducted in accordance with the 
principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. 
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Design  
Negative arousal (high vs. low) was manipulated in a between-subjects design. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: Unpleasant Activation (UA, high 
arousal group, n = 31; Mage = 21.06 ; 19 females) and Unpleasant Deactivation (UD, low arousal 
group, n = 41; Mage = 22.66 ; 17 females). A statistical analysis revealed that the two groups 
differed significantly in terms of age, t = 2.64 p = .01. Therefore, all the subsequent analysis have 
been run controlling for participants’ age. 
Materials 
 Risk taking task. Risk taking was assessed by asking participants to choose between pairs 
of 18 two-outcome lotteries, A and B, which shared the same expected value (EV) but differed in 
terms of risk (see Table 1). The degree of riskiness was determined by the variance between the two 
monetary outcomes, so that the higher the variance the higher the risk. All lotteries offered the 
participant the opportunity to win or lose a monetary reward with a 50% probability. For example, 
lottery A offered a 50% probability to win €7 or a 50% probability to win €5 and lottery B offered a 
50% probability to win €12 or a 50% probability to win €0. Among the set of risky lotteries, six 
included a zero gain as outcome (e.g. €12, 0.5; €0, 0.5), six included a sure gain as outcome (e.g. 
€12, 0.5; €1, 0.5) and six included a loss as outcome (e.g. €10, 0.5; €-1, 0.5). Table 1 reports the list 
of all stimuli used in this study. The two lotteries were displayed in two four-cell grids each with 
the two monetary outcomes displayed in the two upper cells and the 50% probability in the lower 
cells (see figure 1). In order to avoid changing participants’ affective state, no feedback was 
provided after a choice was made.  
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 Riskier lottery Safer lottery  
Decision # Outcome A Outcome B Outcome A Outcome B Expected value 
(EV) 
1 Winning €11 Winning €0 Winning €6 Winning €5 5.5 
2 Winning €12 Winning €0 Winning €7 Winning €5 6 
3 Winning €13 Winning €0 Winning €6 Winning €7 6.5 
4 Winning €15 Winning €0 Winning €8 Winning €7 7.5 
5 Winning €16 Winning €0 Winning €7 Winning €6 8 
6 Winning €20 Winning €0 Winning €11 Winning €9 10 
7 Winning €12 Winning €1 Winning €7 Winning €6 6.5 
8 Winning €14 Winning €1 Winning €6 Winning €9 7.5 
9 Winning €13 Winning €2 Winning €7 Winning €8 7.5 
10 Winning €14 Winning €3 Winning €9 Winning €8 8.5 
11 Winning €15 Winning €2 Winning €7 Winning €10 8.5 
12 Winning €17 Winning €1 Winning €9 Winning €10 9 
13 Winning €6 Losing €3 Winning €1 Winning €2 1.5 
14 Winning €7 Losing €2 Winning €3 Winning €2 2.5 
15 Winning €11 Losing €3 Winning €3 Winning €5 4 
16 Winning €11 Losing €1 Winning €4 Winning €5 5 
17 Winning €16 Losing €2 Winning €6 Winning €8 7 
18 Winning €18 Losing €3 Winning €7 Winning €8 7.5 
Table 1. Pairs of two-outcome lotteries used in the risk taking task. 
The order of presentation of the 18 trials was randomized between participants.  
 Affective induction. We induced affect using images chosen from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2005) and selected according to the affective norms
3
. 
Ratings in valence and arousal were obtained from a normative study conducted on a large sample 
of six-hundred fifty-nine Italian students (Balconi, Arangio, & Venutelli, in prep.) that followed the 
same procedure used in the original study by Lang et al. (2005). A total of  36 images were used for 
this experiment: among these, 18 were unpleasant emotional-eliciting stimuli high in arousal and 18 
were unpleasant emotional-eliciting stimuli low in arousal. Images chosen for the UA condition 
included unpleasant high arousal stimuli. This category included images depicting scenes of 
                                                          
3
 List of IAPS pictures used in experiment 1. Unpleasant Activation: 3000; 3010; 3015; 3016; 3030; 3051; 3053; 3060; 
3063; 3064; 3068; 3069; 3080; 3101; 3170; 3261; 3266; 6550. Unpleasant Deactivation: 2205; 2276; 2399; 2590; 2752; 
2840; 3300; 7031; 7060; 9000; 9001; 9008; 9041; 9110; 9210; 9280; 9290; 9330. 
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mutilation, death, bloody pictures or surgeries. These are stimuli able to induce states of negative 
tension such as fear, disgust or terror, i.e. unpleasant affective reactions characterized by a high 
level of arousal. Images chosen for the UD condition included unpleasant low arousal stimuli. This 
category included images depicting scenes of poverty, environmental pollution, cemeteries, children 
or adults crying. These stimuli can induce states of sadness, boredom or depression, i.e. unpleasant 
affective reactions characterized by a low level of arousal. Criteria for stimuli selection were set 
such that their range for valence dimension was 4.5 or less. High arousal stimuli had a range for 
arousal dimension of 5.5 or greater whereas low arousal stimuli had a range of 2.5 or less. Overall, 
high arousal stimuli had a mean of 1.33 in valence dimension and a mean of 7.5 in arousal 
dimension; for the law arousal stimuli the valence mean was 3.44 and the arousal mean was 2.61. 
Notably, a statistical analysis conducted across rating data from Balconi et al. (in prep.) indicated a 
significant difference in arousal ratings, t = 12.24 p < .001. However, also a difference in valence 
ratings has been registered, , t = -8.6 p < .001. Even though all the selected stimuli have a valence 
rating far below the neutral point (5) so that they must be considered unpleasant, it is reasonable to 
observe that arousing stimuli have been rated as more unpleasant than unarousing stimuli. Since 
stimuli selected for the affective manipulation differed significantly also along valence dimension, 
we tested the effect of arousal on risky choice controlling for differences in participants’ levels of 
experienced valence.    
 Affective experience task. Following Lang et al. (2005), we used a computerized version of 
the two nine-point Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) scales asking participants to rate their level of 
experienced valence and arousal while viewing each image selected for their specific experimental 
condition. 
 Post-task questionnaire. In a post-task questionnaire participants were asked to provide 
information about their age, gender and educational level.  
Procedure 
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 The experiment was conducted at the University Experimental Economic Laboratory, in a 
large room with 24 carrels divided by partitions that prevent visual contact and discourage 
conversation with neighbors. On arrival at the lab participants drew a number randomly to learn 
their assigned carrel and were asked to observe silence. Participants were told that they would 
complete two tasks: the risk taking task and the affective experience task. All the tasks were run on 
PCs (operating system: Windows 7, Intel processor) and presented on monitors with 1920 × 1080 
resolution. Experimental protocol was developed using Borland Delphi
®
 software package. 
Participants first read instructions on the screen under the guide of the experimenter, and then the 
lights of the laboratory were turned off to encourage individual focus and the experiment started 
with a practice trial. 
 At the beginning of each trial a fixation cross was displayed for a random interval between 
100-300 ms. Next, the pair of two-outcome lotteries and the associated image were displayed (see 
figure 1).  
 
Figure 2. Example of trial in the risk taking task. Note: The example is taken from Experiment 2, Pleasant Activation condition. 
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To induce an affective state during choice we revealed the affective manipulation (i.e. the image) 
and the stimuli (i.e. the lotteries) in the exact time. The left/right presentation of the riskier and safer 
lottery was randomized, so that in some trials lottery A was the safer option and in the other trials 
lottery B was the safer option. Also lotteries position was randomized, so that in some trials each 
grid containing the lottery was placed above the image, in the upper part of the screen, and in the 
other trials grids were placed below the image, in the lower part of the screen. A button reporting 
the label “Alternative A” or “Alternative B” was placed below each grid. After revealing the two 
lotteries (alternative A and alternative B) with the associated image, participants could select the 
lottery they preferred by clicking on the respective button. After completing the risk taking task, 
participants were presented with the affective experience task: they saw all the previously seen 
pictures and asked to report their current affective state using the two SAM scales. 
 Participants were told initially they already gained a €3 participation fee for taking part in 
the study. Furthermore, they were told and reminded throughout that one pair of gambles would be 
selected at random at the end of the experiment and the lottery they had chosen from that pair would 
be played for real money. After they completed the task, the computer determined which of their 
choices would be played for real, and then played the lottery to determine the outcome of the 
gamble they had chosen. In case of loss, the corresponding amount was deducted from the €3 
participation fee. For this reason negative payoffs did not exceed €3 (see Table 1). At the end of the 
experiment, after completing the affective experience task, participants were presented with a 
screen reporting the trial extracted for the remuneration, the chosen option and the obtained 
outcome. Then they completed the post-task questionnaire. Finally they were paid in cash, debriefed 
and released. 
4.3.2 Results 
 Choice made by participants across trials was used as dichotomous dependent variable. The 
safer lottery was coded as “0” and the riskier lottery as “1”.  
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 Affective experience task. Ratings of valence and arousal provided for emotional stimuli at 
the affective experiencing task were averaged in order to obtain an overall index of valence and 
arousal for each participant. The affective induction worked as expected. Self-reported levels of 
arousal in response to emotional stimuli were higher for participants in UA group than for 
participants in UD group t(70) = -4.32 p < .001 (UA, M = 5.66 SD = 1.75; UD, M = 4.19 SD = 
1.11). In addition, participants in UA condition reported lower levels of valence in response to 
emotional stimuli than did participants in UD condition t(70) = 5.58 p < .001 (UA, M = 2.75 SD = 
1.07; UD, M = 3.89 SD = .65). This result is aligned to literature  which shows that negative 
arousing stimuli are also evaluated as more unpleasant. Both groups reported a mean score of 
valence collocated below the neutral midpoint of the scale (5) indicating that in either group 
participants experienced negative affect. Female participants reported lower levels of valence in 
response to emotional stimuli than did male participants t(70) = -3.72 p < .001 (Males, M = 3.81 SD 
= .68; Females, M = 2.98 SD = 1.14) and reported higher levels of arousal than did males 
participants t(70) = 3.14 p < .01 (Males, M = 4.27 SD = 1.14; Females, M = 5.38 SD = 1.78). 
 Arousal induction and risk taking. In order to test the influence of arousal on probability 
of making a risky choice, we developed the following generalized linear mixed model of logistic 
regression 
ln (
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
) = ?̅? + 𝑎𝑗 + 𝑏1̅ + 𝑏2̅̅ ̅ + 𝑏3̅̅ ̅ + 𝑏4̅̅ ̅ + 𝑏5̅̅ ̅ 
including arousal (b1), gender (b2) and the interaction between the two (b3) as fixed effects, 
including age (b4) and valence (b5) ratings as covariates, and the intercept estimated for each 
participant (𝑎𝑗) as random effect, specifying the participants identification variable as a cluster, as 
required by the mixed models procedure. Choices made across trials were used as dependent 
variable specifying the safe choice as reference category.  
 Analysis revealed a one-tailed significant main effect of arousal on predicting risky choices 
F(1, 1285) = 2.72 p = .09. In particular, participants assigned to the UA group (high arousal) 
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selected the riskier option more often than did participants assigned to the UD group (low arousal) 
(UA, M = 4.3 SD = .77; UD, M = 2.43 SD = .66; see figure 3). Neither gender effect nor interaction 
between arousal and gender was found. The two covariates, age and valence, were not significant in 
predicting risky choice, all p > .05. Additional analyses introducing self-reported levels of valence 
as a covariate showed that valence did not predicted risky choice, p = .37, while the effect of 
arousal was still one-tailed significant, p = .08. 
 
Figure 3. Number of risky choices across conditions, Unpleasant Deactivation (UD) and Unpleasant Activation (UA) differentiated by 
gender. 
 We run additional analysis distinguishing between the three domains of stimuli used in this 
study (i.e. zero gain stimuli, sure gain stimuli and loss stimuli). A unique one-tailed significant 
effect of arousal on risky choice was found among stimuli including a zero gain as outcome F(1, 
421) = 3.26 p = .07. 
 Summarizing, participants induced into a high-arousal negative state made more risky 
choices than those induced into a low-arousal negative state. 
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4.4 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was identical to experiment 1 except that we focused on the influence of 
incidental high-positive vs. incidental low-positive arousal on preference for monetary lotteries 
varying in risk. 
4.4.1 Method 
Participants 
Sixty-eight undergraduate students participated in the study  (Mage = 23 years; 35 females). 
Students were recruited by a campus email announcement promising monetary reward for 
participation in a decision-making task. Eligibility criteria were defined as experiment 1.  
Design  
Positive arousal (high vs. low) was manipulated in a between-subjects design. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: Pleasant Activation (PA, high 
arousal group, n = 30; Mage = 22.37 ; 15 females) and Pleasant Deactivation (PD, low arousal group, 
n = 38; Mage = 23.5 ; 20 females). A statistical analysis revealed that the two groups did not differ 
significantly in age. 
Materials 
 Risk taking task. Risk taking task was identical to experiment 1. 
Affective induction. A total of  36 IAPS pictures were used for this experiment
4
: among 
these, 18 were pleasant emotional-eliciting stimuli high in arousal and 18 were pleasant emotional-
eliciting stimuli low in arousal. Images chosen for the PA condition included pleasant high arousal 
stimuli. Since images involving people tend to be rated as more arousing, especially pictures with 
                                                          
4
 List of IAPS pictures used in experiment 2. Pleasant Activation: 2344; 4652; 4656; 4658; 4659; 4670; 4681; 4683; 
4800; 4810; 5629; 8030; 8191; 8210; 8300; 8370; 8400; 8490. Pleasant Deactivation: 2514; 2580; 2850; 5000; 5020; 
5220; 5250; 5300; 5631; 5635; 5720; 5731; 5764; 5779; 5780; 5891; 7490; 7900. 
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erotic content, pleasant high arousal images included pictures depicting situations with people 
having fun or playing extreme sports as well as erotic stimuli. The latter were selected among those 
involving double-sex couples. These are stimuli able to elicit states of excitement and euphoria, i.e. 
pleasant affective reactions characterized by a high level of arousal. Images chosen for the PD 
condition included pleasant low arousal stimuli. This category included pictures depicting 
landscapes, flowers, scenes from the outer space, cute animals, and serene faces. These stimuli are 
generally expected to elicit a sense of calm and peacefulness, i.e. positive affective states usually 
associated with a low level of arousal. Criteria for stimuli selection were set such that their range for 
valence dimension was 5.5 or greater. High arousal stimuli had a range for arousal dimension of 5.5 
or greater whereas low arousal stimuli had a range of 2.5 or less. Overall, high arousal stimuli had a 
mean of 6.33 in valence dimension and a mean of 6.06 in arousal dimension; for the law arousal 
stimuli the valence mean was 6.17 and the arousal mean was 1.72. Notably, a statistical analysis 
conducted across rating data from Balconi et al. (in prep.) indicated a significant difference in 
arousal ratings, t(34) = 21.4 p < .001 and no difference in valence ratings, t(34) = .61, ns. between 
selected high arousal and low arousal stimuli.  
Affective experience task. As in experiment 1. 
Post-task questionnaire. As in experiment 1.  
Procedure 
In experiment 2 we followed the same procedure adopted for experiment 1. 
4.4.2 Results 
 Choice made by participants across trials was used as dichotomous dependent variable. The 
safer lottery was coded as “0” and the riskier lottery as “1”.  
 Affective experience task. Ratings of valence and arousal provided for emotional stimuli at 
the affective experiencing task were averaged in order to obtain an overall index of valence and 
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arousal for each participant. The affective induction worked as expected. Self-reported levels of 
arousal in response to emotional stimuli were higher for participants assigned to the PA group (high 
arousal) than participants assigned to the PD group (low arousal) t = -5.47 p < .001 (PA, M = 4.92 
SD = 1.31; PD, M = 3.36 SD = 1.03). Valence ratings did not differ significantly between the two 
groups t = -1.38 ns. No gender difference between males and females emerged in response to both 
valence and arousal scales, all p > .05. 
Arousal induction and risk taking. In order to test the influence of arousal on probability 
of making a risky choice, we developed the following generalized linear mixed model of logistic 
regression 
ln (
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
) = ?̅? + 𝑎𝑗 + 𝑏1̅ + 𝑏2̅̅ ̅ + 𝑏3̅̅ ̅ 
including arousal (b1), gender (b2) and the interaction between the two (b3) as fixed effects, and the 
intercept estimated for each participant (𝑎𝑗) as random effect, specifying the participants 
identification variable as a cluster, as required by the mixed models procedure. Choices made across 
trials were used as dependent variable specifying the safe choice as reference category. No main 
effect of arousal in predicting risky choice emerged F(1, 1221) = .82 ns. A main effect of gender on 
was found F(1, 1221) = 5.18 p < .05 (Males, M = 3.45 SD = .52; Females, M = 1.95 SD = .51). A 
significant interaction effect emerged between arousal and gender in predicting risky choice F(1, 
1221) = 4.8 p < .05. Probability of making a risky choice was higher for males participants assigned 
to the PA group (high arousal) compared to males participants assigned to the PD group (low 
arousal) (PA Males, M = 4.06 SD = .77; PD Males, M = 2.83 SD = .71). Conversely, probability of 
selecting a risky option was lower for females assigned to the PA group (high arousal) compared to 
females participants assigned to the PD group (low arousal) (PA Females, M = 1.06 SD = .78; PD 
Females, M = 2.85 SD = .67, see figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Number of risky choices across conditions, Pleasant Deactivation (PD) and Pleasant Activation (PA) differentiated by 
gender. 
 We run additional analysis distinguishing between the three domains of stimuli used in this 
study (i.e. zero gain stimuli, sure gain stimuli and loss stimuli). A unique significant gender effect 
was found among stimuli including a loss as outcome F(1, 404) = 7.42 p < .01, while a marginally 
significant interaction effect between arousal and gender was found among stimuli including a zero 
gain as outcome F(1, 404) = 3.46 p < .06. 
 Summarizing, positive arousal influenced risky choice in a gender-dependent manner 
increasing it in males and decreasing it in females.  
4.5 Discussion  
In this study we examined the impact of inducing incidental unpleasant (pleasant) affective 
states with high or low levels of arousal on preferences for monetary options varying in risk. By 
adopting the technique of contextual priming (Yi, 1990), we repeatedly induced incidental affective 
states with high or low arousal, keeping the valence constant (negative or positive). Arousal was 
manipulated by presenting participants with arousing or unarousing images (IAPS pictures) inserted 
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as contextual factor of the decisional scenario. In a risk taking task we asked participants to make 
choices between safer and riskier lotteries with the same expected value and constant probability.    
In both experiment 1 and experiment 2, we found that introducing an arousing cue as part of the 
decision context influences preferences for risk. In particular, we found that inducing an high-
intensity unpleasant affective state increases preference for the risky option, as compared to the 
condition in which participants were induced into a low-intensity unpleasant affective state. Even 
though this result was one-tailed significant it is consistent with a growing literature which finds 
that experiencing negative arousal (e.g. distress) does indeed increase risk taking behavior (e.g 
Mano, 1992; Porcelli & Delgado, 2009; Starcke et al., 2008). Previous research mainly ignored the 
role of positive stress on decision making. Nevertheless, evidence show that positive arousal and 
risk taking are positively correlated as well. For example, it has been shown that positive arousal 
decreases resistance to temptations (Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010), increases willingness to be 
engaged in risky sexual activities (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006), and increases financial risk taking 
(Knutson et al., 2008). In the current study we found that positive arousal influenced risk taking 
behavior in a gender-dependent manner. Specifically, we found that inducing high-intensity positive 
affective states increased risk taking behavior in males participants and decreased it in females 
participants. However, the interplay between stress (arousal) and gender should be further 
examined. In previous studies on negative stress, often this interaction effect has been evident under 
specific conditions (e.g. Lejuez et al., 2002; Lighthall et al., 2009; Pighin, Bonini, Savadori, 
Hadjichristidis, & Schena, 2014). Therefore, future research should deeply investigate gender 
differences in response to positive stress as well as their impact on behavior and cognition. Overall, 
the role of positive stress on influencing preferences for economic risk remains mostly unclear, 
therefore in the next paper of this dissertation we focused on positive arousal only. Furthermore, 
this study does not permit to validate any psychological explanation about the effect of arousal in 
risk taking behavior, therefore in the following papers we will seek to understand the mechanisms 
that underlie such relationship.  
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 In summary, this study represents a preliminary attempt to extend the scientific investigation 
regarding the role of arousal on risk preferences. We showed that both, negative and positive 
arousal may have impact on shaping individual preferences for risk. This research highlights the 
need of assessing both dimensions of valence and arousal when affective state is used as 
explanatory variable of differences in risk taking between individuals, considering that incidental 
affective states (elicited through situational or contextual factors) may influence risk preferences in 
a gender-dependent manner. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Paper II – Positive Arousal and Individual’s 
Preferences for Risky Lotteries 
 
 
5.1 Abstract  
It is recognized that high positive arousal impacts decision-making  but little is known on its 
effect on preferences for risk.  We manipulated positive arousal in an experimental setting and 
measured individual choices under risk in an incentivized task. 125 participants were randomly 
assigned to either a low-arousal or a high-arousal condition and asked to choose between pairs of 
two-outcome monetary lotteries with same expected value but different risk, in terms of outcome 
variance. The probability  was fixed at 50%. Participants in the high-arousal group selected the 
risky lottery more often and took more time to make choices than participants in the low-arousal 
group. These results show that high positive arousal alters economic behavior. The mechanisms 
responsible for this effect and practical implications are discussed.  
5.2 Introduction  
In many occasions people experience positive high-arousal. For example, getting married, 
passing an exam, being sexually attracted to someone else, feeling excited by partaking in a 
particular activity (e.g. extreme sports, or clubbing in an overcrowded party), are all instances of 
situations characterized by a highly intense positive emotion. Despite this, the majority of studies 
investigating the effect of high-intensity emotions on decision making have examined negative 
emotions, such as, stress, anxiety, anger (for a review, see Starcke & Brand, 2012). Few studies 
have examined the effect of high-intensity positive emotions (i.e. joy, excitement, elation) on 
decision making.  
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High-intensity emotions, either positive or negative,  are characterized by high levels of 
arousal. Arousal is the intensity with which pleasure (displeasure) is experienced and ranges from 
deactivation (or calm) to activation (or stress) (see Russell, 2003). Arousing reactions, along with 
pleasantness, constitutes affective state (i.e. the immediate reaction to any emotionally charged 
event). Affect provides basic information about the state of the environment and the organism and, 
most of the time, this information is used as a basis for guiding judgments and decisions (e.g. 
Schwarz & Clore, 1983). It is therefore crucial to examine the influence of affect on cognition at 
different levels of arousal.  
A variety of studies from psychology, economics, and marketing tend to converge on the 
fact that inducing positive arousal does indeed increase individual preference for risk. In a famous 
field study, players of a Las Vegas Casino gambled more money when the slot machines area was 
odorized with a pleasant odor, compared to when the area was unodorized (Hirsch, 1995). Even if 
there are no proofs that the effect of odor on behavior was mediated by an increase in positive 
arousal, the authors suggest this as a very likely explanation. Individuals in a positive high-arousal 
state also show more impulsive buying (Rook & Gardner, 1993), consume more chocolate (Macht, 
Roth, & Ellgring, 2002) and resist less to temptations (Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010). For example, 
participants exposed to pleasant arousing stimuli were more impatient toward obtaining a smaller 
but sooner reward in an intertemporal choice task and this effect was more evident in individuals 
with higher reward sensitivity (Van den Bergh, Dewitte, & Warlop, 2008).  Likewise, sexually 
aroused subjects (i.e. a specific form of positive arousal) have been found to be more willing to take 
various morally dubious measures to procure sex and engage in risky sexual activities (Ariely & 
Loewenstein, 2006) and male participants exhibited increased preference for disadvantageous decks 
in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) when these were associated with sexual pictures (Laier, 
Pawlikowski, & Brand, 2013). More relevant to our study, male participants presented with pleasant 
incidental cues (erotic pictures) increased their preference for risk and this effect was partially 
mediated by nucleus accumbens activation which is usually stimulated by an anticipatory affect  
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(Knutson, Wimmer, Kuhnen, & Winkielman, 2008). On a similar vein, it has been found that 
individuals exhibit an increased preference for risk on hypothetical gambles after viewing opposite 
sex faces (McAlvanah, 2009).  
The effect of positive arousal on risk attitude has been explained in various ways. It has 
been suggested that positive high-arousal may increase anticipatory affect, thus increasing the 
desire for rewards  (Knutson et al., 2008) and  the preference for immediate, compared to future, 
rewards (Van den Bergh et al., 2008). The effect of opposite-sex faces on gambling has also been 
attributed to the activation of either a mating mindset or to an increase in competitiveness 
(McAlvanah, 2009). According to several views, positive high-arousal causes a state of cognitive 
depletion in which the individual attention is focused on a very specific aspect of the situation 
(presumably the rewards) thus altering choice behaviour (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Fedorikhin 
& Patrick, 2010; Laier et al., 2013; Rook & Gardner, 1993). According to this view, positive high-
arousal should impact individual’s choice under risk, increasing preferences for risk which is 
associated to greater rewards. To test this prediction we measured the effect of positive high-arousal 
on individual preference for risk in an incentivized task. Previous studies focused on erotic stimuli 
which is only a subset of positive arousal activators. Furthermore, in most of these studies only 
male participants were used. In the present study, both male and female participants were either 
induced into a high-positive or a low-positive arousal condition and their preferences for a series of 
choices varying between safer and riskier lotteries, equal in Expected Value and with 50%  
probability, were measured. Risk was manipulated by varying the degree of variance between 
monetary outcomes of two options. To illustrate this, imagine that alternative A is a lottery which 
offers you a 50% chance of winning $15 and a 50% chance of winning $0 while alternative B is 
another lottery which offers you a 50% chance of winning $8 and a 50% chance of winning $7. The 
expected value for both alternatives is the same (i.e. $7.5) but A is riskier than B. We expect that 
participants in the high positive arousal condition  will choose the riskier option more often than 
those in the low positive arousal condition.  
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It must be said, however, that in some studies stress has been found to affect risk taking 
differently depending on gender. Male participants exhibited greater risk taking under stress while 
female were less risk-taking under stress (e.g. Lighthall, Mather, & Gorlick, 2009). Thus, we 
controlled also for the interaction between gender and arousal in search for a replication of the 
effect.  
Differently from most of the previous studies that have manipulated arousal through 
classical priming techniques (e.g. Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010; Knutson et al., 2008), we adopted the 
technique of contextual priming (Yi, 1990). This technique requires that a subject is simultaneously 
exposed to a stimulus (in our case, the gamble) and a contextual factor (in our case, the arousing or 
unarousing images). The simultaneous presentation of the stimulus and the contextual factor creates 
an association such that the contextual factor can prime certain attributes of the stimulus influencing 
preferences for choice options. 
5.3 Method 
Participants  
One-hundred twenty six undergraduate students participated in the study (Mage = 22.74 
years; 64 females). Students were recruited by a campus email announcement promising monetary 
reward for participation in a decision-making task. Eligibility criteria were defined as follows: (i) 
being in good health; (ii) having excellent knowledge of the experimental language; (iii) not having 
actual or previous episodes of psychopathology and not being under psychopharmacological 
treatment. Before confirming their participation in the study all participants were asked to carefully 
read an information sheet containing few information about the aim of the study, eligibility criteria, 
experimental procedure, and remuneration procedure.  
Ethicality  
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Approval for this study was obtained by the University Ethics Committee for Experimentation on 
the Human Being. This experiment was conducted in accordance with the principles of Declaration 
of Helsinki. 
Design 
Arousal (high vs. low) was manipulated in a between-subjects design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two experimental conditions (High arousal, n = 65; Mage = 22.94; 32 females; 
Low arousal, n = 61; Mage = 22.53; 32 females). 
Materials  
Risk taking task. Risk taking was assessed by asking participants to choose between pairs 
of 18 two-outcome lotteries, A and B, which shared the same EV but differed in terms of risk (see 
Table 1). The degree of riskiness was determined by the variance between the two monetary 
outcomes, so that the higher the variance the higher the risk. All lotteries offered the participant the 
opportunity to win or lose a monetary reward with a 50% probability. For example, lottery A 
offered a 50% probability to win €7 or a 50% probability to win €5 and lottery B offered a 50% 
probability to win €12 or a 50% probability to win €0 Among the set of risky lotteries, six included 
a zero gain as outcome (e.g. €12, 0.5; €0, 0.5) and twelve included a loss as outcome (e.g. €10, 0.5; 
€-1, 0.5). Table 1 reports the list of all stimuli used in this study. The two lotteries were displayed in 
two four-cell grids each with the two monetary outcomes displayed in the two upper cells and the 
50% probability in the two lower cells (see figure 1). In order to avoid changing participants’ 
affective states, no feedback was provided after a choice was made. In addition to participants’ 
preference for lottery A or lottery B, decision time for each choice was also measured.  
To ensure that participants paid attention to the task (i.e., did not choose randomly) we 
included 6 filler trials. The filler trials consisted of 6 choices between pairs of two-outcome lotteries 
109 
 
that differed in probability of occurrence and expected value (see Table 1). Participants who did not 
prefer the dominant option in at least five out of six filler trials were excluded from the analyses.  
 
 Riskier lottery Safer lottery  
Decision # Outcome A Outcome B Outcome A Outcome B Expected value 
(EV) 
1 Winning €11 Winning €0 Winning €6 Winning €5 5.5 
2 Winning €12 Winning €0 Winning €7 Winning €5 6 
3 Winning €13 Winning €0 Winning €6 Winning €7 6.5 
4 Winning €15 Winning €0 Winning €8 Winning €7 7.5 
5 Winning €16 Winning €0 Winning €7 Winning €6 8 
6 Winning €20 Winning €0 Winning €11 Winning €9 10 
7 Winning €6 Losing €1 Winning €2 Winning €3 2.5 
8 Winning €7 Losing €2 Winning €3 Winning €2 2.5 
9 Winning €11 Losing €3 Winning €5 Winning €3 4 
10 Winning €10 Losing €1 Winning €5 Winning €4 4.5 
11 Winning €11 Losing €1 Winning €6 Winning €4 5 
12 Winning €14 Losing €1 Winning €7 Winning €6 6.5 
13 Winning €16 Losing €2 Winning €8 Winning €6 7 
14 Winning €16 Losing €1 Winning €8 Winning €7 7.5 
15 Winning €18 Losing €3 Winning €8 Winning €7 7.5 
16 Winning €18 Losing €2 Winning €9 Winning €7 8 
17 Winning €19 Losing €3 Winning €9 Winning €7 8 
18 Winning €33 Losing €3 Winning €14 Winning €16 15 
Table 2. Pairs of two-outcome lotteries used in the risk-taking task. 
The order of presentation of the 24 trials was randomized between participants. 
Affective induction. We induced affect using images chosen from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2005) and selected according to the affective norms
1
. 
Ratings in valence and arousal were obtained from a normative study conducted on a large sample 
of six-hundred fifty-nine fellow countryman students (Balconi, Arangio, & Vanutelli, in prep.) that 
followed the same procedure used in the original study by Lang et al. (2005). A total of 72 images 
were used: among these, 48 were positive emotional-eliciting stimuli (24 high in arousal, 24 low in 
arousal) and 24 were neutral emotional-eliciting stimuli. Since images involving people tend to be 
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rated as more arousing, especially pictures with erotic content, pleasant high arousal images 
included pictures depicting situations with people having fun or playing extreme sports as well as 
erotic stimuli. The latter were selected among those involving double-sex couples. These are stimuli 
able to elicit states of excitement and euphoria, i.e. pleasant affective reactions characterized by a 
high level of arousal. Pleasant low arousal images included pictures depicting landscapes, flowers, 
scenes from outer space, cute animals, and serene faces. These stimuli are generally expected to 
elicit a sense of calm and peacefulness, i.e. positive affective states usually associated with a low 
level of arousal. Neutral stimuli mainly included pictures depicting objects as well as geometric 
shapes. These stimuli are not expected to elicit a substantial change in participant’s affective state. 
Criteria for stimuli selection were set such that their range for valence dimension was 5.5 or greater. 
High arousal stimuli had a range for arousal dimension of 5.5 or greater whereas low arousal stimuli 
had a range of 2.5 or less. Neutral images were selected among stimuli with a valence range 
between 4 and 5 and an arousal range between 1 and 3. Overall, high arousal stimuli had a mean of 
6.42 in valence dimension and a mean of 6.17 in arousal dimension; for the low arousal stimuli the 
valence mean was 6.13 and the arousal mean was 1.63, while neutral stimuli had a mean valence of 
5.08 and a mean arousal of 1.58. Notably, a statistical analysis conducted across rating data from 
Balconi et al. (in prep.) indicated a significant difference in arousal ratings, t(46) = 27.5, p < .001 
and no difference in valence ratings, t(46) = 1.2, ns. between selected high arousal and low arousal 
stimuli.  
Affective experience task. Following Lang et al. (2005), we used a computerized version of 
the two nine-point Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) scales asking participants to rate their level of 
experienced valence and arousal while viewing each image selected for their specific experimental 
condition. 
Post-task questionnaire. In a post-task questionnaire participants were asked to provide 
information about their age, gender and education level.   
Procedure 
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The experiment was conducted at the University Experimental Economic Laboratory, in a 
large room with 24 carrels divided by partitions that prevent visual contact and discourage 
conversation with neighbors. On arrival at the lab participants drew numbers randomly to learn their 
assigned carrel and were asked to observe silence. All participants provided written informed 
consent before starting the experiment. Participants were told that they would complete two tasks: 
the risk-taking task and the affective experience task. All the tasks were run on PCs (operating 
system: Windows 7, Intel processor) and presented on monitors with 1920 × 1080 resolution. 
Experimental protocol was developed using Borland Delphi software package. Participants first 
read the instructions on the screen under the guide of the experimenter, and then the lights of the 
laboratory were turned off to encourage individual focus and the experiment started with a practice 
trial. 
At the beginning of each trial a fixation cross was displayed for a random interval between 
100-300 ms (see Figure 1). Next, two vertical rectangles with the label “click to show” were 
displayed. Participants had to click with the mouse on each rectangle for revealing the pair of two-
outcome lotteries and the associated images. Each lottery of the pair was associated to an image. To 
induce an affective state during choice we revealed the affective manipulation (i.e. the image) and 
the stimuli (i.e., the lottery) in the exact same time. One image was neutral and the other was high 
(or low) in arousal. The association between the lottery and the arousing (unarousing) image was 
counterbalanced across participants, so that for each individual who saw the arousing (unarousing) 
image associated to the riskier lottery, another saw the arousing (unarousing) image associated to 
the safer lottery. The other lottery was always associated to a neutral image. The left/right 
presentation of the riskier and safer lottery was also randomized, so that in some trials lottery A was 
the safer option and in the other trials lottery B was the safer option. Each grid containing the 
lottery was placed inside the image, in the lower part, with a button reporting the label “Alternative 
A” or “Alternative B” below it. Only after revealing both lottery A (with its associated image) and 
112 
 
lottery B (with its associated image) participants could select the lottery they preferred by clicking 
on the respective button. 
 
Figure 8. Time course of one trial in the risk taking task. 
After completing the risk-taking task, participants were presented with the affective 
experience task: they saw all the previously seen pictures and asked to report their current affective 
state using the two SAM scales.  
Participants were told initially that they already gained a €3 participation fee for taking part in the 
study. Furthermore, they were told and reminded throughout that one pair of gambles would be 
selected at random at the end of the experiment and the lottery they had chosen from that pair would 
be played for real money. After they had completed the task, the computer determined which of 
their choices would be played for real, and then played the lottery to determine the outcome of the 
gamble they had chosen. In case of loss, the corresponding amount was deducted from the €3 
participation fee. For this reason negative payoffs did not exceeded €3 (see Table 1). At the end of 
the experiment, after completing the affective experience task, participants were presented with a 
screen reporting the trial extracted for the remuneration, the chosen option and the obtained 
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outcome. Then they completed the post-task questionnaire. Finally they were paid in cash, debriefed 
and released. 
5.4 Results 
Choice made by participants across trials was used as dichotomous dependent variable. The 
safer lottery was coded as “0” and the riskier lottery as “1”. One participant was excluded for not 
having chosen the dominant option in at least five filler trials in the behavioral task, so that the final 
sample resulted in one-hundred twenty-five participants (high arousal, n = 65; 32 females; low 
arousal, n = 60; 31 females).  
Affective experience task. Ratings of valence and arousal provided for emotional stimuli at 
the affective experiencing task were averaged in order to obtain an overall index of valence and 
arousal for each participant. The affective induction worked as expected. Self-reported levels of 
arousal in response to emotional stimuli were higher for participants in high arousal condition than 
for participants in low arousal condition t(123) = 5.62 p < .0001 d = 1.01 (High Arousal, M = 5.76 
SD = 1.56; Low Arousal, M = 4.32 SD = 1.25). In addition, participants in high-arousal condition 
reported higher levels of valence in response to emotional stimuli than did participants in low-
arousal condition t(123) = 2.43  p = .01 d = 0.43 (High Arousal, M = 6.98 SD = .97; low arousal, M 
= 6.6  SD = .73). Nevertheless, both groups reported a mean level of valence collocated over the 
neutral midpoint of the scale (5) indicating that in either group participants experienced positive 
affect. Female participants reported higher levels on both valence and arousal scales in response to 
emotional stimuli than did male participants (Valence: t(123) = -2.61 p = .01 d = 0.47 Males, M = 
6.59 SD = .9; Females, M = 7 SD = .82; Arousal: t(123) = -1.98 p < .05 d = 0.35 Males, M = 4.79 
SD = 1.42; Females, M = 5.34 SD = 1.7).  
Arousal induction and risk taking. In order to test the influence of arousal on the 
probability of making a risky choice, we developed a generalized linear mixed model of logistic 
regression including arousal, gender, and the interaction between the two as fixed effects, and the 
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intercept estimated for each participant as random effect, indicating the participant identification 
variable as a cluster, as required by the mixed models procedure. Choices made across trials were 
used as dependent variable specifying the safe choice as reference category. Filler trials were 
excluded from the analysis and only the choices made through the 18 experimental trials were 
analyzed.  
Analyses revealed a significant main effect of arousal on predicting risky choices F(1, 2245) 
= 4.47 p = .03. Participants in the high-arousal condition selected the riskier option more often than 
did participants in the low-arousal condition  (High Arousal, M = 4.14; SD = 3.9; Low Arousal, M = 
2.8; SD = 3.38; see figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Number of risky choices across conditions, Low arousal and High arousal. 
A main effect of gender, F(1, 2245) = 3.7 was also found and this result was significant at the p = 
.05 level. Males made more risky choices than females (Males, M = 4.15 SD = 3.91; Females, M = 
2.86 SD = 3.39). Finally, the interaction effect between arousal and gender was not significant in 
predicting risky choice, p = .38.  
Ratings provided during the affective experience task revealed that the high and the low 
arousal groups differed in the experienced arousal, confirming that the arousal manipulation 
worked. However, they also differed in valence. For this reason, we performed the regression model 
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again introducing valence ratings as covariate. Valence ratings did not influence directly risky 
choice, p = 1 and the effect of arousal on risk preference was still significant F(1, 2194) = 4.51 p = 
.03. 
We run additional analyses distinguishing between the only-gain lotteries (the first 6 rows of 
Table 1) and the mixed lotteries (from row 7 to the end of Table 1). A unique effect of arousal on 
risky choice was found only among those lotteries  including a loss as outcome F(1, 1121) = 5.17 p 
= .02 (e.g. 16;-1 vs. 7;8).  
An independent samples t-test also revealed that participants in the high-arousal condition 
took on average more time than participants in the low-arousal condition to make each choice, 
t(123) = 2.46; p = 0.01 d = 0.44, (High Arousal, M = 10269.16; SD = 4071.01; Low Arousal, M = 
8517.33; SD = 3841.86). Including the decision time measure into the regression model as a 
covariate showed that it significantly predicted risky choice F(1, 2242) = 19.82 p < .001, and 
reduced the effect of the arousal factor to a marginally significant one F(1, 2242) = 3.48 p = .06 
suggesting a possible mediational effect of time on the relationship between arousal and risky 
choice. 
Summarizing, participants induced into a high-arousal positive state made more risky 
choices and took more time to decide than those induced into a low-arousal state. 
5.5 Discussion 
In this study we examined the impact of positive high-arousal on risk preferences. By 
adopting the technique of contextual priming (Yi, 1990), we repeatedly induced incidental affective 
states with high or low levels of positive arousal. We found that introducing a pleasant arousing cue 
as part of the decision context increases individual’s preferences for the risky option. Our results are 
consistent with a growing literature on arousing effects on risk propensity which finds that positive 
arousal and risk taking behavior are positively related (e.g. Laier et al., 2013; McAlvanah, 2009).  
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In this study, the two experimental groups differed in the level of experienced arousal as 
indicated by the self-reported indices of arousal provided in the affective experience task. However, 
they also differed in terms of valence: the high-arousal group reported higher positive valence than 
the low-arousal group. This is not an unexpected result since stimuli rated as more pleasant are 
rated as more arousing as well (Bradley & Lang, 2007). This is not even a troublesome result, since 
after controlling for valence, the effect of arousal on risky choice was still significant. Therefore, we 
can conclude that differences in risky choices found between the two experimental groups are not 
better explained by differences in valence ratings.  
The effect of positive high-arousal that we have reported is somewhat similar to the effect of 
negative high-arousal. Previous research indeed showed that stress leads to increased risk taking 
behavior (e.g. Mano, 1992). Given that physiological reactions, neural activations and self-report 
indices are the same for both positive and negative arousal (Codispoti, Surcinelli, & Baldaro, 2008; 
Reich & Zautra, 2002; Stark et al., 2005), it is not surprising to find that the two have similar effects 
on behavior. However, it is noteworthy, since it could mean that high positive arousal might have 
the same negative effects on health as negative high arousal.  
Why greater physiological activation does increase risk-taking? According to several views 
elevated arousal decreases cognitive capacity (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Fedorikhin & Patrick, 
2010; Laier et al., 2013; Rook & Gardner, 1993). Arousal theories correlate the arousal level of 
emotional stimuli to attention (Fernandes, Koji, Dixon, & Aquino, 2011); in particular, high 
arousing stimuli are capable of capturing attention. More importantly, it is arousal that influences 
the amount of attention that is voluntarily or involuntarily directed to those stimuli. Lang, 
Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm (1993) demonstrated that participants look at arousing images for 
longer than unarousing images regardless of valence. Gronau, Cohen, and Ben-Shakhar (2003) 
showed that skin conductance, a feature of arousal, is correlated with the interference effect on an 
emotional Stroop task. Schimmack and Derryberry (2005) examined the interference effect of 
arousal on cognition and attention by asking participants to ignore emotional stimuli (IAPS 
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pictures) while performing a cognitive task (study 1, solving math problems) and an attentional task 
(study 2, detecting the location of a line). It was found that arousal level of pictures predicted 
interference effect on both tasks with the most arousing pictures (with positive and negative 
valence) producing the strongest interference effect.  
According to the cognitive depletion hypothesis, a reduced cognitive capacity is 
accompanied by an altered sensitivity to rewards which triggers increased risk-taking (e.g. (Ferrara 
et al., 2015; Killgore, Kamimori, & Balkin, 2011) (Venkatraman, Huettel, Chuah, Payne, & Chee, 
2011). Positive high-arousal indeed has been linked to an increase in anticipatory affect which 
increases the desire for rewards  (Knutson et al., 2008). Since greater risk is always associated to 
greater rewards, an altered sensitivity to rewards can explain why high-arousal induces people to be 
more risk takers. 
 In our study we found evidence that decision times were longer for the high-arousal group. 
However, when controlling for decision times the effect of arousal was reduced but still marginally 
significant. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the difference in the time spent for making decisions 
between the high arousal and low arousal groups directly mediates the relation between arousal and 
increased risk taking but stronger methodologies for attention allocation detection, such as some 
process-tracing measures (e.g. eye-tracking), might help to disentangle the attentional mechanisms 
that determine the impact of arousal on choice. 
Furthermore, we found that the effect of positive arousal on risk-taking was specific for 
mixed lotteries involving a gain and a loss. A unique effect in such specific lotteries might indicate 
that arousal alters in particular individual indexes of loss aversion (increased sensitivity to rewards 
would reduce individual index of loss aversion). However, this may also be due to the difference in 
the number of stimuli involving a loss and those involving no loss used for this study. Future works 
using an identical number of stimuli may help to clarify this point. Moreover, in this experiment 
probability was kept constant at the 50% level. Additional studies may investigate whether the 
effect of positive arousal on risk-taking is sensitive to variations in probability of the outcomes. 
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In sum, this research represents a further evidence on the role of positive high-arousal on 
risk preferences for monetary options in an incentivized task  We showed that both male and female 
participants induced in a high arousal state were more attracted by the risky option than by the safer 
option compared to those induced into a low-arousal state; furthermore valence was not the 
explanation, since reported levels of valence made no difference to the main result.  
We also showed that incidental affect was able to influence decision making under risk. In 
particular, a pleasant and arousing cue inserted as a contextual factor of a decisional scenario was 
able to shift individual preferences. This evidence has practical relevance for psychological, 
marketing and consumer research since a lot of studies in these fields currently seek to understand 
the role of emotional states and mood on choices. Several real-world decisions like healthcare and 
retirement investments involve significant emotional tradeoffs. Yet very little is known about the 
mechanisms underlying the interplay between affect and cognition. We contend that further 
understanding of such mechanisms would provide valuable insights into the comprehension of 
decision making processes.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Paper III – Negative Arousal and Individual’s 
Preferences for Risky Lotteries: an Eye-tracking 
Study 
 
6.1 Abstract 
In this study we seek to understand how incidental affective states with high or low levels of 
negative arousal differently influence preferences for monetary offers varying in risk. Previous 
evidence indicates that experiencing high-intensity negative affect increases risk taking, however 
little is known about the mechanisms which govern the relationship between arousal and risk. 
Arousal is often associated with cognitive depletion and narrowed attention. Therefore, we 
predicted that introducing an unpleasant arousing cue as part of the decision context will subtract 
attentional resources and interfere with normal decision making processes thus alter risk taking. In 
an eye-tracking experiment we manipulated arousal within subjects by presenting participants with 
pictures varying in the level of negative arousal. 22 participants were asked to choose between pairs 
of two-outcome monetary lotteries with same expected value but different risk. In line with 
attentional theory of arousal participants spent more time looking at arousing images. Behavioral 
results indicated that participants presented with an arousing contextual image selected more often 
the lottery higher in risk. Implications for future studies are discussed.   
6.2 Introduction 
Consider Laura, a 30-year-old advertiser that is going to present her proposal for a new spot 
for a very famous company. Laura worked really hard on her project and today she will show her 
idea in front of a large commission who will judge her work and will decide whether or not to 
assume her for developing her idea. Laura is restless, tense, and also frightened. She is experiencing 
negative emotions with an high level of activation. 
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Laura had her presentation very late, she is very tired and annoyed, and she is looking 
forward to meet her friends for hanging out with them at a party tonight. Unfortunately she got a 
very bad cold and she must stay at home for the night. She is completely bored, frustrated and sad. 
Now, she is experiencing a multitude of negative emotions with a low level of activation. 
Now imagine that Laura was asked to choose between: 
A: a sure win of 500.000 dollars 
B: a 50% chance to win 1 million dollars and a 50% chance to win nothing. 
Option A is safer  while option B is riskier. What would she choose? Would her choice be the same 
in the two moments presented above? Before her presentation, Laura was experiencing high-
intensity negative emotions. Then, when she became sick, Laura experienced low-intensity negative 
emotions. In both situations Laura experienced negative feelings but at different level of arousal. 
Experiencing a high-intensity negative affect (e.g. distress) or experiencing a low-intensity negative 
affect (e.g. boredom) would impact her choice differently?  
High intensity affects are characterized by high levels of arousal (stress). Indeed, there is 
accumulating evidence documenting a positive relationship between arousal and risk taking 
behavior (e.g. Mano, 1994, see also Galentino et al., chapter 4 and 5 in this dissertation). A variety 
of studies from psychology and economics have demonstrated that experiencing high level of stress 
would increase preference for risk (e.g. Starcke, Wolf, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2008). However, the 
mechanisms which govern the effect of arousal on risk preferences remain unclear. Therefore, 
returning to the example above, Laura will be more tempted to choose the riskier alternative before 
presenting her project while she is tense, than when she is bored and sick. 
In the present work we replicate and extend the effect of experimentally inducing incidental 
negative arousal on risky choice. Furthermore, we tested an attentional explanation for the effect. 
We show that introducing an arousing stimuli contextually presented in the decision scenario 
(contextual priming) captures individual attention thus subtracting attentional resources from the 
main task.  
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 With the term incidental affect we refer to short-lived affective states with a clear trigger or 
cause. Differently from integral affect, which are affective reactions elicited by the act itself of 
making a decision, incidental affect arises independent of a decision. Therefore, it could represent 
an individual disposition to react to an event but it could also be elicited through situational factors 
(e.g. stressor events) or contextual and environmental cues (e.g. images, sounds, odors). Affective 
reactions elicited by such external events are normatively irrelevant to the decision at hand but 
nonetheless have influence on decision making process (e.g. Bonini et al., 2011). 
 By definition, an affective state is conceived as the immediate reaction to a stimulus or 
event. It represents the most primitive part of what characterize an emotion. affective state is 
typically described according to two main dimensions: valence and arousal (e.g. Russell, 2003). 
Differently form valence, which provides information about the current well-being of the organism, 
arousal refers to the psychological and physiological experience of energy, mobilization, activity, 
tension, alertness or quietness (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999). Arousal dimension ranges from 
deactivation (or calm) to activation (or stress). Furthermore, it is associated with a bodily 
experience since it is characterized by changes in many physiological parameters through the 
autonomic nervous system activity (e.g Hagemann, Waldstein, & Thayer, 2003).  
 Arousing reactions, along with pleasantness, provide basic information about the state of the 
environment and the organism and, most of the time, this information is used as a basis for guiding 
judgments and decisions (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). As 
summarized by Storbeck & Clore (2008), arousal can be easily misattributed to other unrelated 
events leading people to make more polarized judgments: i.e. positive outcomes or events are 
evaluated more favorably while negative outcomes or events are evaluated less favorably. Given the 
data, it is crucial to examine the influence of affect on cognition at different levels of arousal. For 
example Lerner & Keltner (2001) showed that fear and anger, two negative emotions which differ 
in the level of arousal, have opposite effect on risk taking. In particular, fear leads to pessimistic 
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risk-estimates and risk averse choices while anger leads to optimistic risk estimates and risk seeking 
choices. 
 A large amount of studies show that inducing negative distress increases risk-taking 
behavior (Johnson, Dariotis, & Wang, 2013; Mano, 1992; Pabst, Brand, & Wolf, 2013; Pighin, 
Bonini, Savadori, Hadjichristidis, & Schena, 2014; Pighin & Schena, 2012; Porcelli & Delgado, 
2009; Reynolds et al., 2013; Starcke et al., 2008). 
 Starcke et al. (2008) for example, required participants to prepare a public speech (a 
common method for inducing distress and consequently negative arousal (Levenson et al., 1988) 
prior to paying the Game of Dice Task (GDT, Brand et al., 2005), a computerized game where the 
goal is to maximize a capital of fictitious money by choosing between alternatives that consists of 
different combinations of dice. Stressed participants selected the risky combination significantly 
more often and had a significantly lower net score than non-stressed participants. Using the same 
social stressor and the same task, a more recent study replicated this findings but a time dependent 
result was found: the risk-taking increase was observed after 18 minutes from the stressing task but 
not before (Pabst et al., 2013). The same stressor also increased adolescent risk-taking on the BART 
(Lejuez et al., 2002), a task in which participants have to pump a virtual balloon wherein more 
pumps are associated with increased earnings but also increased risk of balloon explosion and 
consequent loss of the earning s for that trial (Johnson et al., 2012; Reynolds et al., 2013). In a study 
using the cold press task (Ferracuti, Seri, Mattia, & Cruccu, 1994) wherein participants are asked to 
immerse a hand into an ice water container for one minute, a stronger reflection effect (Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) was observed: increased risk-taking in the loss 
frame (i.e. a gamble was preferred over a sure loss of equal expected value and decreased risk-
taking in the gain frame (Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). Similarly, when participants were examined in 
the same task in an oxygen depleted environment (physical stress), they exacerbated the reflection 
effect: they choose the gamble over the sure thing more often than when they were examined in a 
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normal environment, especially in the loss frame (i.e. when the sure thing was compared with a loss 
of equal expected value (EV) (Pighin et al., 2012). 
Taken together, this evidence suggests that experiencing an unpleasant affective state 
characterized by an high level of arousal may increase individual risk taking. Therefore, in line with 
previous studies, we expect to observe an increase in individual’s preference for a riskier option 
when an incidental unpleasant arousing cue is inserted in the decision context. 
 In some studies, but not all, stress has been found to affect risk taking differently depending 
on gender. Male participants under the cold press task pumped more times on the BART 
(demonstrating greater risk taking) than non-stressed male participants; while female stressed 
participants were less risk-taking than female non-stressed participants on the BART (Lighthall, 
Mather, & Gorlick, 2009). Similarly, when male athletes were under stress (intense physical 
exercise) they made more pumps on the BART, than when they were not; on the contrary, female 
athletes made less pumps on the BART under stress (Pighin, Savadori, Bonini, Andreozzi, 
Savoldelli, & Schena, in press). For this reason, in our study we controlled for the interaction 
between arousal and gender. 
 Why an increase in the tone of arousal does increase risk taking? At present, no definite 
unique explanation has been provided.  Some authors, following the dual-process approach, found 
that high-intensity affect leads people to adopt more automatized risk biases (Porcelli & Delgado, 
2009). However, most of the studies converge toward a cognitive depletion explanation. According 
to this assumption, the increased risk-taking observed under stressful conditions may be the result 
of a decrease in cognitive capacity caused by elevated arousal (e.g. Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010; 
Galentino et al., submitted; Mano, 1992; Reynolds et al., 2013). In this view, arousal acts as a 
distractor focusing motivation on a very narrow goal (e.g. an immediate reward). More specifically, 
arousal theories connect arousal to attention. For example, Anderson (2005) reports that increased 
arousal is associated with decreased attentional resources, enabling emotional significance to shape 
perceptual experience. A large amount of research suggests that in the presence of a source of 
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elevated arousal an interference effect is produced and it has disrupting consequences on attention 
allocation and cognitive performance (Fernandes, Koji, Dixon, & Aquino, 2011; Gronau, Cohen, & 
Ben-Shakhar, 2003; P J Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993; Sanbonmatsu & Kardes, 1988; 
Schimmack & Derryberry, 2005). Lang et al. (1993) showed that people look at arousing pictures 
for longer than unarousing pictures. In a consumer choice study, Sanbonmatsu & Kardes (1988) 
found that participants in an high arousal state were less accurate in evaluating advertisements 
compared to those in a low arousal state since they were distracted by peripheral cues. Schimmack 
& Derryberry (2005) demonstrated the presence of an attentional interference arising from 
presenting participants with arousing images (IAPS pictures). Participants were asked to ignore 
emotional pictures while solving math problems or detecting the location of lines. However, 
participants were unable to ignore emotional pictures and were subject to interference effects on 
both tasks; moreover, the more arousing were the pictures (unpleasant or pleasant) the greater the 
interference. Similarly, participants waiting to give a public speech were slower in learning the 
advantageous decks on the Iowa Gambling Task presumably because they were distracted by 
thoughts concerning the pending speech (Preston, Buchanan, Stansfield, & Bechara, 2007). Based 
on this evidence, we believe that introducing an arousing cue as part of the decisional context may 
interfere with normal decision making processes by subtracting attentional resources allocated on 
the choice task, thus altering the standard risk aversion tendency observed in neutral conditions. 
 In sum, evidence suggests that high levels of negative arousal are associated to increased 
risk taking but this evidence is fragmented as regards the type of arousal manipulation and the type 
of task used to measure risk aversion. In this study participants were asked to choose between a 
series of pairs of monetary gambles with same expected value but different risk. In line with 
previous literature on the effect of negative arousal on risk taking, we expect that the probability of 
making a risky choice would be higher when the monetary offers are contextually presented with an 
unpleasant arousing stimuli. We induced incidental negative arousal within subjects in order to have 
a more efficient comparison of the condition of people experiencing high arousal or low arousal on 
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the same group of subjects. Therefore, all participants were exposed to both experimental 
treatments (high arousal and low arousal). Furthermore, our arousal manipulation was minimally 
contaminated by uncontrolled emotions, such as fear, anxiety or anger, that could have polluted 
previous ones. For example, asking subjects to give a public speech has often been used as a 
manipulation of negative arousal, however, one could complain that giving a public speech 
produces a cohort of emotions ranging from fear to excitement, which are both positive and 
negative in valence. We used IAPS images (Lang et al., 2005) to manipulate arousal and valence. 
This allowed us to control the level of arousal and the level of arousal induced by each image in two 
ways. First, by using records collected in previous studies with a similar population. Second, by 
asking our participants to report perceived arousal and perceived valence for each stimuli in an 
additional task at the end of the experiment. By adopting the technique of contextual priming (Yi, 
1990), participants were simultaneously exposed to stimuli (i.e. the gambles) and a contextual factor 
(i.e. the affective picture). In contextual priming, the simultaneous presentation of a stimulus and a 
contextual cue is able to create an association which can prime specific attributes of the stimulus 
influencing decision making. Furthermore, we tested the interference effect hypothesis of arousal on 
visual attention. We used an eye-tracking to collect data on gaze direction and looking times. We 
gathered data on the percentage of time participants spent looking at the arousing (unarousing) 
picture, as well as  probability information and monetary outcomes. According to arousal theories 
of attention (Anderson, 2005) participants should look at arousing pictures longer than unarousing 
pictures, and this should distract participants from the main choice. Therefore, the use of contextual 
priming represents a very efficient way in order to specifically test the interference effect of 
incidental affect on risky choice (distinguishing it from the effect of integral affect). 
 6.3 Method 
Participants 
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 Twenty-two undergraduate students participated in the study (Mage = 20.2 years; 10 
females). Students were recruited by a campus email announcement promising credits for 
participation in an eye tracking decision-making task. Eligibility criteria were defined as follows: (i) 
being in good health; (ii) not having actual or previous episodes of psychopathology and not being 
under psychopharmacological treatment. Before confirming their participation in the study all 
participants were asked to carefully read an information sheet containing few information about the 
aim of the study, eligibility criteria, experimental procedure, and remuneration procedure.  
Ethicality  
Approval for this study was obtained by the Office for Human Subjects Protection of 
Temple University. This experiment was conducted in accordance with principles of Declaration of 
Helsinki.  
Design  
Negative arousal (high/low) was manipulated in a within-subjects design. All participants 
were exposed to both High arousal and Low arousal treatment. 
Materials 
 Risk taking task. Risk taking was assessed by asking participants to choose between pairs 
of 48 two-outcome lotteries, G1 and G2. The degree of riskiness was determined by the variance 
between the two monetary outcomes, so that the higher the variance the higher the risk. All lotteries 
offered the participant the opportunity to win or lose a monetary reward. Three categories of stimuli 
were included: (i) stimuli with same level of probability; (ii) stimuli with large spread of 
probability; (iii) stimuli with low spread of probability; plus some fillers (see table 1, table 2 and 
table 3). 18 stimuli included pairs of lotteries which shared the same expected value (EV) and same 
probability (50% level). For example, gamble 1 offered a 50% probability to win $7 or a 50% 
probability to win $5 and gamble 2 offered a 50% probability to win $12 or a 50% probability to 
130 
 
win $0. Among the set of risky lotteries, six included a zero gain as outcome (e.g. $12, 0.5; $0, 0.5) 
and twelve included a loss as outcome (e.g. $10, 0.5; $-1, 0.5). 18 stimuli included pairs of lotteries 
which shared the same EV, but different probability. For example, gamble 1 offered a 60% 
probability to win $11 or a 40% probability to win $12 and gamble 2 offered a 60% probability to 
lose $21 or a 40% to win $60. Among these, 9 included stimuli with large spread of probability (i.e. 
75% level of probability and 25% level of probability) and 9 included stimuli with small spread of 
probability (i.e. 60% level of probability and 40% probability). Table 1 reports the list of stimuli 
used in this study. The two lotteries were displayed in a nine-cell grid. Each cell was used as area of 
interest for eye tracking recording (see figure 1). The first raw included an empty cell and the two 
probability values. In the second raw there were displayed the label “G1” and the two monetary 
outcomes for G1. In the third raw there were displayed the label “G2” and the two monetary 
outcomes for G2.   
(Empty) 0,6  0,4  
G1  -5  28  
G2  5  13  
Figure 1. Nine-cell grids containing stimuli used for the risk taking task. Each cell represents an area of interest for eye tracking 
data. 
In order to avoid changing participants’ affective state, no feedback was provided after a 
choice was made. To ensure that participants paid attention to the task (i.e., did not choose 
randomly) we included 12 filler trials. The filler trials consisted of 12 choices between pairs of two-
outcome lotteries that differed in their expected value. Participants who did not prefer the dominant 
option in at least five out of twelve filler trials were excluded from the analyses. In total, 
participants were presented with 48 stimuli (see table 1, table 2 and table 3).  
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 Riskier lottery Safer lottery  
Decision # Outcome A 
(50%) 
Outcome B 
(50%) 
Outcome A 
(50%) 
Outcome B 
(50%) 
Expected value 
(EV) 
1 Winning $11 Winning $0 Winning $6 Winning $5 5.5 
2 Winning $12 Winning $0 Winning $7 Winning $5 6 
3 Winning $13 Winning $0 Winning $6 Winning $7 6.5 
4 Winning $15 Winning $0 Winning $8 Winning $7 7.5 
5 Winning $16 Winning $0 Winning $7 Winning $6 8 
6 Winning $20 Winning $0 Winning $11 Winning $9 10 
7 Winning $6 Losing $1 Winning $2 Winning $3 2.5 
8 Winning $7 Losing $2 Winning $3 Winning $2 2.5 
9 Winning $11 Losing $3 Winning $5 Winning $3 4 
10 Winning $10 Losing $1 Winning $5 Winning $4 4.5 
11 Winning $11 Losing $1 Winning $6 Winning $4 5 
12 Winning $14 Losing $1 Winning $7 Winning $6 6.5 
13 Winning $16 Losing $2 Winning $8 Winning $6 7 
14 Winning $16 Losing $1 Winning $8 Winning $7 7.5 
15 Winning $18 Losing $3 Winning $8 Winning $7 7.5 
16 Winning $18 Losing $2 Winning $9 Winning $7 8 
17 Winning $19 Losing $3 Winning $9 Winning $7 8 
18 Winning $33 Losing $3 Winning $14 Winning $16 15 
Table 3. Pairs of two-outcomes lotteries with same probability used in the risk taking task. 
 
 Riskier lottery Safer lottery  
Decision # Outcome A 
(75%) 
Outcome B 
(25%) 
Outcome A 
(75%) 
Outcome B 
(25%) 
Expected value 
(EV) 
1 Losing $20 Winning $94 Winning $7 Winning $13 8.5 
2 Losing $4 Winning $54 Winning $13 Winning $3 10.5 
3 Losing $15 Winning $85 Winning $11 Winning $7 10 
4 Losing $7 Winning $43 Winning $2 Winning $16 5.5 
5 Losing $13 Winning $65 Winning $5 Winning $11 6.5 
6 Losing $10 Winning $70 Winning $9 Winning $13 10 
7 Losing $22 Winning $89 Winning $13 Losing $16 5.75 
8 Losing $20 Winning $78 Winning $7 Losing $3 4.5 
9 Losing $15 Winning $81 Winning $16 Losing $12 9 
Table 4. Pairs of two-outcomes lotteries with large spread of probability used in the risk taking task. 
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 Riskier lottery Safer lottery  
Decision # Outcome A 
(60%) 
Outcome B 
(40%) 
Outcome A 
(60%) 
Outcome B 
(40%) 
Expected value 
(EV) 
1 Losing $21 Winning $60 Winning $11 Winning $12 11.4 
2 Losing $12 Winning $47 Winning $8 Winning $17 11.6 
3 Losing $13 Winning $29 Winning $3 Winning $5 3.8 
4 Losing $23 Winning $57 Winning $11 Winning $6 9 
5 Losing $5 Winning $28 Winning $5 Winning $13 8.2 
6 Losing $9 Winning $32 Winning $7 Winning $8 7.4 
7 Losing $28 Winning $72 Winning $32 Losing $18 12 
8 Losing $44 Winning $81 Winning $26 Losing $24 6 
9 Losing $16 Winning $50 Winning $24 Losing $10 9 
Table 5. Pairs of two-outcomes lotteries with small spread of probability used in the risk taking task. 
The order of presentation of the 48 trials was randomized between participants. 
Affective induction. We induced affect using images chosen from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2005) and selected according to the affective norms
5
. 
A total of 48 images were used for this experiment: among these, 24 were unpleasant emotional-
eliciting stimuli high in arousal and 24 were unpleasant emotional-eliciting stimuli low in arousal. 
High arousal stimuli included images depicting scenes of mutilation, death, bloody pictures or 
surgeries. These are stimuli able to induce states of negative tension such as fear, disgust or terror, 
i.e. unpleasant affective reactions characterized by a high level of arousal. Low arousal stimuli 
included images depicting scenes of poverty, environmental pollution, cemeteries, children or adults 
crying. These stimuli can induce states of sadness, boredom or depression, i.e. unpleasant affective 
reactions characterized by a low level of arousal. Criteria for stimuli selection were set such that 
their range for valence dimension was 4.5 or less. High arousal stimuli had a range for arousal 
dimension of 5.5 or greater whereas low arousal stimuli had a range of 2.5 or less. Overall, high 
arousal stimuli had a mean of 1.33 in valence dimension and a mean of 7.5 in arousal dimension; 
                                                          
5
 List of IAPS pictures used in the study. High arousal: 3000; 3010; 3015; 3016; 3022; 3030; 3051; 3053; 3060; 3061; 
3062; 3063; 3064; 3068; 3069; 3080; 3101; 3170; 3261; 3266; 6260; 6550; 9410; 9570. Low arousal: 2205; 2276; 2399; 
2590; 2752; 2800; 2840; 3300; 5534; 7006; 7031; 7060; 9000; 9001; 9008; 9041; 9110; 9190; 9210; 9280; 9290; 9330; 
9360; 9561. 
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for the law arousal stimuli the valence mean was 3.44 and the arousal mean was 2.61. Notably, a 
statistical analysis indicated a significant difference in arousal ratings, t (46) = 11.69  p < .001. 
However, also a difference in valence ratings has been registered, t (46) = 7.48 p < .001. Even 
though all the selected stimuli have a valence rating far below the neutral point (5) so that they must 
be considered unpleasant, it is reasonable to observe that arousing stimuli have been rated as more 
unpleasant than unarousing stimuli. Since stimuli selected for the affective manipulation differed 
significantly also along valence dimension, we tested the effect of arousal on risky choice 
controlling for differences in participants’ levels of experienced valence. 
Affective experience task. Following Lang et al. (2005), we used a computerized version of 
the two nine-point Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) scales asking participants to rate their level of 
experienced valence and arousal while viewing each image selected for their specific experimental 
condition. 
Post-task questionnaire. In a post-task questionnaire participants were asked to provide 
information about their age, gender and education level.   
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a quiet room at Center for Neural Decision Making of 
Temple University. On arrival all participants provided written informed consent before starting the 
experiment. Participants were told that they would complete two tasks: the risk-taking task and the 
affective experience task. A Tobii 1750 eye-tracker was used to collect data on gaze direction and 
looking times. The eye-tracker was integrated into a 17-in monitor. All the tasks were run on a PC 
(operating system: Windows 7
®
) connected to this monitor. Experimental protocol was developed 
using E-prime
®
 software package. Each participant sat 50 cm from the monitor. Participants first 
read the instructions on the screen under the guide of the experimenter and then the experiment 
started with a five-point calibration procedure in which a red dot with a black fixation point in the 
middle appeared repeatedly on five different locations of the screen. Participants were instructed to 
look at the dot and their looks were used to calibrate the eye-tracker. The presentation was repeated 
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until the calibration was considered successful (for further technical details about the calibration 
procedure see von Hofsten, Dahlström, & Fredriksson, 2005). To reduce errors due to differences in 
pupil size and to encourage individual focus on the task, the lights of the room were turned off. 
Then, the risk-taking task started with a practice trial.  
At the beginning of each trial a fixation cross was displayed for a random interval between 
100-300 ms. Next, the grid containing the pair of two-outcome lotteries and the associated image 
were displayed. To induce an affective state during choice we revealed the affective manipulation 
(i.e. the image) and the stimuli (i.e. the lotteries) in the exact time. The presentation of the riskier 
and safer lottery was randomized, so that in some trials G1 was the safer option and in the other 
trials G2 was the safer option. Images were presented in 6 blocks (2 high arousal blocks; 2 low 
arousal blocks; 2 mixed blocks). Each block was made of 8 trials. Mixed blocks included 4 high 
arousal trials and 4 low arousal trials. Block presentation and images presentation were randomized. 
After revealing the two lotteries (G1 and G2) with the associated image, participants could select 
the lottery they preferred by pressing the corresponding button on the keyboard. After completing 
the risk-taking task, participants were presented with the affective experience task: they saw all the 
previously seen pictures and asked to report their current affective state using the two SAM scales. 
At the end of the experiment, after completing the affective experience task, participants completed 
the post-task questionnaire. Finally they were debriefed and released. 
6.4 Results  
 Choice made by participants across trials was used as dichotomous dependent variable. The 
safer lottery was coded as “0” and the riskier lottery as “1”. 
Affective experience task. Ratings of valence and arousal provided for emotional stimuli at 
the affective experiencing task were averaged in order to obtain for each participant two overall 
indices of valence, one for arousing stimuli and one for unarousing stimuli, and two overall indices 
of arousal, one for arousing stimuli and one of unarousing stimuli. The affective induction worked 
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as expected. Self-reported levels of arousal in response to arousing stimuli were higher than 
unarousing stimuli t(20) = 9.1 p < .001 (High arousal, M = 6.15 SD = 2; Low arousal, M = 2.45 SD 
= 1.27). In addition, self-reported levels of valence in response to arousing stimuli were lower than 
unarousing stimuli t(20) = -15.31 p < .001 (High arousal, M = 1.89 SD = .67; Low arousal, M = 3.9 
SD = .68). Nevertheless for both, arousing and unarousing stimuli, participants reported a mean 
score of valence collocated below the neutral midpoint of the scale (5) indicating that in each trial 
participants experienced negative affect. Female participants reported lower levels of valence in 
response to both arousing stimuli t(20) = -3.9 p < .001 (Males, M = 2.28 SD = .65; Females, M = 
1.43 SD = .33) and unarousing stimuli t(20) = -2.9 p < .001 (Males, M = 4.24 SD = .48; Females, M 
= 3.5 SD = .67). No gender differences emerged in levels of experienced arousal, all p > .05. 
Arousal induction and risk taking. In order to test the influence of arousal on probability 
of making a risky choice, we developed the following generalized linear mixed model of logistic 
regression 
ln (
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
) = ?̅? + 𝑎𝑗 + 𝑏1̅ + 𝑏2̅̅ ̅ + 𝑏3̅̅ ̅ 
including arousal (b1), gender (b2) and the interaction between the two (b3) as fixed effects, 
and the intercept estimated for each participant (𝑎𝑗) as random effect, specifying the participants 
identification variable as a cluster, as required by the mixed models procedure. Choices made across 
trials were used as dependent variable specifying the safe choice as reference category. Analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of arousal on predicting risky choices F(1, 788) = 4.32 p < .05. In 
particular, the 35.5% of risky choices made by participants during the task was made in an high 
arousal trial (i.e. when an arousing stimuli was associated to the gambles) while the 23.9% was 
made in a low arousal trial (i.e. when an unarousing stimuli was associated to the gambles; see 
figure 2). Neither gender effect nor interaction between arousal and gender was found. 
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Figure 2. Percentage of risky choices made across trials. 
Ratings provided during the affective experience task revealed that self-reported levels of 
arousal were higher for arousing stimuli. However, participants reported also lower levels of 
valence in response to arousing stimuli. For this reason, we performed the regression model again 
introducing valence ratings as covariate. Valence ratings did not influence directly risky choice, p = 
.81 while the effect of arousal on risk preference was one-tailed significant F(1, 715) = 2.78 p = .09. 
We run additional analysis distinguishing between the three domains of stimuli used in this 
study (i.e. stimuli with 50% level of probability, stimuli with large spread of probability and stimuli 
with small spread of probability). No unique effect on a specific category of stimuli was found, all p 
> .05. 
Looking times. We used eye tracking data collected during the risk-taking task in order to 
assess the influence of arousal on participants’ attention allocation. We performed a linear mixed 
model including arousal and gender as fixed effects and the intercept estimated for each participant 
as random effect, specifying the participants identification variable as a cluster, as required by the 
mixed models procedure. The percentage of time spent looking at each area of interest was used as 
dependent variable (i.e. the arousing/unarousing image and the cells constituting the grid displayed 
in figure 1 providing information about probability level and monetary values for both safer and 
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riskier lotteries). Analysis revealed that arousal was a significant predictor of the percentage of time 
spent fixating the arousing (unarousing) picture  F(1, 653) = 24.67 p < .001. In particular, 
participants looked at arousing stimuli longer than unarousing stimuli (High arousal, M = .28 SD = 
.027; Low Arousal, M = .21 SD = .027). No other differences in other areas of interest emerged, all 
p > .05 (see table 4). 
 
High arousal trials Low arousal trials 
Image .28* .21* 
Probability 1 .09 .11 
Probability 2 .76 .78 
Riskier 1 .15 .17 
Riskier 2 .12 .12 
Safer 1 .15 .15 
Safer 2 .12 .13 
Table 6. Percentage of time spent looking at each area of interest across trials in the risk taking task. 
Summarizing, participants made more risky choices during high arousal trials (i.e. when an 
unpleasant arousing stimuli was presented), compared to low arousal trials (i.e. when an unpleasant 
unarousing stimuli was presented). Moreover, in the high arousal trials participants spent more time 
looking at the image compared to low arousal trials.  
6.5 Discussion  
In this study we investigated the effect of incidental negative arousal on preferences for 
monetary risk. In a within-subjects experiment, we experimentally manipulated participants’ 
affective state in order to induce high-intensity and low-intensity negative affect. By adopting the 
technique of contextual priming (Yi, 1990) we introduced an unpleasant arousing or unarousing 
cues (IAPS pictures) as part of a decision scenario and we asked participants to make choices 
between couples of gambles with same expected value but different risk (as determined by the 
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variance between the two monetary payoffs). We found that the probability of making a risky 
choice was higher when an arousing visual stimuli was contextually presented with the pair of 
gambles. This result is in line with previous evidence showing a positive relationship between 
distress and risk taking (e.g Mano, 1992; Porcelli & Delgado, 2009; Starcke et al., 2008).  We also 
showed that this effect is not due to variations in probability since no unique effect among lotteries 
with same level of probability, large spread of probability or low spread of probability was found. 
In this study, participants experienced higher levels of arousal during high arousal trials as indicated 
by the self-reported indices provided during the affective experience task. However, in the high 
arousal trials they also reported lower levels of valence which means that they experienced a more 
unpleasant affective state when an arousing cue was presented. This data is not surprising since 
stimuli rated as more unpleasant are rated as more arousing as well (Bradeley & Lang, 2007). 
Furthermore, after inserting valence ratings as covariate we found that they do not predict risky 
choice as arousal does. Therefore, we can conclude that differences in risky choices are not better 
explained by differences in levels of affective valence experienced across trials. 
At present, it has not been provided a valid explanation for why arousal should increase risk 
taking behavior. Some evidence seem to converge toward a cognitive explanation hypothesis: 
affective state characterized by high levels of intensity decrease cognitive capacity (on this point see 
Kaufman, 1999). It is well documented that arousing stimuli are capable of capturing attention and 
narrow attentional focus since they are evaluated as the most salient object in the context (e.g. 
Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Loftus, 1979). Moreover, it has been shown that elevated arousal is often 
accompanied with decreased attentional resources (Anderson, 2005), hence it may interfere with the 
execution of a main task (Gronau et al., 2003; Schimmack & Derryberry, 2005). In our study we 
tested the influence of arousal on visual attention. Eye tracking data gathered during the risk-taking 
task revealed that participants looked at negative arousing pictures longer than negative unarousing 
pictures. A similar result was obtained by Lang et al. (1993) which demonstrated that participants 
presented with IAPS pictures spend more time looking at arousing images regardless of their 
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valence. Given this data we may argue that including an arousing cue as part of the decision context 
captured participants’ attention. This might interfere with the normal decision making process (i.e. 
the tendency to prefer a surer option over a riskier option). However, additional studies are needed 
in order to demonstrate the interference effect of attention on information processing of risk. Such 
effect may be associated to an enhanced sensitivity to rewards or to an overestimation of 
probabilities caused by elevated arousal. However, eye tracking data does not permit to address this 
question since no unique effect of arousal on rewards or probabilities have been found.  
In summary, in this study we showed that incidental negative arousal influenced decision 
making under risk. In particular including an unpleasant arousing cue as part of the decision context 
increases the probability of making a risky choice. The robustness of such effect has been proved by 
manipulating arousal as a within subject variable. The effect does not seem to be influenced by 
variations in probability. Furthermore, we demonstrated that in line with attentional theories of 
arousal contextual arousing cues influence individual attention, however the link between decreased 
attentional resources caused by elevated arousal and increased risk taking remain still undetected. In 
the next paper, we will try to replicate and extend such effect to the domain of positive arousal.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Paper IV – Positive Arousal and Individual’s 
Preferences for Risky Lotteries: an Eye-tracking 
Study 
 
7.1 Abstract  
In this study we examined the effect of incidental positive arousal, elicited through the 
exposure to contextual cues (IAPS pictures), on preferences for monetary risk. In chapter 6 of this 
dissertation we found that a negative arousing contextual cue increases individual preference for 
monetary risk and influence attention allocation. In the study presented in this chapter we seek to 
replicate and extend such evidence also to positive arousal. Previous research suggests a positive 
relationship between positive arousal and risk taking, however the mechanism underlying such 
relationship is still unclear. Combining evidence from studies on arousal and risk taking and arousal 
and attention, we tested the influence of arousal on visual attention suggesting a possible link 
between diminished attentional resources registered under conditions of elevated arousal and 
preference for risk. In a within-subjects experiment we repeatedly induced high and low levels of 
positive arousal and asked participants to make choices between pairs of two-outcomes gambles 
with same expected value but varying in risk and probability. We found that arousing stimuli 
capture attention and influence the processing of risk information (measured as time spent looking 
at the monetary values constituting the riskier gamble). Implications for future research are 
discussed.  
7.2 Introduction 
 Consider Hans, a 33-year-old accountant in New York. He prepares herself for work, as any 
other day, except that, today is special. The woman he has been pining for all his life has invited 
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him to dinner this evening. He is euphoric, excited, tense, and filled with joy. Today will seem very 
long to Hans. He is experiencing a multitude of exciting, positive emotions. 
 Now imagine that Hans is on vacation. He is “in heaven”. He is on his third day of vacation 
with his new girlfriend in the most relaxing spa he has ever experienced. He is completely relaxed 
and at peace. He thinks that nothing in the world could upset his mood in that moment. He is 
experiencing a multitude of positive, soothing emotions. 
 Now imagine that Hans was asked to choose between: 
A: a sure win of 500.000 dollars 
B: a 50% chance to win 1 million dollars and a 50% chance to win nothing. 
Option A is safer while option B is riskier. What would he choose? Would his choice be the same in 
the two moments presented above? In both moments Hans is experiencing positive emotions, but at 
different levels of arousal, that is, the intensity with which the emotional reaction is actually 
experienced. In the first situation Hans is experiencing high arousal while in the second one he is 
experiencing low arousal. Experiencing an high-intensity positive affect (e.g. excitement) or a low-
intensity positive affect (e.g. calm) would impact his choice differently?  
There is accumulating evidence documenting a positive relationship between arousal and 
risk taking (e.g. Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Mano, 1994; Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). However 
previous studies mostly focused on the role of negative arousal (e.g. distress) while positive arousal 
has been examined less often. Nonetheless, many researchers seem to converge on the idea that 
experiencing high levels of positive arousal may increase risk taking behavior as well. Therefore, 
returning to the example presented above, Hans will be likely to choose the riskier alternative 
before his romantic dinner when he is excited and exuberant, than when he is calm and relaxed. 
In this study we examine the effect of inducing high and low levels of incidental positive 
arousal (i.e. pleasant arousing/unarousing reactions unrelated to the decision at hand) on preferences 
for monetary risk. Previous research showed that experiencing high levels of positive arousal is 
associated to a risk prone behaviors (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010; 
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Galentino et al., submitted; Hirsch, 1995; Knutson, Wimmer, Kuhnen, & Winkielman, 2008; Laier, 
Pawlikowski, & Brand, 2013; Macht, Roth, & Ellgring, 2002; McAlvanah, 2009; Rook & Gardner, 
1993; Rhodes & Pivik, 2011). For example, it has been proved that a positive mood which is 
associated to an elevated tone of arousal, is related to impulsive buying (Rook & Gardner, 1993). 
On the same vein, Macht et al. (2002) found that joy, which is often accompanied by arousing 
reactions, increases chocolate consumption. Fedorikhin & Patrick  (2010), in a consumer choice 
study, provided experimental evidence that positive arousal is associated with cognitive depletion 
and results in a decreased resistance to temptation. More relevant for risk taking behavior, Ariely & 
Loewenstein (2006) studied the role of sexual arousal (i.e. a specific form of positive arousal) on 
sexual decision making. After inducing sexual arousal (through self-stimulation), authors required 
participants to express judgments and hypothetical decisions on the attractiveness of different 
sexual stimuli; on the willingness to take various morally dubious measures to procure sex; and 
willingness to engage in risky sexual activities. Authors reported that, compared to the condition in 
which the same participants answered the questions in a neutral unaroused state, sexual arousal 
acted as a strong amplifier of sorts, narrowing focus of motivation and increasing impulse to 
procure sex. Similarly, Laier et al. (2013) demonstrated that male participants performing a 
modified version of Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000) exhibited a 
worse performance when sexual pictures were associated with disadvantageous decks. Authors 
explained that sexual arousal due to the sexual pictures distracted participants from task 
requirements interfering with feedback learning. Similarly, McAlvanah (2009) asked participants to 
evaluate a series of hypothetical gambles before and after viewing opposite sex faces pictures. The 
control group viewed pictures depicting cars. Both males and females exhibited an increased risk 
tolerance after viewing opposite sex-faces, while participants in the control group did not show a 
substantial change. This effect has been attributed to the activation of either a mating mindset or to 
the presence of others i.e.,(the person in the picture) that may trigger increases in both 
competitiveness and risk taking. In our view,  exposure to opposite sex-faces might be considered a 
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positive arousal activation. Neuroscientific evidence suggests that the exposure to highly arousing 
stimuli (e.g. erotic images) activates the same reward system associated to monetary rewards (Stark 
et al., 2005). Such reward system lies along the dopaminergic mesolimbic pathway in the brain and 
its activity has been found to correlate with self-reported levels of positive affect (Knutson, Adams, 
Fong, & Hommer, 2001a;  Knutson, Fong, Adams, Varner, & Hommer, 2001b). Positive arousal, 
indeed, was also found to have impact on the sensibility for monetary rewards (e.g. Van den Bergh 
& Dewitte, 2006). More important to us, Knutson et al. (2008) showed that presenting participants 
with pleasant incidental cues (erotic pictures) increased risk taking behavior and that this effect was 
partially mediated by nucleus accumbens activation. Similarly, Galentino et al. (submitted) showed 
that subjects positively aroused through IAPS images with different activators of positive arousal 
were more risk taking in real monetary gambles. 
Taken together. This evidence suggests that when an emotional state is accompanied by 
increased arousal it may lead to risk prone behavior. Therefore, we expect to observe an increased 
preference for risk when participants are induced into a high positive arousal compared to when the 
same participants are induced into a low positive arousal state. In this study we manipulated 
positive arousal by presenting participants with affective eliciting cues (IAPS pictures) varying in 
the level of positive arousal and asked them to make choices between pairs of gambles with the 
same expected value . As it has been done for the other studies described throughout this 
dissertation, we adopted the technique of contextual priming (Yi, 1990) which requires that a 
stimuli (the gambles) is associated to a contextual factor. The simultaneous presentation of  the 
stimulus and the contextual factor creates an association such that the contextual factor can prime 
certain attributes of the stimuli influencing preferences for choice option (see Mandel & Johnson, 
2002). For this reason, in a within-subjects experiment, we induced arousal repeatedly in each trial 
of choice by presenting the arousing (unarousing) image as contextual factor of the decision making 
scenario. 
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The reason for why an increase in the tone of arousal should increase risk taking behavior is 
still not clear. Some authors have found that arousal increases sensitivity to rewards and immediate 
gratification (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006). Others, by adopting the dual-process approach, argue 
that experiencing high-intensity affective states may lead people to adopt more automatized risk 
biases (Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). Nevertheless, there is a wide convergence on the fact that an 
elevated tone of arousal is associated with cognitive depletion (i.e. few cognitive resources) which 
results in heuristic or superficial processing (e.g. Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010). As suggested by 
Yerkes and Dodson (1908), cognitive performance is related to arousal through an inverted U-
shaped relationship: according to this view, an optimal human performance requires a moderate 
level of arousal, while too little or too much emotional intensity may result in a cognitive 
breakdown and then impaired performance. Related to this assumption, Anderson (2005) reported 
that increased arousal is associated with decreased attentional resources, thus enabling emotional 
significance to shape perceptual experience. This statement has been empirically investigated 
showing that arousal produces an interference effect which has consequences on attention allocation 
and cognitive performance (Fernandes, Koji, Dixon, & Aquino, 2011; Gronau, Cohen, & Ben-
Shakhar, 2003; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993; Schimmack & Derryberry, 2005). For 
example, Lang et al. (1993) showed that participants look at arousing pictures longer than 
unarousing pictures (regardless of valence), indicating that arousing stimuli influence attention 
allocation. In a study by Schimmack and Derryberry (2005) participants were asked to ignore 
arousing stimuli (IAPS pictures) while solving math problems or detecting the location of lines. It 
was found that participants were unable to ignore emotional pictures. Furthermore, the more 
arousing were the pictures, the greater was the interference effect on both cognitive tasks. Taken 
together this evidence indicate that arousal may capture attention interfering with the execution of 
the task at hand. Therefore, we predicted that when participants are presented with pleasant 
arousing stimuli their attention would be captured by the emotional picture leaving few attentional 
resources to be allocated to the processing of risky information. In order to achieve this goal, we 
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used an eye tracker for gathering data on participants’ gaze direction and looking times while they 
were exposed to arousing (unarousing) pictures and asked to make their own choices. 
7.3 Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-four undergraduate students participated in the study (Mage = 20.14 years; 11 
females). Students were recruited by a campus email announcement promising credits for 
participation in an eye tracking decision-making task. Eligibility criteria were defined as follows: (i) 
being in good health; (ii) not having actual or previous episodes of psychopathology and not being 
under psychopharmacological treatment. Before confirming their participation in the study all 
participants were asked to carefully read an information sheet containing few information about the 
aim of the study, eligibility criteria, experimental procedure, and remuneration procedure.  
Ethicality  
Approval for this study was obtained by the Office for Human Subjects Protection of Temple 
University. This experiment was conducted in accordance with principles of Declaration of 
Helsinki.  
Design  
Positive arousal (high/low) was manipulated in a within-subjects design. All participants were 
exposed to both High arousal and Low arousal treatment. 
Materials 
 Risk taking task. Risk taking was assessed by asking participants to choose between pairs 
of 48 two-outcome lotteries, G1 and G2.. The degree of riskiness was determined by the variance 
between the two monetary outcomes, so that the higher the variance the higher the risk. All lotteries 
offered the participant the opportunity to win or lose a monetary reward. Three categories of stimuli 
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were included: (i) stimuli with same level of probability; (ii) stimuli with large spread of 
probability; (iii) stimuli with low spread of probability; plus some fillers (see table 1, table 2, table 
3). Eighteen stimuli included pairs of lotteries which shared the same expected value (EV) and same 
probability (50% level). For example, gamble 1 offered a 50% probability to win $7 or a 50% 
probability to win $5 and gamble 2 offered a 50% probability to win $12 or a 50% probability to 
win $0. Among this set of 18 equal EV lotteries, 6 included a gamble with a zero gain as outcome 
(e.g. $12, 0.5; $0, 0.5) and 12 included a gamble with a loss as outcome (e.g. $10, 0.5; $-1, 0.5). 
Eighteen stimuli included pairs of lotteries which shared the same EV, but different probability. For 
example, gamble 1 offered a 60% probability to win $11 or a 40% probability to win $12 and 
gamble 2 offered a 60% probability to lose $21 or a 40% to win $60. Among these, 9 included 
gambles with large spread of probability (i.e. 75% level of probability and 25% level of probability) 
and 9 included gambles with small spread of probability (i.e. 60% level of probability and 40% 
probability). The two lotteries were displayed in a nine-cell grid. Each cell was used as area of 
interest for eye tracking recording (see figure …). The first row included an empty cell and the two 
probability values. In the second row it was displayed the label “G1” and the two monetary 
outcomes for G1. In the third raw it was displayed the label “G2” and the two monetary outcomes 
for G2.   
(Empty) 0,6  0,4  
G1  -5  28  
G2  5  13  
Figure 9. Nine-cell grids containing stimuli used for the risk taking task. Each cell represents an area of interest for eye tracking 
data. 
 
In order to avoid changing participants’ affective state, no feedback was provided after a 
choice was made. To ensure that participants paid attention to the task (i.e., did not choose 
randomly) we included 12 filler trials. The filler trials consisted of 12 choices between pairs of two-
outcome lotteries that differed in their expected value. Participants who did not prefer the dominant 
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option in at least five out of twelve filler trials were excluded from the analyses. In total, 
participants were presented with 48 stimuli.  
 Riskier lottery Safer lottery  
Decision # Outcome A 
(50%) 
Outcome B 
(50%) 
Outcome A 
(50%) 
Outcome B 
(50%) 
Expected value 
(EV) 
1 Winning $11 Winning $0 Winning $6 Winning $5 5.5 
2 Winning $12 Winning $0 Winning $7 Winning $5 6 
3 Winning $13 Winning $0 Winning $6 Winning $7 6.5 
4 Winning $15 Winning $0 Winning $8 Winning $7 7.5 
5 Winning $16 Winning $0 Winning $7 Winning $6 8 
6 Winning $20 Winning $0 Winning $11 Winning $9 10 
7 Winning $6 Losing $1 Winning $2 Winning $3 2.5 
8 Winning $7 Losing $2 Winning $3 Winning $2 2.5 
9 Winning $11 Losing $3 Winning $5 Winning $3 4 
10 Winning $10 Losing $1 Winning $5 Winning $4 4.5 
11 Winning $11 Losing $1 Winning $6 Winning $4 5 
12 Winning $14 Losing $1 Winning $7 Winning $6 6.5 
13 Winning $16 Losing $2 Winning $8 Winning $6 7 
14 Winning $16 Losing $1 Winning $8 Winning $7 7.5 
15 Winning $18 Losing $3 Winning $8 Winning $7 7.5 
16 Winning $18 Losing $2 Winning $9 Winning $7 8 
17 Winning $19 Losing $3 Winning $9 Winning $7 8 
18 Winning $33 Losing $3 Winning $14 Winning $16 15 
Table 7. Pairs of two-outcomes lotteries with same probability used in the risk taking task. 
 
 Riskier lottery Safer lottery  
Decision # Outcome A 
(75%) 
Outcome B 
(25%) 
Outcome A 
(75%) 
Outcome B 
(25%) 
Expected value 
(EV) 
1 Losing $20 Winning $94 Winning $7 Winning $13 8.5 
2 Losing $4 Winning $54 Winning $13 Winning $3 10.5 
3 Losing $15 Winning $85 Winning $11 Winning $7 10 
4 Losing $7 Winning $43 Winning $2 Winning $16 5.5 
5 Losing $13 Winning $65 Winning $5 Winning $11 6.5 
6 Losing $10 Winning $70 Winning $9 Winning $13 10 
7 Losing $22 Winning $89 Winning $13 Losing $16 5.75 
8 Losing $20 Winning $78 Winning $7 Losing $3 4.5 
9 Losing $15 Winning $81 Winning $16 Losing $12 9 
Table 8. Pairs of two-outcomes lotteries with large spread of probability used in the risk taking task. 
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 Riskier lottery Safer lottery  
Decision # Outcome A 
(60%) 
Outcome B 
(40%) 
Outcome A 
(60%) 
Outcome B 
(40%) 
Expected value 
(EV) 
1 Losing $21 Winning $60 Winning $11 Winning $12 11.4 
2 Losing $12 Winning $47 Winning $8 Winning $17 11.6 
3 Losing $13 Winning $29 Winning $3 Winning $5 3.8 
4 Losing $23 Winning $57 Winning $11 Winning $6 9 
5 Losing $5 Winning $28 Winning $5 Winning $13 8.2 
6 Losing $9 Winning $32 Winning $7 Winning $8 7.4 
7 Losing $28 Winning $72 Winning $32 Losing $18 12 
8 Losing $44 Winning $81 Winning $26 Losing $24 6 
9 Losing $16 Winning $50 Winning $24 Losing $10 9 
Table 9. Pairs of two-outcomes lotteries with small spread of probability used in the risk taking task. 
 
The order of presentation of the 48 trials was randomized between participants. 
Affective induction. We induced affect using images chosen from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2005) and selected according to the affective norms
6
. 
A total of 48 images were used for this experiment: among these, 24 were pleasant emotional-
eliciting stimuli high in arousal and 24 were pleasant emotional-eliciting stimuli low in arousal. 
Since images involving people tend to be rated as more arousing, especially pictures with erotic 
content, pleasant high arousal images included pictures depicting situations with people having fun 
or playing extreme sports as well as erotic stimuli. The latter were selected among those involving 
double-sex couples. These are stimuli able to elicit states of excitement and euphoria, i.e. pleasant 
affective reactions characterized by a high level of arousal. Pleasant low arousal images included 
pictures depicting landscapes, flowers, scenes from outer space, cute animals, and serene faces. 
These stimuli are generally expected to elicit a sense of calm and peacefulness, i.e. positive 
affective states usually associated with a low level of arousal. Criteria for stimuli selection were set 
                                                          
6
 List of IAPS pictures used in the study. High arousal: 2352; 4670; 8370; 4658; 4653; 8501; 4660; 4652; 2344; 4683; 
4664; 5629; 4681; 8210; 8030; 4659; 8490; 4656; 8300; 4800; 4810; 4695; 8400; 8191. Low arousal: 7140; 7900; 5300; 
5220; 5731; 5779; 2514; 5250; 5780; 7490; 5030; 5000; 5635; 2397; 2580; 5891; 5500; 2850; 5764; 5720; 7180; 5631; 
5520; 5020. 
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such that their range for valence dimension was 5.5 or greater. High arousal stimuli had a range for 
arousal dimension of 5.5 or greater whereas low arousal stimuli had a range of 2.5 or less. Overall, 
high arousal stimuli had a mean of 6.91 in valence dimension and a mean of 6.42 in arousal 
dimension; for the law arousal stimuli the valence mean was 6.09 and the arousal mean was 3.15. 
Notably, a statistical analysis indicated a significant difference in arousal ratings, t (46) = 20.43  p < 
.001. However, also a difference in valence ratings has been registered, t (46) = 4.26 p < .001. Even 
though all the selected stimuli have a valence rating far below the neutral point (5) so that they must 
be considered pleasant, it is reasonable to observe that arousing stimuli have been rated as more 
pleasant than unarousing stimuli (Bradley & Lang, 2007). Since stimuli selected for the affective 
manipulation differed significantly also along valence dimension, we tested the effect of arousal on 
risky choice controlling for differences in participants’ levels of experienced valence. 
Affective experience task. Following Lang et al. (2005), we used a computerized version of 
the two nine-point Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) scales asking participants to rate their level of 
experienced valence and arousal while viewing each image selected for their specific experimental 
condition. 
Post-task questionnaire. In a post-task questionnaire participants were asked to provide 
information about their age, gender and education level.   
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a quiet room at Center for Neural Decision Making of 
Temple University. On arrival all participants provided written informed consent before starting the 
experiment. Participants were told that they would complete two tasks: the risk-taking task and the 
affective experience task. A Tobii 1750 eye-tracker was used to collect data on gaze direction and 
looking times. The eye-tracker was integrated into a 17-in monitor. All the tasks were run on a PC 
(operating system: Windows 7
®
) connected to this monitor. Experimental protocol was developed 
using E-prime
®
 software package. Each participant sat 50 cm from the monitor. Participants first 
read the instructions on the screen under the guide of the experimenter and then the experiment 
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started with a five-point calibration procedure in which a red dot with a black fixation point in the 
middle appeared repeatedly on five different locations of the screen. Participants were instructed to 
look at the dot and their looks were used to calibrate the eye-tracker. The presentation was repeated 
until the calibration was considered successful (for further technical details about the calibration 
procedure see von Hofsten, Dahlström, & Fredriksson, 2005). To reduce errors due to differences in 
pupil size and to encourage individual focus on the task, the lights of the room were turned off. 
Then, the risk-taking task started with a practice trial.  
At the beginning of each trial a fixation cross was displayed for a random interval between 
100-300 ms. Next, the grid containing the pair of two-outcome lotteries and the associated image 
were displayed (see figure 2).  
 
Figure 10 Example of high arousal trial in the risk taking task. 
To induce an affective state during choice we revealed the affective manipulation (i.e. the image) 
and the stimuli (i.e. the lotteries) in the exact time. The presentation of the riskier and safer lottery 
was randomized, so that in some trials G1 was the safer option and in the other trials G2 was the 
safer option. Images were presented in 6 blocks (2 high arousal blocks; 2 low arousal blocks; 2 
mixed blocks). Each block was made of 8 trials. Mixed blocks included 4 high arousal trials and 4 
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low arousal trials. Block presentation and images presentation were randomized. After revealing the 
two lotteries (G1 and G2) with the associated image, participants could select the lottery they 
preferred by pressing the corresponding button on the keyboard. After completing the risk-taking 
task, participants were presented with the affective experience task: they saw all the previously seen 
pictures and asked to report their current affective state using the two SAM scales. At the end of the 
experiment, after completing the affective experience task, participants completed the post-task 
questionnaire. Finally they were debriefed and released. 
7.4 Results 
 Choice made by participants across trials was used as dichotomous dependent variable. The 
safer lottery was coded as “0” and the riskier lottery as “1”. 
Affective experience task. Ratings of valence and arousal provided for emotional stimuli at 
the affective experiencing task were averaged in order to obtain for each participant two overall 
indices of valence, one for arousing stimuli and one for unarousing stimuli, and two overall indices 
of arousal, one for arousing stimuli and one of unarousing stimuli. The affective induction worked 
as expected. Self-reported levels of arousal in response to arousing stimuli were higher than 
unarousing stimuli t(23) = 8.71 p < .001 (High arousal, M = 5.05 SD = 1.56; Low arousal, M = 3.08 
SD = 1.27). In addition, self-reported levels of valence in response to arousing stimuli were higher 
than unarousing stimuli t(20) = 3.75 p = .001 (High arousal, M = 6.32 SD = .96; Low arousal, M = 
5.54 SD = .86). Nevertheless for both, arousing and unarousing stimuli, participants reported a 
mean score of valence collocated below the neutral midpoint of the scale (5) indicating that in each 
trial participants experienced positive affect. No gender differences emerged in the levels of 
experienced valence and arousal for both arousing and unarousing stimuli, all p > .05.  
Arousal induction and risk taking. In order to test the influence of arousal on probability 
of making a risky choice, we developed the following generalized linear mixed model of logistic 
regression 
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ln (
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
) = ?̅? + 𝑎𝑗 + 𝑏1̅ + 𝑏2̅̅ ̅ + 𝑏3̅̅ ̅ 
including arousal (b1), gender (b2) and the interaction between the two (b3) as fixed effects, 
and the intercept estimated for each participant (𝑎𝑗) as random effect, specifying the participants 
identification variable as a cluster, as required by the mixed models procedure. Choices made across 
trials were used as dependent variable specifying the safe choice as reference category. Analysis 
revealed no main effect of arousal on predicting risky choices p > .05. Specifically, participants 
induced in an high-arousal state (i.e. when an arousing stimuli was associated to the gambles) made 
the 32.8% of risky choices while participants induced in a low-arousal state (i.e. when an 
unarousing stimuli was associated to the gambles) made the 30.5% of risky choices (see figure 3). 
Neither gender effect nor interaction effect between arousal and gender was found. 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of risky choices made across trials. 
 
We run additional analysis distinguishing between three types of  stimuli used in this study, 
and namely, the  stimuli with 50% level of probability, the stimuli with large spread of probability 
and the stimuli with small spread of probability. No unique effect on a specific category of stimuli 
was found, all p > .05. 
27,00%
28,00%
29,00%
30,00%
31,00%
32,00%
33,00%
34,00%
Low arousal trials High arousal trials
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
ri
sk
y 
ch
o
ic
e
s 
Low arousal trials
High arousal trials
155 
 
However, participants spent more time for making decisions during high arousal trials 
compared to low arousal trials F(1, 733) = 4.65 p < .05 (High arousal, M = 5168 SD = 554; Low 
arousal, M = 4693 SD = 555). 
Looking times. We used eye tracking data collected during the risk-taking task in order to 
assess the influence of arousal on participants’ attention allocation. We performed a linear mixed 
model including arousal and gender as fixed effects and the intercept estimated for each participant 
as random effect, specifying the participants identification variable as a cluster, as required by the 
mixed models procedure. The percentage of time spent looking at each area of interest was used as 
dependent variable (i.e. the arousing/unarousing image as well as the cells constituting the grid 
displayed in figure 1 containing information about probability level and monetary values for both 
safer and riskier lotteries). Analysis revealed that arousal was a significant predictor of the 
percentage of time spent fixating the arousing (unarousing) picture  F(1, 620) = 24.87 p < .001. In 
particular, participants looked at arousing stimuli longer than unarousing stimuli (High arousal, M = 
.23 SD = .018; Low Arousal, M = .17 SD = .019). Neither gender effect nor interaction effect 
between arousal and gender were found. Furthermore, arousal was a significant predictor of the 
percentage of time spent fixating at each grid containing the monetary values constituting the riskier 
gamble (in figure 1 the two cells related to G1): first riskier cell F(1, 672) = 6.31 p = .01; second 
riskier cell F(1, 638) = 9.92 p < .01. Specifically, during high arousal trials participants fixated at 
the monetary values constituting the riskier gamble less compared to low arousal trials (Risk cell 1: 
High arousal, M = .15 SD = .01; Low Arousal, M = .16 SD = .01; Risk cell 2: High Arousal, M = 
.11 SD = .00; Low arousal, M = .13 SD = .00 see figure 4). This was not the case for the percentage 
of time spent fixating the monetary values constituting the safer gamble: safer cell 1, p > .05; safer 
cell 2, p > .05.  
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Figure 4. Percentage of looking times toward the two monetary offers constituting the riskier option across trials in the risk taking 
task. 
No further differences in looking times emerged for other areas of interest; all p > .05 (see 
table 4).   
 
High arousal trials Low arousal trials 
Image .23* .17* 
Probability 1 .09 .1 
Probability 2 .08* .07* 
Riskier 1 .15* .16* 
Riskier 2 .11* .13* 
Safer 1 .15 .16 
Safer 2 .13 .13 
Table 10. Percentage of time spent looking at each area of interest across trials in the risk taking task. 
 
Summarizing, the kind of image (high arousal or low arousal) associated with the two 
gambles was not a predictor of risky choices made by participants. However, in the high arousal 
trials participants spent more time for making decisions. Furthermore, they looked at arousing 
pictures longer than unarousing pictures. More important, arousal influenced the percentage of time 
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spent fixating at the riskier option. In particular, during high arousal trials participants look at the 
riskier option less than low arousal trials. This indicates that participants paid less attention to 
process risky information during high arousal trials.  
7.5 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of incidental positive arousal on 
preferences for monetary risk. In a within-subjects experiment, we manipulated participants’ 
affective state in order to induce high and low levels of positive arousal. As it has been done for 
previous studies presented in this dissertation, we adopted the technique of contextual priming (Yi, 
1990). Therefore we inserted a pleasant arousing (unarousing) cue (IAPS pictures) as contextual 
factor of a decision scenario and required participants to play a risk taking task where they had to 
make choices between couples of two-outcomes lotteries with same expected value but different 
risk (determined through the variance between payoffs). Furthermore, we tested the influence of 
positive arousal on visual attention. By using an eye tracker we gathered data about participants’ 
gaze direction and measured looking times for the different areas of interest present in the context. 
We found that arousal was a significant predictor of the time taken for making decisions. In 
particular participants spent more time during high arousal trials compared to low arousal trials. 
Contrary to what we found in previous studies contained in this dissertation (see chapter 4 and 5), 
an effect of arousal on predicting the probability of making a risky choice did not emerged in this 
experiment. The reasons for this could be various. First, sample size for this experiment may not be 
large enough to make the effect of arousal evident, considering that frequency of choices follows 
the same trend found from previous studies presented in this dissertation. Indeed, the 32.8% of risky 
choices is made during a high arousal trial, while the 30.5% is made during a low arousal trial. 
Second, differently from previous studies we manipulated arousal within-subjects. This may have 
provided participants information about experimenter’s aim, encouraging the searching of strategies 
to deal with the task (on this point see Kahneman, 2003).Third, there could be some cultural 
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differences in the way people experience positive arousal. On this regard, it should be noted that the 
current study and studies described in chapter 4 and 5 have been conducted on different populations 
(Americans vs. Italians). Fourth, contrary to previous studies presented in this dissertation, the 
current study was not incentivized, this might have reduced participants’ motivation to perform the 
task consistently with their own preferences. These, or others factors, may have make the effect of 
arousal on risky choice not replicable for this experiment.  
Importantly, eye tracking data are more informative about a possible explanation about the 
relationship between arousal and risk taking. Consistently with previous evidence (Lang et al., 
1993) and with the result found in the current study on decision times, we found that participants 
looked at arousing stimuli longer than unarousing stimuli. This data is in line with arousal theories 
of attention which show that arousing stimuli are capable of capturing attention (Anderson, 2005). 
Furthermore, we found that in the arousing trials participants looked at risky information (monetary 
values) less than in the unarousing trials. We can conclude that arousal influenced the way 
participants paid attention to and then the way they processed risky information. Such effect of 
arousal on visual attention is consistent with the cognitive depletion hypothesis (Fedorikhin & 
Patrick, 2010) and may be related to what in literature has been defined as the interference effect of 
arousal: i.e. arousing stimuli presented in concomitance with the execution of a cognitive task may 
interfere with individual performance (e.g. Gronau et al., 2003; Schimmack & Derryberry, 2005).  
Evidence show that a reduced cognitive capacity is accompanied by an altered sensitivity to 
rewards which triggers increased risk taking (e.g. Ferrara et al., 2015; Killgore, Kamimori, & 
Balkin, 2011; Venkatraman, Clithero, Fitzsimons, & Huettel, 2012). Experiencing high levels of 
positive arousal has been linked to increased anticipatory desire for rewards (Knutson et al., 2008). 
This may explain the increase in risk taking behavior in conditions of high positive arousal found in 
previous studies (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Galentino et al., submitted; Laier et al., 2013). 
However, we cannot state that less processing of risky information is associated with increased 
sensitivity to rewards since participants did not look at the riskier option longer. Conversely, they 
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looked at the riskier option less. At the same time, we cannot conclude that cognitive depletion lead 
participants to make a superficial processing of choice options. If it was so, they would have looked 
less to all information, but this was not the case. Future studies may help to fill the gap between 
information processing of risk and risk taking behavior. 
In summary, we found that incidental arousal, induced through the exposure to pleasant 
arousing contextual cues, influenced decision times, as well as individual’s visual attention and 
information processing of choice option (as resulted from reduced looking times toward riskier 
gamble during arousing trials). This evidence suggests that a pleasant and arousing cue inserted as a 
contextual factor of a decisional scenario is able to influence individual attention, information 
processing and, in some cases, individual’s preference for choice options. 
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Part III 
Conclusion 
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Every time you decide, there is a loss, no matter how you decide.  
It’s always a question of what you cannot afford to lose 
 
F. X. Stork 
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CHAPTER 8 
General Discussion 
 
Through the experimental work presented in this dissertation I studied the influence of 
incidental affective states on decision making under risk, in particular, I explored the role of 
affective arousal on shaping preferences for economic risk. I systematically examined the effect of 
experimentally inducing high or low levels of incidental positive and negative arousal, elicited 
through the exposure to affective-eliciting peripheral cues inserted as part of the decision context, 
on preferences for monetary offers varying in risk. For all studies presented in the four papers 
reported here I adopted the same methodological framework. Participants were required to play a 
risk taking task where they had to choose between couples of two-outcomes lotteries varying in risk 
(as determined by the variance between the two monetary payoffs) but equivalent in their expected 
value and, in paper 1 and 2, also in probability. Arousal (high/low) was manipulated (between 
subjects – paper 1 and 2 – or within subjects – paper 3 and 4) by presenting participants with 
emotional images (IAPS pictures), selected according to the affective norms, varying in the levels 
of positive arousal (paper 1, 2 and 4) or negative arousal (paper 1 and 3) and inserted as contextual 
factor of the decision scenario (contextual priming). Results from studies presented here seem to 
converge on the fact that affective arousal matters and it does influence individual’s risk 
preferences. In particular, experiencing an elevated tone of arousal may increase risk taking 
behavior, even though in some cases this effect may intecarct with gender and valence  (see paper 1, 
chapter 4): in one instance we found that positive arousal (but not negative) increased risk taking 
only in males (but decreased it in femanles).  
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These findings confirm existing evidence about the role of arousal on decision making, 
showing that experiencing high intensity affective states (pleasant or unpleasant) may lead people to 
adopt a risk prone behavior.  
As I explained earlier, it is not surprising to find that both positive and negative arousal have 
similar effects on risk taking since both form of arousal (or stress) elicit the same physiological 
changes through the activity of the autonomic nervous system. Therefore, to the extent that 
physiological reactions are the same it is reasonable to expect that also the behavior would be the 
same.  
However, in this dissertation I made a step further to try to understand the mechanism 
underlying the effect of arousal on risk preferences. I tested an attentional-cognitive depletion 
hypothesis, according to which high-arousing contextual stimuli capture attention and leave less 
cognitive resources to the task at hand. I wished to demonstrate that less cognitive resources meant 
less attention to the risk information and hence, less protective, risk-averse reactions towards risk. 
Results from studies presented in paper 3 (chapter 6) and 4 (chapter 7) show that inserting the 
arousing stimuli as part of the decision scenario was able to capture visual attention and to influence 
the way people process risk information. In particular, as it has been shown in paper 4 (chapter 7), 
under conditions of elevated (positive) arousal, participants looked at the riskier gamble less, maybe 
because distracted by the presence of the arousing stimuli considered as the most relevant stimuli. 
Furthermore, this was not the case for the safer gamble. Looking times calculated for fixations 
toward the safer option were identical in both conditions of high and low arousal. This suggests that 
my hypothesis could be right: high arousal may lead people to process risky information in a more 
superficial way.  
Many researchers already argued that a condition of elevated arousal represents an instance 
of cognitive depletion in which cognitive resources are minimized (see section 2.4.1 of this 
dissertation). If pure cognitive depletion was the explanation for the effect of arousal on risk taking 
I would have found that, when induced to experience an high arousal affective state, participants 
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would look less to all the information, thus resulting in a more superficial processing of both choice 
options (the safer option and the riskier option). But, this was not the case. As I show in the last 
study (paper 4, chapter 7) participants processed less only the riskier information when this was 
contextually presented with an arousing stimuli, but not the safer information. Therefore, increased 
risk taking under conditions of elevated arousal is not only due to cognitive depletion, at least for 
the studies presented here.  
Some authors, argued that a consequence of the reduced cognitive capacity is an altered 
sensitivity to rewards. If this was true,  participants should look longer at higher rewards, but this 
was not the case.  
A  second important results from these studies is that, for both positive and negative arousal, 
participants looked at arousing stimuli longer than unarousing stimuli (see paper 3, chapter 6 and 
paper 4, chapter 7). Since in this experimental work incidental arousal was elicited through 
contextual features presented in association with choice options, I may conclude that the reduced 
processing of risky information might be a consequence of the increased attention directed toward 
the arousing stimuli. Nevertheless, the reason for why a reduced information processing of risk may 
lead to increased risk taking behavior remains still an unsolved problem and future studies adopting 
the same experimental protocol I adopted in this work may help to fill this gap. Some, indeed, could 
argue that rik information is more difficult to process than sfe information, and hence, a simple 
cognitive depletion hypothesis could explain individual behaviors.     
Elements of novelties from this experimental work are various. First, in this work I assessed 
the role of arousal on risk taking keeping the valence controlled (positive or negative) and using the 
same task across all studies. Thus, I was able to test the effect of positive and negative arousal on 
risk taking separately making results more generalizable and comparable across conditions.  
Second, I extended the scientific investigation about the influence of arousal on risk taking 
to the domain of positive affect which has often been ignored from previous studies. On this point, 
precedent studies mostly studied the effect of sexual arousal (which is considered a specific form of 
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positive arousal) and most of them used male samples only. In studies presented here samples were 
balanced in terms of gender and different activators of positive arousal have been used (i.e. erotic 
stimuli but also stimuli inducing feelings of happiness, joy, enjoyment and so forth).  
Third, due to the arousal manipulation adopted in this experimental work (i.e. the exposure 
to affective eliciting pictures) I was able to manipulate both valence and arousal avoiding the 
induction of one specific kind of emotion (e.g. fear or happiness). Furthermore, in all studies 
presented in this dissertation, after completing the risk taking task participants played the affective 
experienced task in which they were asked to report the levels of experienced valence and arousal in 
response to all stimuli used for the affective manipulation. In this way, I was able to double-check 
the efficacy of the arousal induction and I was able to estimate the effect of arousal on risk 
preferences controlling for differences in the levels of experienced valence and arousal.  
Fourth, with the use of the eye tracker I was able to collect data about participants’ gaze 
direction and record looking times (paper 3 and 4). In this way I was able to investigate the effect of 
arousal on visual attention. Moreover, I could test the presence of an interference effect of arousal 
on the processing of risk information. 
There are also some limitations to this experimental work. First, the use of IAPS pictures for 
arousal manipulation represent a good way to study the influence of incidental affect (i.e. affective 
states unrelated to the decision at hand) on choice but at the same time it is not a powerful arousal 
activator since people are repeatedly exposed to emotional visual stimuli which can be find on the 
TV, Internet, newspapers and so on. This contributes to create a sort of habituation effect which 
may have made the affective manipulation less efficient. Second, studies presented in paper 1 and 2 
were incentivized, while studies presented in paper 3 and 4 were not. This makes studies less 
comparable and may explain some inconsistencies found among them. Third, different populations 
of subjects have been recruited for this research project. Studies described in paper 1 and 2 have 
been conducted on a sample of Italian undergraduate students while studies described in paper 3 
and 4 have been conducted on a sample of American undergraduate students. Such discrepancy 
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carries over a series of cultural issues related to differences in risk perception and risk taking 
behavior, differences in the way people experience affect and emotions as well as heightened or 
reduced gender differences.  
8.1 Practical implications 
Even though the effect of affective arousal on decision making has been largely ignored 
from previous experimental studies, experts in the field of marketing repeatedly seek to induce 
high-intensity emotions in consumers which could be associated to a specific consumer good and 
experienced as a reaction to it. As it has been illustrated in chapter 2 of this dissertation, arousal can 
be easily misattributed or transferred to unrelated objects or events when the source of arousal is 
associated to the object of the decision and is experienced as a reaction to that. Similarly to the way 
we manipulated arousal in our studies (contextual priming), the simultaneous presentation of the 
consumer good and the contextual arousing stimuli can influence consumers’ decisions, for 
example by anticipating future emotions related to that specific good. Such strategy has been 
largely exploited by marketing companies especially in advertising. A case can clearly explain this. 
In 2009 a famous brand of beer made a new TV commercial showing a naked woman lying face 
down with a bottle of beer on her back (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 11. TV commercial of a famous beer brand. 
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The scene shows the woman moving making the bottle  swing in a lateral direction. Subsequently, it 
shows hands of men taking the bottle from different angles and placing it back on the woman’s 
back. Therefore, the commercial clearly shows a sexual act between people in order to elicit a state 
of excitement in consumers in a way to make them experience it, as a response to the beer. To make 
this clearer, at the end of the commercial a label is displayed, citing “Share it one with a friend. Or 
two.” Aim of the TV commercial was to elicit sexual arousal in consumers so that it could be easily 
be transferred to the product (the beer) by anticipating future pleasures deriving from drinking it. In 
a similar way, other marketing companies resorted to the strategy of introducing arousing 
contextual stimuli in commercials in order to make products more desirable. For example, cars 
advertisings often include beautiful women or high-speed driving scenarios; liquors advertisings 
often present scenes of people having fun or partying in clubs; and so on and so forth. Since every 
choice we make in our daily life is not risk-free, evidence from this experimental work result of 
interests for the developing of new marketing strategies. More important, it is of relevance also for 
consumers in order to make them aware of the mechanisms through which arousal, or more in 
general affect and emotions have impact on our choices. 
8.1 Concluding remarks 
To conclude, the research presented throughout this dissertation highlights the importance of 
assessing both dimensions of valence and arousal when affective state is used as explanatory 
variable of differences in individual risk preferences. In particular, this experimental work 
demonstrates that incidental affective states characterized by high levels of positive and negative 
arousal may influence attention allocation, may absorb cognitive resources and influence the way 
risky information are processed. This may lead people to increase risk taking behavior. This 
research has relevance for studies which currently seek to understand the mechanisms which 
underlie the interplay between affect and cognition which is still poorly understood. Furthermore, 
several life decisions (e.g. purchases, insurance choice, financial investments, healthcare, and so 
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forth) are influenced by decision maker’s current mood and involve a significant emotional trade-
off. Therefore, the understanding of such mechanisms would provide valuable insights into the 
development of policies and interventions for improving marketing strategies as well as decision 
making.  
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